Sources of intuitive and deliberative decisions: the role of implicit and explicit motives by Okvitawanli, Ayu
  
 
 
 
Sources of Intuitive and Deliberative Decisions:  
The Role of Implicit and Explicit Motives 
 
 
 
Dissertation 
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades 
doctor philosophiae (Dr. phil.) 
 
________________________________________________________________ 
vorgelegt dem Rat der Fakultät für Sozial- und Verhaltenswissenschaften 
der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena 
von Ayu Okvitawanli, MSc., BCogSc. 
geboren am 06.10.1990 in Yogyakarta 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Gutachter 
1. ________________________________ 
2. ________________________________ 
________________________________ 
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: _____________________ 
Intuitive and Deliberative Decisions | II  
Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... V 
Summary .....................................................................................................................................VII 
Zusammenfassung....................................................................................................................... IX 
1 Theoretical Introduction ............................................................................................................1 
1.1 Manipulations, Characteristics, Outcomes and Explanations of Intuitive/Deliberative 
Decisions  .....................................................................................................................................4 
1.1.1  Manipulations of Intuitive/Deliberative Modes  ............................................................4 
1.1.2 Characterisics of Intuitive/Deliberative Decisions  .........................................................5 
1.1.3 Outcomes of Intuitive/Deliberative decisions  ................................................................7 
1.1.4 Explanations of  intuitive/deliberative decisions  ............................................................8 
1.2 Implicit and Explicit Motives as Sources of Intuitive and Deliberative Decisions  ..............9 
1.3 Hypotheses   .........................................................................................................................12 
1.4 Overview of Studies   ...........................................................................................................14 
2 Empirical Studies ......................................................................................................................16 
2.1 Pilot Study  ...........................................................................................................................16 
2.1.1 Method ...........................................................................................................................16 
2.1.2 Results ...........................................................................................................................20 
2.1.3 Discussions ....................................................................................................................21 
2.2 Experiment 1 ........................................................................................................................22 
2.2.1 Method ...........................................................................................................................22 
2.2.2 Results ...........................................................................................................................27 
2.2.3 Discussions ....................................................................................................................31 
2.3 Experiment 2 ........................................................................................................................33 
2.3.1 Method ...........................................................................................................................33 
2.3.2 Results ...........................................................................................................................35 
2.3.3 Discussions ....................................................................................................................37 
2.4 Experiment 3 ........................................................................................................................38 
2.4.1 Method ...........................................................................................................................38 
2.4.2 Results ...........................................................................................................................42 
Intuitive and Deliberative Decisions | III  
 
2.4.3 Discussions ....................................................................................................................47 
2.5 Experiment 4 ........................................................................................................................48 
2.5.1 Method ...........................................................................................................................48 
2.5.2 Results ...........................................................................................................................52 
2.5.3 Discussions ....................................................................................................................55 
2.6 Joint Analysis: Meta-Analysis across Studies ......................................................................56 
3 General Discussions ..................................................................................................................60 
3.1 Measurement Issue of Implicit Motive ................................................................................60 
3.1.1 Multi-Motive Grid .........................................................................................................60 
3.1.2 Implicit Association Test ...............................................................................................61 
3.1.3 Picture Story Exercise ...................................................................................................65 
3.2 Distinction between Intuitive and Deliberative Decisions ...................................................65 
3.2.1 When is intuitive mode activated? ................................................................................66 
3.2.2 When activated which conditions determine which process affect behavior? ..............67 
3.2.3 Which motivational sources influence and drive which process? .................................68 
3.3 Do Implicit Motives Predict Decisions? ..............................................................................68 
3.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................70 
References .....................................................................................................................................71 
Appendices ....................................................................................................................................78 
Appendix A: Material Set for Pilot Study 1 ...............................................................................78 
Appendix A.1 Multi-Motive Grid (Sokolowski et al., 2000) .................................................78 
Appendix A.2 Achievement Motives Scale (Lang & Fries, 2006) ........................................86 
Appendix A.3 Intuitive and Deliberative Instructions ...........................................................87 
Appendix A.4 Decision Tasks ...............................................................................................88 
Appendix B: Experiment 1 .........................................................................................................92 
Appendix B.1 Unified Motive Scales (Schünbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012) ............................93 
Appendix B.2 Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005) ..................................................96 
Appendix B.3 Post-Decision Questionnaire ...........................................................................96 
Appendix B.4 Preference for Intuition and Deliberation (Betsch, 2004) ...............................97 
Appendix B.5 Decision Tasks ................................................................................................98 
Intuitive and Deliberative Decisions | IV  
Appendix B.6 Correlations between Motives Measures (MMG & UMS) ...........................101 
Appendix C: Summary of Mismatch Regressions ...................................................................102 
Appendix C.1 Summary of Mismatch Regressions for Experiment 1 .................................102 
Appendix C.2 Summary of Mismatch Regressions for Experiment 2 .................................105 
Appendix C.3 Summary of Mismatch Regressions for Experiment 3 .................................106 
Appendix C.4 Summary of Mismatch Regressions for Experiment 4 .................................108 
Appendix D: Alternative Moderator Variable..........................................................................108 
Appendix E: Decision Task Instructions for Experiment 2  ....................................................109 
Appendix F: Experiment 3 .......................................................................................................110 
Appendix F.1 Decision Task Instructions for Experiment 3 ................................................110 
Appendix F.2 Implicit Association Test Material for Experiment 3 ....................................111 
Appendix G: Experiment 4 ......................................................................................................112 
Appendix G.1 Implicit Association Test Material for Experiment 4 ...................................112 
Appendix G.2 Picture Story Exercise ...................................................................................113 
Appendix H: Correlations between Implicit and Explicit Motives on Choices and Ratings of 
Motive Options across Intuitive and Deliberative Conditions in Four Studies ........................118 
 
 
 
Intuitive and Deliberative Decisions | V  
Acknowledgements  
 
It still feels unreal that I am writing this acknowledgements page. I would like to thank 
Prof. Dr. Klaus Rothermund for his supervision of this dissertation. We both know the 
space here can’t quite cover our story. I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Oliver Kirchkamp 
for his willingness to assess this dissertation in such a short notice. I thank the Jena 
Graduate School of „Human Behaviour in Social and Economic Change“, the 
International Max Planck Research School for Adapting Behaviour in a Fundamentally 
Uncertain World and the Department of General Psychology II, Friedrich-Schiller 
University Jena. Without the supports of these institutions I would not have had the 
chance to take up this endeavor.  
 
And what an endeavor it indeed was. Without being surrounded by colleagues, friends 
and family, it was simply impossible. My eternal thanks to Dr. Benedikt Werner, a 
generous friend. I thank you for open ears, engaging conversation and accompany 
throughout numerous lectures, workshops and conferences in game theory and game 
practice alike. I also thank all the colleagues within the General Psychology II, Dr. 
Florian Müller, Dr. Franziska Meißner, Dr. Carina Giessen, Dr. Susanne Schwager, Dr. 
Nils Meier, Swanje Puls and Peggy Voß. The intellectual prowess that the department 
own incite both envy and gratefulness. I am thankful for your help and for the 
dedication of all the student assistants in running the multitude of experiments.  
 
I thank my co-authors of a different paper, Dr. Marian Panganiban and Dr. Alexia 
Gaudeul. The fresh ideas and enthusiasm were direly needed and the two of you are 
simply fantastic, I am looking forward for more Mc. Donald’s collaboration. I thank all 
colleagues from the IMPRS Uncertainty. My officemates Laura Lyhs and Giorgi 
Jvarsheishvili, Dr. Susanne Büchner, Dr. Olexandr Nikolaychuk, Dr.  Magdalena 
Kaczmarek and of course, Judith and Mike Farjam. Your enthusiasm made me love science 
all over again. I am absolutely happy for this fantastic year you are having. 
Congratulations, congratulations and congratulations, each for its very own deserved 
achievement. 
 
Jena is a wonderful place. And like normally, I took it for granted. How I miss having a 
dozen people with PhDs hanging around in every coffee corner. I would like to thank 
Karen Bondoc for her ever present support and a bed to sleep for each visit. I thank my 
dear Indonesian community, Elvin, Reyna, Bianca, Edo, Fira, Putra for reminding me of 
Indonesian hospitality, one of a kind. I thank Clara, Sebastian, Hertie, Elli and Dennis 
for bringing me Catalonian, Turkish and German hospitality. 
Intuitive and Deliberative Decisions | VI  
 
Of course, I am eternally grateful to Prof. Dr. Diana Boer. You are simply wonderful. 
Your humor, your open-mindedness, your knowledge, your experience, your kind and 
caring outlook, I could not imagine a better boss. I am looking forward to our ongoing 
and future projects. I would also like to thank the many scientists that have opened 
their mind for me to probe as well as sharing valuable life advices, Prof. Dr. Oliver 
Schultheiss, Prof. Dr. Andreas Glöckner, Prof. Dr. Thomas Kessler, Prof. Dr. Johannes 
Keller, Prof. Dr. Andreas Mojzisch and lecturers of IMPRS Summer Schools, IMPRS 
Workshops and various Conferences.  
 
I thank Daniel Gremore for his willingness to do a grammar proof-reading. I still long 
for the day we finally meet again. I thank my best friends, Stanislaw Zeitlin and Elisa 
Cheng. You are the threads that bind me across continents. Thank you for always being 
just a phone call away. I thank Pinky Fong and Anis Matsham for being my soulmates 
in caring for social issues, education and humanities. The CDA time is always the most 
memorable for me. I can’t wait to see what we can make for the future.  
 
I thank my Koblenz buddies that are welcoming and understanding of the whole 
strange academic life. I thank Isabelle, Sama, Maren, Emko, Micha, Laura, Vanessa and 
Jan.  
 
I thank my family. I thank my mother whose largest gift is letting me go. It is not a 
thing that any mother can do. I thank my invincible, determined, extraordinary father 
whose good wills and good deeds must have been the cause for all my good fortunes. I 
thank my grandmother whose visions are well past her generations. I thank my 
cunning and stunning sister, Bryna Meivitawanli and my way too mature Cahyani 
Fortunitawanli. The world is open for you and I know you two will live the most 
extraordinary lives.  
 
I thank Mutti and Vatti and Katja for giving me a family. I thank God, mysterious as it 
is, yet still I believe.  
 
Last but not least, I thank Dr. Ing. Martin Fischer. I am clueless, confused and 
sometimes mean yet you always bring laugher and sunshine to our shared life. What 
else could I ask for? Thank you for your patience, dedication and never ending support. 
Indeed it is time for our next project (yes, it’s a Yes!). 
 
 
Intuitive and Deliberative Decisions | VII  
Sources of Intuitive and Deliberative Decisions: 
The Role of Implicit and Explicit Motives 
 
Abstract: 
 
The question of underlying (motivational) sources of decisions has largely been neglected within 
both psychology and economics. This dissertation aims to understand the ‘what’ of decision 
making by connecting two fields of research that have up to now been studied independently and 
in isolation: Intuitive/Deliberative Decisions and Dual-Motive Theory. The dual-motive theory 
proposes two kinds of underlying motivational sources: Implicit and Explicit Motives. While 
implicit motives are non-declarative, affective-based and partially an innate-system, explicit 
motives are declarative, cognitively elaborate and a socially-influenced system. This dissertation 
proposes that intuitive decisions are driven by implicit motives while deliberative decisions are 
driven by explicit motives.  
 
These two hypotheses were tested empirically across four experiments. Throughout the 
experiments, intuitive and deliberative decision modes were induced via instructions. Depending 
on whether decisions were made intuitively or deliberatively we expect either the implicit or the 
explicit motives to predict decisions. Decisions were in the form of scenarios with options 
corresponding to Achievement, Affiliation and Power motives. 
 
 Contrary to our hypothesis, we did not find differences depending on the decision mode. 
Regardless of whether decisions were made intuitively or deliberatively, explicit motives 
predicted decisions and implicit motives did not predict decisions. The fact that implicit motives 
did not predict decisions could mean that (a) it is not implicit motives that drive intuitive 
decisions or (b) it was not intuition which was assessed.  
 
Further examinations on implicit motive and decision making literature revealed that (a) while 
the influence of implicit motives has been shown in a variety of cognitive and behavioural 
indicators, the exact processes of how motives affect behaviors have not been properly addressed 
and (b) while the basic distinction between intuitive and deliberative may be clear  (intuitive 
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decisions are spontaneous and impulsive while deliberative decisions are explicit and conscious), 
it remains unclear when exactly each mode of decision making becomes activated. When 
activated and in conflict, current state of knowledge is insufficient to answer which conditions 
and variables determine which processes will translate into behavior. And finally, it remains 
inconclusive whether the conditions and variables influencing decision mode could be 
categorized into meaningful superordinate category such as the implicit/explicit motives.  
 
Keywords: Intuition, Deliberation, Implicit Motive, Explicit Motive, Decision Making, 
Motivation, Achievement, Affiliation, Power, Choices, Evaluations. 
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Ursachen von unbewussten und bewussten Entscheidungen: 
Die Rolle von impliziten und expliziten Motiven 
 
Zusammenfassung: 
 
Die Frage bezüglich der zugrunde liegenden (motivierenden) Ursachen von Entscheidungen 
wurde sowohl in der Psychologe als auch Ökonomie größtenteils vernachlässigt. Aus diesem 
Grund befasst sich diese Dissertationsschrift mit der Ursache der Entscheidungsfindung auf zwei 
Forschungsgebieten, welche bis zum gegenwärtigen Stand unabhängig und isoliert voneinander 
betrachtet worden sind. Bei den Forschungsgebieten handelt es sich um unbewusste/bewusste 
Entscheidungsfindung und duale Motivforschung. Die Theorie der dualen Motivforschung 
betrachtet zwei grundlegenden Arten von Motivationsquellen: implizite und explizite Motive. 
Implizite Motive sind durch eine nichtdeklarative Charakteristik gekennzeichnet, welche auf 
einem affektiven und teilweise angeborenen System basiert. Explizite Motive sind hingegen 
durch eine deklarative Charakteristik gekennzeichnet, welche auf einem kognitiv erarbeiteten 
und sozial beeinflussten System basiert.In der Dissertationsschrift werden zwei 
Entscheidungsmodelle betrachte: Unbewusste Entscheidungen werden durch implizite Motive 
angetrieben und bewusste Entscheidungen werden durch explizite Motive angetrieben.  
Beide Entscheidungsmodelle werden anhand von vier empirischen Untersuchungen verifiziert. In 
den Experimenten wurden sowohl unbewusste als auch bewusste Entscheidungen anhand von 
Anleitungen hervorgerufen. In Abhängigkeit von der jeweils unbewusst oder bewusst 
getroffenen Entscheidung wurden entweder implizite oder explizite Motive zur 
Entscheidungsfindung prognostiziert. Die Entscheidungen wurden anhand von Szenarien 
getroffen, welche den Themen Erfolg, Zugehörigkeit und Macht zuzuordnen waren.  
Anhand der Experimente konnten keine Unterschiede basierend auf den beiden 
Entscheidungsmodellen gefunden werden. Unabhängig von der jeweilig unbewusst oder bewusst 
getroffenen Entscheidung ließen sich explizite Motive vorhersagen und implizite Motive nicht 
vorhersagen. Die Ursache für die nicht Vorhersagbarkeit der impliziten Motive kann darauf 
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schließen, dass (a) unbewusste Entscheidungen nicht durch implizite Motive angetrieben werden 
oder (b) dass die Intuition nicht bewertet wurde.  
Anderweitige Untersuchungen haben in diesen Zusammenhang aufgezeigt, dass (a) trotz einer 
Beeinflussung der unbewussten Motive (anhand von Bewusstseins- und Verhaltensindikatoren) 
die exakten Prozesse zur Beeinflussung des Verhaltens nicht genau angesprochen worden sind. 
Weiterhin (b) kann zwar die grundlegende Unterscheidung zwischen unbewussten und 
bewussten Entscheidungen deutlich sein (unbewusste Entscheidungen sind spontan und impulsiv 
während bewusste Entscheidungen eindeutig und sorgfältig sind), allerdings bleibt es undeutlich 
wann genau welches Modell der Entscheidungsfindung aktiviert wird. Bei einer in Konflikt 
zueinander stehenden Aktivierung ist der gegenwärtige Wissensstand nicht ausreichend, um eine 
eindeutige Aussage über die Konditionen und Variablen zur Vorhersage des Verhaltens 
abzuleiten. Weiterhin kann nicht eindeutig bewiesen werden, ob die Bedingungen und Variablen 
der Entscheidungsmethodik in einer übergeordneten bedeutsamen Kategorie (wie 
implizite/explizite Motive) eingeordnet werden können. 
Schlagwörter: Intuition, Sorgfalt, implizite Motive, explizite Motive, Entscheidungsfindung, 
Motivation, Erfolg, Zugehörigkeit, Macht, Entscheidungen, Bewertungen. 
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Chapter 1 Theoretical Introduction 
 
This research aims at understanding the ‘what’ of decision making, a topic that has been 
notoriously neglected in economics and psychology. In economics, preferences have often been 
regarded as something completely arbitrary: Preferences are not explained or derived from basic 
motives, instead they are “revealed in the decisions that people make” (revealed preferences; 
Samuelson, 1947, 1948). The idea of revealed preference has permeated almost all economic 
theories, ranging from the demand and supply curve, the marginal rate of substitution and the 
rational choice theory. However, “with reference to their subjective nature, it is left unexplained 
… what it is that people have preferences for” (Witt, 2006). 
 
Secondly, the psychology of decision making has also neglected the ‘what’ dimension, and has 
focused only on the processes of information integration (e.g., Betsch & Glöckner, 2010) and 
optimal decision making (solving problems with a unique computational solution; e.g. 
Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006), and at best, has addressed conflicts between short term and long 
term incentives (time-dependent preference reversals, time discounting; e.g. Frederick et al., 
2002). Thus, both within psychology and economics, the question of underlying (motivational) 
sources of decisions has largely been neglected.   
 
What do human motivations consist of? Apart from basic needs such as eating and resting, 
McClelland (1987) introduced three underlying social/psychological motives, namely 
achievement, affiliation and power. The achievement motive refers to ‘the desire to accomplish 
something difficult, to excel one’s self, to overcome obstacles and to attain a high standard of 
performance (Murray, 1938). The affiliation motive refers to ‘the concern of establishing, 
maintaining, or restoring a positive emotional relationship with another person or group’ 
(Heynes et al, 1958, in Weinberger, Cotler & Fishman, 2010). The power motive refers to ‘the 
desire to influence, control, and impress others and to derive pleasure from receiving acclaim or 
recognition for these power-motivated behaviors’ (Fodor, 2010). 
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Even though all three motives are present in all individuals, motivation research has found 
different patterns of behaviors depending on whether individuals score high or low on these 
motives. Achievement-motivated individuals consistently choose to undertake tasks of moderate 
difficulty, as opposed to tasks that are too easy or too difficult (Atkinson, 1957). They exhibit 
persistence in a task after failure (McClelland et al., 1989) and their performances are either 
uncorrelated or inversely correlated with the presence and degree of extrinsic incentive (French, 
1955; McKeachie, 1961). Affiliative-motivated individuals on the other hand, are concerned with 
maintaining good relationships rather than reaching individual success (French, 1958). They 
spend as much time as possible engaging in social interactions (McClelland, 1985) and while 
they perform poorly in competitive tasks, they excel in tasks requiring team work (Karabenick & 
Miller, 1977; Moulton et al., 1958). Affiliative-motivated individuals more rapidly perceived 
visual cues related to human faces (Atkinson & Walker, 1956) and have a higher progesterone 
level after seeing an affiliative scene (Schultheiss, Wirth, & Stanton, 2004). Lastly, power 
motivated individuals are preoccupied with seeking and obtaining positions that will provide 
them with opportunities to exercise power. They seek close friends that are lower in recognition 
and status, as well as preferring unassertive, dependent wives (Winter, 1973). Politicians who are 
high in power motive continue their election campaigns even when winning is not possible 
indicating that they enjoyed the act of campaigning in and of itself (Winter, 1982). In a 
competitive contest, power-motivated individuals exhibit higher level of testosterone in events of 
success or anticipated success (Schultheiss, Campbell & McClelland, 1999). 
 
After decades of research, McClelland and colleagues in a seminal paper of 1989 summarized 
their research within the framework of dual-motive theory. Despite the pervasive influence of 
dominant motives on behaviors, individuals’ knowledge of their own motives may differ from 
their actual manifested motives. Motives as measured through projective methods (e.g. Thematic 
Apperception Test) predict long term trends of behavior. Achievement motive predicts 10 year-
long entrepreneurial activity in the United States (McClelland, 1965) and in India (McClelland, 
1987b), power motive predicts managerial success in major U.S. companies over 16 years 
(McClelland & Boyatzis, 1982) and affiliation motive predicts marital happiness and overall 
psychosocial adjustment over 17 years (McAdams & Vaillant, 1982). On the other hand, 
knowledge of motives, as measured through self-reported questionnaires, predicts immediate 
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incentive-sensitive behaviors such as intensity and performance shortly after announcement or 
reminder of extrinsic rewards (e.g. money). These differential predictions as well as consistent 
finding that motives measured in these two manners are uncorrelated (McClelland et al., 1989) 
led to the formation of two kinds of motives. Those measured projectively (Implicit Motives) are 
conceptualize as non-declarative, affective-based and partially-innate system, while those 
measured reflectively (via questionnaires) are conceptualize as declarative, cognitively elaborate 
and socially-influenced system (Explicit Motive).  
 
A similar duality is found within the decision making research. Decisions can be made either 
intuitively or deliberatively. Intuitive decisions come with ease, endow the decision maker with a 
conviction and the processes behind the decisions are elusive even to the decider. Deliberative 
decisions on the other hand, require laborious process in which the decision maker deliberately 
compares choices by weighing the pro and the contra of each option. Through this process, the 
decision maker is able to articulate reasons for why he comes to a decision. Intuitive decisions 
are commonly associated with emotion and feeling while deliberative decisions are commonly 
associated with rationality and cognition (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). The exact processes behind 
intuitive and deliberative decisions are an on-going debate. They have been identified as 
different information processing systems (Kahneman, 2011), evolved vs. learned mechanism 
(Gigerenzer & Selten, 2002), conscious vs. unconscious thinking (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 
2006) or as a part of the reflective or the impulsive system (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). 
 
Despite parallels characteristics, research connecting intuitive/deliberative decisions and 
implicit/explicit motives is rare. This dissertation aims to fill the gap, addressing the ‘what’ in 
decisions by connecting the two fields of research that have up to now been studied 
independently and in isolation. This dissertation will introduce the basic findings of the literature 
and empirically test the idea that deliberative decisions are driven by explicit motives, whereas 
intuitive decisions are driven by implicit motives.  
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1.1 Manipulations, Characteristics, Outcomes and 
Explanations of Intuitive/Deliberative Decisions 
 
In this segment, the manners in which intuitive/deliberative mode have been induced in 
experimental settings will be described. Secondly, criteria or characteristics of intuitive and 
deliberative decisions will be defined. Thirdly, outcomes or consequences of these choices will 
be briefly discussed. Fourthly, different accounts that explain the differences between 
intuitive/deliberative decisions will be presented. In closing, relevant aspects of decision mode 
for this dissertation will be mentioned.  
1.1.1  Manipulations of Intuitive/Deliberative Mode 
 
This segment will introduce several ways in which intuitive/deliberative mode have been 
induced or determined in experimental settings.  
 
Firstly, intuitive/deliberative mode has been induced via direct instruction (Wilson & Schooler, 
1991; Halberstadt & Levine, 1999). In inducing via direct instruction, it is assumed that 
participants are able to select themselves into deciding via different decision modes. Intuitive 
manipulations instruct participants to make their decisions spontaneously and without second 
thought. Decisions should be made based on first impression and gut feelings. Additionally, 
participants were asked to make their decisions as fast as possible. On the other hand, 
deliberative manipulations instruct participants to make their decisions deliberatively. They were 
requested to weigh the pros and cons of different options,  to carefully consider their decisions 
and to explicitly state the reasons for deciding for one option and against another option. 
Additionally, they were given a considerable amount of time in which they could deliberate their 
decisions.  
 
Secondly, the intuitive condition was induced by reducing cognitive resources available to 
perform deliberative processes. This manipulation follows from the assumed characteritic of 
deliberation, namely that it needs cognitive resources to function. Cognitive resources reduction 
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is implemented using time pressure (Rand et al., 2012; Tinghög et al., 2013) and/or cognitive 
load. In the case of time pressure, participants are given a small time window in which they 
should decide. This is usually emphasized by presenting participants a count down of time left 
for decisions. Cognitive loads are either achieved by giving participants a large amount of 
information (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008) or by occupying their working memory (e.g., making 
decisions while paying attention to a second task; Gilbert et al., 1993; Greene et al., 2008). 
Deliberative condition is thus induced by providing enough resources and time to perform the 
specific tasks.  
 
Thirdly, whether participants have decided intuitively or deliberatively was categorized post-hoc 
by asking them how they have decided (similar to a manipulation check) or by administering the 
Cognitive Reflection Task (Frederick, 2005). This method of categorization is frequently used to 
examine the effect of decision modes on other variables as opposed to understanding the 
processes behind the decisions (Greene, 2008 on moral decisions; Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2011 
on financial trading). 
 
Lastly, intuitive/deliberative modes have been induced via priming which should shift the 
likelihood of participants in deciding intuitively or deliberatively. To illustrate, Butler, Guiso and 
Jappelli (2013) asked participants to briefly describe (ten) situations in which they have relied on 
their intuition (or deliberation) to make a decision and that doing it this way turned out to be the 
correct thing to do.  
 
1.1.2 Characterisics of Intuitive/Deliberative Decisions 
 
Decisions made intuitively have been characterized as being driven by feelings and emotions 
(Epstein, 2008), as being processed fast and automatically (Kahneman, 2011), as being non-
verbal in nature and as being resistant to change (Dane & Pratt, 2009). It has been proposed that 
intuitive decision making is capable of processing a large amount of information while 
consuming little or no cognitive resources through the use of parallel and holistic processing 
(Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; Betsch & Glöckner, 2010). 
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Decisions made deliberatively, on the other hand, are driven by conscious effort of making 
comparisons and drawing logical inferences, which is why they are laborious and slow, but are 
reasoned and precise (Kahneman, 2011). Deliberative decisions require cognitive resources and 
thus they are compromised when resources are unavailable, such as under time pressure or 
cognitive load conditions (see, e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & 
Deutsch, 2004). Deliberative processing focuses on only a small amount of information, works in 
a serial manner and the processes in which one comes to a deliberate decision are often 
transparent. This transparency enables objective inspections and thus provides good estimates of 
facts and external factors (Wilson & Schooler, 1991). Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of 
intuitive and deliberative decisions (taken from Evans & Stanovich, 2013). 
  
Table 1 Clusters of Attributes Frequently Associated With Dual-Process and Dual-System 
Theories of Higher Cognition 
Type 1 process (intuitive) Type 2 process (reflective) 
Defining features 
Does not require working memory Requires working memory 
Autonomous Cognitive decoupling; mental simulation 
Typical correlates 
Fast Slow 
High capacity Capacity limited 
Parallel Serial 
  Nonconscious   Conscious 
  Biased responses   Normative responses 
  Contextualized   Abstract 
  Automatic   Controlled 
  Associative   Rule-based 
  Experience-based decision making   Consequential decision making 
  Independent of cognitive ability   Correlated with cognitive ability 
  System 1 (old mind)   System 2 (new mind) 
  Evolved early   Evolved late 
  Similar to animal cognition   Distinctively human 
  Implicit knowledge   Explicit knowledge 
  Basic emotions   Complex emotions 
Taken from Evans, J. S. B., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013). Dual-process theories of higher cognition 
advancing the debate. Perspectives on Psychological Science,8(3), 223-241.   
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1.1.3 Outcomes of Intuitive/Deliberative decisions 
 
With regards to outcomes, research on intuitive/deliberative decisions has sometimes shown that 
intuitive decisions are better than deliberative decisions (Wilson & Schooler, 1991). They are 
better because they somehow conform to the ‘true attitudes’ that individuals have (Wilson, 
Lindsey & Schooler, 2000). Wilson and Schooler let participants decide in either modes a variety 
of strawberry jams and a variety of posters. In the strawberry jams experiment, they found that 
intuitive compared to deliberative decisions corresponded better to experts’ opinions. In the 
posters experiment, participants’ decisions were evaluated in light of their own future preference: 
Participants who decided intuitively like their choice more a couple of weeks later as compared 
to those who decided deliberatively. Halberstadt and Levin (1999) also found that future 
predictions of experts were more accurate when made intuitively as compared to deliberatively, 
by asking basketball experts to predict the upcoming game results in either modes. 
 
In a similar vein, Dijksterhuis & Nordgren (2006) conducted a series of experiments 
documenting that distracting participants before completing decision tasks led to more accurate 
decisions. In this case, accurate decisions refered to selecting option that has a higher total 
number of positive relative to negative characteristics (e.g. car A vs. car B, roommate A vs. 
roommate B). Betsch & Glöckner (2010) have also shown that with online distractions 
(attention-grabbing advertisements that are run simultaneously with the target information), 
participants in the intuitive compared to the deliberative conditions were more accurate in 
integrating information and selecting better options. Better options (financial stocks) refered to 
the ones with a higher total amount of profit.  
 
In contrast to these positive outlooks, intuitive decisions have also been found to lead to short-
sighted decisions (Kahneman, 2011) or that impulsive behaviours serve only short and not long-
term goals (Nederkoorn et al., 2007). Asking participants to write a random high or low number 
before an estimation (e.g. digits from their social security number) led to a corresponding over or 
under-estimation of products’ prices and other factual information (e.g. population of different 
cities). This phenomena has been termed the anchoring effect (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
Similarly, changing irrelevant aspect of a problem such as whether it was presented in terms of 
Intuitive and Deliberative Decisions | 8 
losses or gains significantly changed the resulting behaviors (Tversky & Kahneman, 1979). Even 
experts are proned to such biases. Medical doctors dealing daily with prevalence statistics were 
grossly mistaken when presented with probabilites as opposed to frequency information 
(Hoffrage & Gigerenzer, 1998).  
 
One might argue that these biases apply more broadly to thinking in general as opposed to only 
intuitive decisions. Indeed these biases are robust, meaning that even in deliberation it is hard to 
avoid the pitfall of the anchoring effect or the emotional burden of loss versus gain. As a result, 
participants might believe they are deliberating while their thinking is still being led by the 
corresponding biases. However, an explicit warning of these pitfalls as well as a prolong 
deliberation allow for manual corrections of these decisions. Thus, even though these biases 
might be ‘natural’ to thinking, they serve to illustrate that intuitive impulses could lead us astray.  
 
Absent from all these studies is the influence of intuitive impulses with regards to self. When the 
goodness of a decision rests not on factual accuracy but on congruency with own preference and 
attitudes, will the intuitive mode be of help or of hinderance? 
 
1.1.4 Explanations of  intuitive/deliberative decisions 
 
Explanation of the differences in intuitive and deliberative decisions came in many forms. While 
some believe that intuitive and deliberative decisions stemmed from two distinct systems, others 
simply utilize the distinction without making any claim on the exact nature of the systems (e.g. 
the two modes can come from a single system or from combinations of different systems). Many 
articles have been devoted to review the dual (distinct) systems variety (see Evans, 2003, 2008, 
2011; Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). In this segment we will briefly 
review different theories accounting for intuitive and deliberative decisions.  
 
Kahneman (2011) adheres to the view that there are two parallel information processing systems 
in human: System 1, the default intuitive system managing day-to-day activities and System 2, 
the deliberative and rational system allowing for an informed, reasoned decision. Gigerenzer 
(2007) adheres to a similar but modified view that System 1 consists of smart evolved 
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mechanisms that are informed and reasoned given the appropriate circumstances. Dijksterhuis & 
Nordgren (2006) and Glöckner and Betsch (2008) focus on the characteristics of intuitive and 
deliberative decisions without making claims on whether the resulting patterns came from one or 
more systems. Strack and Deutsch (2004) focuses instead on the interaction between an 
impulsive (intuitive) system and a reflective (deliberative) system. With regards to decision 
making, Strack and Deutsch hold the view that intuitive system plays passive role by providing 
content for the reflective system, which in turn deliberates and controls the decision process. 
Lastly, Wilson, Lindsey and Schooler (2000) argued that intuitive decisions reflect a deeper, 
more essential attitude while deliberative decisions reflect a temporary attitude constructed from 
salient factors of the ongoing context.  
 
All these theories provided bases in which similarities were drawn between intuitive decisions 
and implicit motives as well as between deliberative decisions and explicit motives. Throughout 
the experiments, instructions will be used as main experimental manipulation (Wilson & 
Schooler, 1991), scenario-based decisions will be used as decision tasks (Dijksterhuis & 
Nordgren, 2006) and Kahneman/Tversky and Strack/Deutsch models will be discussed in light of 
the experimental results.  
 
1.2 Implicit and Explicit Motives as Sources of Intuitive and 
Deliberative Decisions 
 
Dual-motive theory proposed that there are two types of motivations, implicit and explicit 
motives. Implicit motives are stable, biologically driven affective preferences (McClelland et. al., 
1989). Satisfaction of implicit motives provides pleasure, whereas failing to satisfy implicit 
motives compromises well-being (Brunstein, Schultheiss & Grässman, 1998; Brunstein & Maier, 
2005). Implicit motives developed during infancy, before children acquired full language 
proficiency. They have been shown to influence operant behavior and they have been shown to 
predict long-term developmental outcomes. Explicit motives on the other hand, comprise of 
knowledge and beliefs about one’s own motives (McClelland et al., 1989). Explicit motives 
developed through cognitive processes and were shaped by social norms, by tangible rewards 
and by the maintenance of enduring beliefs that individuals hold, such as their self-concepts and 
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internalized social expectancies (see, e.g., McClleland et al., 1989; Schultheiss & Brunstein, 
2010). They are responsive to external incentives and they are better predictors of short-term, 
situation specific responses (respondent behavior; Langens, 1997; Brunstein, 2008).  
 
Importantly, research has shown repeatedly that implicit and explicit motives are independent 
and uncorrelated (Schultheiss & Brunstein, 2001; Spangler, 1992). The fact that they are 
uncorrelated means that it is possible to derive different behavioral predictions from implicit and 
explicit motives, which is a necessary condition for our hypotheses.  
To summarize, the dual motive theory proposed that there are two distinct but parallel motive 
systems: The Implicit and Explicit Motives. They have different developmental origins, are 
found to be independent or uncorrelated and they predict different classes of behaviors. Implicit 
motives predict spontaneous behavior while explicit motives predict respondent behaviors, those 
initiated by external demands and expectation of consequences (McClelland et al., 1989). 
 
We will now look at the similarities in 1) characteristics and 2) outcomes between the intuitive 
mode and the implicit motives as well as between the deliberative mode and the explicit motives.  
 
Intuitive mode and implicit motives share similar characteristics. Both are concerned with 
affective experiences and operate without awareness in influencing decisions and behavior. Both 
are not easily verbally expressed. The reasons behind intuitive decisions are often unknown to 
the decider and similarly, knowledge of one’s own implicit motives is not easily accessible. 
Intuitive processes are fast and work holistically. Holistic process and efficient processing are in 
turn highly suitable to mediate the effect of implicit motives on behavior. On the contrary, 
deliberative mode and explicit motives are concerned with maintaining consistency, are 
conscious and are more easily expressed. The processes involved in deliberative mode and 
explicit motives are more explicit and transparent in comparison to the processes involved in 
intuitive mode and implicit motive (Evan & Stanovich, 2013). Deliberative mode and explicit 
motives rely heavily on cognitive processes and are dependent on the availability of cognitive 
resources (Epstein, 2008; Schultheiss & Brunstein, 2010). Explicit motives often provide goals 
and goal states that individuals strive to attain. The deliberative mode is likely to mediate effects 
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of explicit motives on behavior because it is capable of drawing inferences and making 
comparisons of current and future states. 
 
Regarding outcomes, motivation research has shown that pursuing goals congruent with one’s 
own implicit motives lead to better adaptation, higher life satisfaction and higher efficiency of 
goal pursuit (Brunstein & Schultheiss, 1998). On the contrary, pursuing goals that reflect explicit 
(but not implicit) motives reduce well-being and compromise true, long-lasting satisfaction 
(Baumann, Kaschel & Kuhl, 2005). Similarly, according to Wilson & Schooler’s dual-attitude 
theory, intuitive decisions reflect ‘true attitudes’ while deliberative decisions reflect the salience 
of current context which might be independent from actual wants and needs. Through analogy, it 
seems plausible that intuitive decisions draw on implicit motives, whereas deliberative decisions 
draw on explicit motives. 
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1.3 Hypotheses  
 
Hypotheses put forward in this dissertation are: 
 
1) Decisions made in the intuitive mode draw their content from the implicit motives and  
2) Decisions made in the deliberative mode draw their content from the explicit motives. 
 
 
       Figure 1.1 Main Hypotheses 
 
These hypotheses will be tested across five experiments (a pilot and four main studies). The 
experiments share a basic rationale. In the first part of each study, implicit and explicit motives 
were assessed by their respective measures. In the second part, participants had to work on a 
series of decision tasks and an experimental manipulation forced them to make these decisions in 
either an intuitive or a deliberative manner (see Fig. 1.2). A crucial element of the decision tasks 
was that participants had to indicate their relative preference and evaluation for a set of three 
decision alternatives that represented each of the three basic motives: The first option reflects 
preference for achievement (e.g., performing challenging tasks, testing the limits of one’s own 
skills), the second option represents preference for affiliation (e.g., working together in a group, 
helping and sharing resources) and the third option expresses preference for power (e.g., having 
command over others, being praised by a large audience). 
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Figure 1.2 General procedure of experiments 1 to 4 
If the hypotheses were supported, it is expected that choices made in the intuitive condition will 
reflect the strength of the implicit motives while choices made in the deliberative condition will 
reflect the strength of the explicit motives. Specifically, it is expected that the probability to 
choose a particular motive-related option is a function of the strength of the corresponding 
(implicit or explicit) motive, but only if the mode of decision making (intuitive vs. deliberative) 
matches the nature of the motive (implicit vs. explicit). Stated differently, the decision modes 
will moderate the effect of implicit and explicit motives on choices (see Fig. 1.3. for a 
representation of expected results).  
 
Figure 1.3 Expected results if hypotheses were supported. The relationship should apply to each motive: 
Achievement, Affiliation and Power. 
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1.4 Overview of Studies  
 
In the pilot study, decision tasks were of the following format: Six scenarios with two options 
each were presented to the participants. These options described concrete activities reflecting 
either a low or a high level of the achievement motive. Participants’ task was to select the option 
they preferred. In the intuitive group, participants were instructed to make their decisions 
intuitively and as fast as they can. In the deliberative group, participants were instructed to make 
their decisions carefully and to list down reasons for their decisions. Reliability analyses showed 
that there were no consistencies in the answers of the participants across the six scenarios. 
Additionally, the scenarios were uncorrelated with the strength of the implicit as well as the 
explicit motives.  
In Experiment 1, the decision tasks were modified. Instead of concrete activities, options of each 
scenario now described opportunities to satisfy achievement, affiliation or power motives. 
Participants’ task was no longer to select between different degrees of one motive, rather their 
task was to select between the three different motives. Manipulation of intuitive/deliberative 
decision modes was induced in a similar way as in the pilot study (via instruction). We found 
evidence that contradicted our hypothesis. Implicit motives predicted choices and evaluations 
better in the deliberative as compared to the intuitive condition. This finding was found only for 
the power motive. No other significant interactions were found.  
In Experiment 2, intuitive and deliberative instructions were modified in the following way: 1) In 
the intuitive condition, participants were instructed to focus solely on feelings, to imagine 
themselves being in the described situation and to rely on their first impression. 2) In the 
deliberative condition, participants were instructed to think as carefully as possible, to consider 
how others will view their decisions and to state the consequences of their decisions. We found 
weak support for the deliberation hypothesis; explicit motives predicted evaluation better in the 
deliberative as compared to the intuitive condition. This finding was found only for the 
affiliation motive. No other significant interactions were found.  
In Experiment 3, we introduced a variant of the IAT as an additional measure of implicit 
motives. Our IAT measure did not predict choices, neither in the deliberative nor in the intuitive 
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condition. In Experiment 3, we again found that our implicit motive measure (Multi-Motive 
Grid) predicted ratings better in the deliberative as compared to the intuitive condition. This is a 
similar finding to Experiment 1 and it is contrary to the hypothesis. While in experiment 1 this 
effect was found in the power motive, in experiment 3 the result was found in the achievement 
motive.  
In Experiment 4, three main changes were implemented. First, in order to increase the power of 
our analysis, we dropped our deliberative condition and increased the sample size of our intuitive 
condition. Second, we modified our decision tasks in order to reduce direct comparison of 
choices and to allow for more spontaneous responses in the following manners: (1) Choices and 
evaluative ratings for the decision options were separated into two blocks. Only after participants 
made their choices across all scenarios, the liking ratings for those options were initiated. (2) 
Participants did not select between three motive options, participants considered each option 
separately instead and selected either wanting or not wanting to pursue the activity. (3) 
Participants were asked whether they felt excited/happy/powerful after reading the 
achievement/affiliation/power options. We also replaced the Multi-Motive Grid by Picture Story 
Exercise as the measure of implicit motives.  As an additional implicit motives measure, we 
administered Implicit Association Test (IAT). In experiment 4, we again found that only explicit 
motives significantly predicted choices and ratings of respective motives options. IAT results did 
not correlate with the implicit motives (measured by PSE) or with the explicit motives (measured 
by UMS) and did not predict decisions.  
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Chapter 2 Empirical Studies 
2.1 Pilot Study 
 
The pilot study aimed at testing the main hypotheses with regards to the achievement motive. 
Differential relations between motives and choice behaviors are expected depending on the 
choice condition, with implicit motives predicting intuitive choices and explicit motives 
predicting deliberative choices. Secondly, the study also aimed at testing the dependent variables 
that will be used in further experiments, namely the scenario-based decision tasks. Scenarios 
were created with options that are either high or low in the achievement motive content. If the 
scenarios captured this content well, we would expect a positive correlation between the 
frequency of high achievement choice and the achievement motive strength of the participants. 
Six scenarios were created and we expect choices of participants to be consistent across the 
scenarios. 
 
2.1.1 Method 
 
Participants 
 
Eighty students of the Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena took part in this paper-and-pen 
study ran in July 2012. Participation was rewarded with 2 Euro. 
 
Procedure 
 
The experiment started with an assessment of implicit and explicit motives (the order of these 
assessments was counterbalanced between participants). Following the assessment of motives, 
participants had to answer decision tasks either in the intuitive or the deliberative condition (the 
assignment of participants to conditions was made on a random basis). 
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As a measure of implicit motives the Multi-Motive Grid (Sokolowski et al., 2000) was used. As 
a measure of explicit motives the Achievement Motives Scale - Revised (Lang & Fries, 2006) 
was used. Both measurements measured hope and fear components of the achievement motive.  
Materials
1
  
 
 Motives Measure 
 
 Implicit Motives Measure:  Multi-Motive Grid (Sokolowski et al., 2000).  
 
The Multi-Motive Grid (MMG) measures hope and fear components of Achievement, Affiliation 
and Power motives. Fourteen pictures were presented to the participants in a fixed sequence. For 
each picture, a list of corresponding sentences was displayed. Participants’ task was to decide 
whether the sentences apply to the picture presented. For each sentence, participants responded 
with a ‘yes’ or a ‘no’. In total, there were 12 unique sentences that were presented repeatedly. 
Each motive component was represented by two sentences. To illustrate, “Feeling good about 
meeting other people” represented hope for affiliation and “Feeling good about one’s 
competence” represented hope for achievement. For each motive component, a sum of scores (1 
count for each ‘yes’) throughout the 14 pictures was computed. In this study, only the 
achievement motive (hope and fear component) was relevant. Hope for success score was 
calculated by aggregating (total sum) 12 statements across six relevant pictures (#1, #6, #7, #8, 
#10 and #12). Similarly, Fear of Failure score was calculated by aggregating 12 statements 
across six relevant pictures (#3, #4, #5, #6, #7 and #12). The reliability of hope for success scale 
was Cronbach’s α = .59, M = 6.90, SD = 2.07 and the reliability of fear for failure scale was α 
=.54, M = 4.00, SD = 2.32.  
 
Explicit Motives Measure: Achievement Motives Scale - Revised (Lang & Fries, 2006).  
The Achievement Motive Scale (AMS) is a 24-items questionnaire measuring hope and fear 
components of the Achievement motive. Participants indicated the extent to which each of the 
statements corresponds to themselves; ‘exactly like me’ to ‘very unlike me’ (4-point scale). The 
                                                          
1
 See Appendix A for the complete material set of Pilot Study 1. 
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AMS Revised version (AMS-R) reduced the 24 statements to 10 statements. Hope for Success 
score was calculated by averaging the agreement scores across statements such as “I enjoy 
situations, in which I can make use of my abilities”. Similarly Fear of Failure score was 
calculated by averaging the agreement scores across five statements such as “I feel uneasy to do 
something if I am not sure of succeeding”. In this study, reliability of hope for success scale was 
α = .60, M = 3.17, SD = .41 and reliability of fear of failure scale was .α = .81, M = 2.51, SD = 
.64.  
Table 1.1 Correlations between Multi-Motive Grid Hope for Success (HS) and Multi-Motive 
Grid Fear of Failure (FF) with Achievement Motive Scale (HS & FF). 
 MMG- HS MMG- FF AMS - HS AMS - FF 
MMG- HS -    
MMG- FF  .20 -   
AMS - HS  .01  -.22* -  
AMS - FF -.06 .19 -.03 - 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
Looking only at the matching motives (implicit HS and explicit HS, implicit FF and explicit FF), 
there were no significant correlations between implicit motives (measured by MMG) and explicit 
motives (measured by AMS). There is however a significant negative correlation between 
implicit fear of failure and explicit hope for success with r = -.22.  
 
 Experimental Manipulation 
 
The intuitive condition consisted of (1) information that making decisions using intuition is 
beneficial and making decisions using deliberation could be detrimental, (2) instruction for 
participants to decide intuitively during the remainder of the study by following their gut feelings 
and avoiding rational calculation. 
The deliberative condition consisted of (1) information that making decision using deliberation is 
beneficial and that making decision using intuition could be detrimental, (2) instruction for 
participants to decide deliberatively, thinking carefully and taking time in making decisions, (3) 
participants were asked to write down three reasons for selecting each particular option in the 
decision tasks.  
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Decision Tasks 
As decision tasks, six scenarios were presented to the participants. Each scenario consisted of a 
situation, e.g. “There are two job offers available”, followed by descriptions of two options. The 
two options were either high or low in achievement motive. To illustrate “Job 1 followed a 
specified protocol and maintenance of routines” (low achievement) while “Job 2 encouraged 
active management of a store and attainment of new suppliers” (high achievement). Participants’ 
task was to select the option they prefer. Across the six scenarios, frequency (0 to 6) of selecting 
high achievement option was computed (M = 2.87, SD = 1.34). Reliability of high achievement 
option being selected across scenarios was very low at α = .26. 
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2.1.2 Results 
 
In order to test differential relations between motives and choice behavior, the aggregated 
achievement-choice score for the decision scenarios was predicted by the implicit and the 
explicit motives, the intuitive vs. deliberative choice condition, and the interactions of motives 
and decision modes. All predictor variables were centered before entering them into the 
regression and before computing the interaction terms, centering was done in order to allow for a 
simultaneous estimation of main effects and interactions (Aiken & West, 1991). The results of 
this analysis were presented in Table 1.2 
 
Table 1.2 Standardized regression coefficients for regressions of motive-related choices on the 
corresponding implicit and explicit motives, condition (deliberative vs. intuitive) and their interaction. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
a Because choices are either high or low, low achievement choice is the inverse of high achievement choice. 
b 1 = intuitive mode, 2 = deliberative mode 
 
There was a negative effect of implicit achievement motive (MMG) and explicit achievement 
motive (AMS), indicating that across intuitive and deliberative conditions, achievement choices 
were predicted by low fear of failure score. In contrast, the hope component of both the implicit 
and the explicit motives did not predict achievement choices. Decision mode (deliberative vs. 
intuitive) did not have an influence on choices, nor did we find any indication of interactions 
between decision mode and motive variables. 
 
 Implicit Motive (MMG) Explicit Motive (AMS) 
 High Achievement Choice
a
 High Achievement Choice
a
 
Achievement – 
Hope for Success 
   
motive -.03   .13 
condition
b
  .15 -.15 
motive x condition -.01 -.13 
R
2
  .02  .06 
Achievement – 
Fear of Failure 
    
motive    -.28*   -.22* 
condition
b
  -.11 -.17 
motive x condition   .15 -.15 
R
2
    .09
+
    .09
+
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2.1.3 Discussions 
 
Findings of the pilot study did not support our predictions, that is, we did not find differential 
relations of explicit and implicit measures of the achievement motive with achievement choices 
depending on the decision mode. 
 
We did find a general tendency of fear of failure (of both implicit and explicit motives) in 
predicting achievement choices. However we did not find any tendency of hope for success 
dimension in predicting achievement choices. Reliability analysis indicated lack of consistency 
of choices across scenarios. Despite significant predictive tendency with regards to fear of 
failure, the low reliability indicated that the assessment of achievement choices in the present 
study was suboptimal.  
 
The low reliability (choices across six scenarios were uncorrelated) indicates that the scenarios 
might have tapped into different underlying variables (e.g., habits of participants and/or the 
specifics of the scenarios) more so than the general underlying factor of low/high achievement 
motive.  
 
In the next experiment, we generalized our decision tasks. Instead of concrete activities, we 
created options that describe classes of activities. These descriptions incorporate definitions of 
each of the three motives.  
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2.2 Experiment 1 
 
Experiment 1 aimed to test the main hypotheses of this dissertation. It is expected that decision 
mode moderates the relationship between strength of motives and selection of options. In 
particular, we expect explicit motives to predict deliberative choices and implicit motives to 
predict intuitive choices. In this experiment, we added evaluations of motive-related options 
(liking ratings). We expect similar moderation with regards to these ratings. Explicit motives 
should predict liking ratings in the deliberative condition whereas implicit motives should predict 
liking ratings in the intuitive condition.  
 
Secondly, this study aimed to introduce a new dependent variable, an improved version of the 
scenario-based decision task. As opposed to concrete activities, only abstract descriptions of 
activities were utilized as motive options. We also extended our decision task to include all three 
motives; achievement, affiliation and power motives. If these scenarios captured motive-related 
content, we expect that the choices and ratings of motive-related options are consistent across 
scenarios and are predicted by the implicit and the explicit motives.  
 
2.2.1 Method 
Participants 
Sixty-six people participated in this study ran at the Friedrich-Schiller-University in July 2013. 
Three participants (Subject #14, #20 and #50) were excluded from further analyses due to their 
age (> 2 SD). To balance number of observations in both intuitive and deliberative group, 
Subject #62 (non-native speaker) was excluded from further analyses. As such, the sample for 
Experiment 1 included sixty-two students (63% female, mean age = 23 years old). On average, 
participation was awarded with €5. 
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Procedure 
The experiment started with an assessment of implicit and explicit motives. Measure of implicit 
motives was Multi-Motive-Grid (Sokolowski et al., 2000) and measure of explicit motives was 
Unified Motive Scales (Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012). Following the assessment of motives, 
participants were randomly assigned either to the intuitive or the deliberative condition. In this 
experiment, a manipulation check was added as well as an alternative moderator variable 
assessed by Preference for Intuition and Deliberation Questionnaires (PID; Betsch, 2004). 
 
Materials
2
 
 
Motive Measures 
 
Implicit Motive Measure: Multi-Motive Grid (Sokolowski et al., 2000). 
 
Implicit motives measures were identical to the pilot study. Reliability and descriptives of the 
measures were summarized in Table 1.3. 
 
Table 1.3 Reliability (Cronbach’s alpha), Mean Scores, and Standard Deviation of Implicit and 
Explicit Measures for Achievement (Hope for Success and Fear of Failure), Affiliation (Hope for 
Affiliation and Fear of Affiliation) and Power (Hope for Control and Fear of Losing Control).  
 Multi-Motive Grid Unified Motive Scores 
    Hope Component  
Achievement – HS α = .51, M = 7.00, SD = 1.91 α = .86, M = 4.35, SD = .83 
Affiliation      - HA   α = .56, M = 6.53, SD = 2.10 α = .86, M = 4.04, SD = .83 
Power             - HC  α = .69, M = 8.00, SD = 2.47 α = .94, M = 3.53, SD = 1.15 
    Fear Component   
Achievement – FF α = .60, M = 4.76, SD = 2.27  α = .60, M = 3.80, SD = 1.01 
Affiliation      - FR   α = .62, M = 6.71, SD = 2.39 α = .59, M = 3.85, SD = 1.09 
Power             - FC  α = .66, M = 7.35, SD = 2.54  α = .74, M = 3.90, SD = .96 
HS = Hope for Success, HA = Hope for Affiliation, HC = Hope for Control 
FF = Fear of Failure, FA = Fear of Affiliation, FC = Fear of Losing Control 
 
                                                          
2
 See Appendix B for the complete material set of Experiment 1. 
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 Explicit Motive Measure: Unified Motive Scales (Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012)  
 
The Unified Motives Scales (UMS) was used instead of the Achievement Motives Scale (AMS) 
because the UMS assessed all three motives while the AMS assessed only the achievement 
motive.  The UMS measured both hope and fear components of the motives. This questionnaire 
consisted of two sets of statements scaled on a 6-point scale: The first part consisted of 36 
statements scaled from “stimmt nicht zu (disagree)” to “stimmt zu (agree)” while the second part 
consisted of 18 goals statements scaled from “nicht wichtig (not important)” to “sehr wichtig 
(very important)”. Average scores across the corresponding statements were computed as scores 
for each of the motive components. The UMS incorporated items from various questionnaires 
such as the PVQ (Personal Values Questionnaire; McClelland 1991; German version as used in 
Engeser & Langens, 2010), GOALS (Pöhlmann & Brunstein, 1997), PRF (Personality Research 
Form), Mehrabian’s scales for affiliation and sensitivity to rejection (MAFF and MSR, 
Mehrabian, 1994; German version as used in Engeser & Langens, 2010) and Achievement 
Motive Scale (AMS; Lang & Fries, 2006).  
 
Table of correlations between implicit motives (measured by Multi-Motive Grid) and explicit 
motives (measured by Unified Motive Scales) is available in Appendix B. Looking only at the 
matching motives none of the pair correlations were significant except for implicit and explicit 
hope for control with r = .31.  
 
Experimental Manipulation 
 
Experimental manipulation was identical to the pilot study (see Appendix A). 
 
Manipulation Checks 
 
Manipulation checks were added to the experiment:  
 
(1) Participants were asked directly after the decision tasks how they had made their decisions. 
Definitions of intuitive and deliberative were taken from Preference for Intuition and 
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Deliberation questionnaire (Betsch, 2004). Ten questions were formulated consisting of five 
intuitive, e.g. “While making decisions on the scenario, how much did your feelings play a 
role?” and five deliberative questions, e.g. “While making decisions on the scenario, to what 
extent have you think them through?”. Average score of the five intuitive statements was 
computed as the manipulation check score for the intuitive condition, M = 3.84, SD = .68, 
Cronbach’s α = .53 and average score of the five deliberative statements was computed as the 
manipulation check score for the deliberative condition, M = 3.03, SD = .89, α = .77. 
 
(2) The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) and similar questions were asked in-
between the decision tasks. The CRT consists of questions that have intuitively wrong answers 
and deliberatively correct ones. Percentages of intuitive and deliberative answers per condition 
were calculated. It is expected that higher percentage of intuitive answers is found in the intuitive 
condition and higher percentage of deliberative answers is found in the deliberative condition. 
This was unfortunately not the case (see Table 1.4). At the end of the experiment, participants 
were asked whether they recognized these CRT questions from other contexts (most did not).  
 
Decision Tasks 
 
Decision tasks consisted of eight scenarios with three options. Each of the three options 
incorporated definitions of the three motives. The achievement option was described as an 
activity that is moderately challenging and provides participants with accurate feedback, the 
power option was described as an activity that requires participants to influence and exercise 
control over others and the affiliation option was described as an activity that requires sympathy 
and teamwork. Scenarios were presented in a random order to the participants. All three motive 
options and their corresponding scenarios were presented simultaneously on a computer screen.  
Participants’ task was to decide which of the three options they preferred. Participants were also 
asked to rate how much they like each of the three options. The order of choice and rating tasks 
depended on the manipulation conditions. In the intuitive condition, the choice task was 
presented first followed by the rating task. In the deliberative condition, the rating task was 
presented first followed by the choice task. In the intuitive condition, we did not want the ratings 
to influence the choices of the participants whereas in the deliberative condition, we expected 
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that the participants were consistently making their choices with the options they liked best. 
Additionally, in the deliberative condition participants were instructed to write down reasons for 
why each option was attractive or not attractive. Participants must spend at least 1 minute in this 
writing task. These procedures were repeated until all eight scenarios were presented.  
 
Choices of the participants were aggregated by taking the frequency in which the corresponding 
motive options was selected, out of 8 scenarios on average participants selected 3.7 times the 
achievement option, 3.2 times the affiliation option and 1.1 times the power option. Reliability 
analysis indicated low inter-item correlation with α=.43 for choices of achievement options, 
α=.60 for choices of affiliation option and α=.36 for choices of power option. The variable 
‘Rating’ represented the average score of liking for each motive options across the 8 scenarios; 
Reliability analysis indicated acceptable inter-item correlations with α=.50 for ratings of 
achievement options, α=.64 for ratings of affiliation options and α=.66 for ratings of power 
options.  
 
Preference for Intuition and Deliberation Questionnaire (Betsch, 2004) 
 
Preference for Intuition and Deliberation (PID; Betsch, 2004) is a personality questionnaire that 
measures the extent of participants’ preference in deciding intuitively and deliberatively. The 
intuitive and the deliberative scale were treated as separate independent variables. In total it 
consisted of 20 statements scaled from “stimme nicht zu” (unlike me at all) to “stimme volle zu” 
(exactly like me) with 10 statements representing intuitive preference, e.g. “I pay close attention 
to my inner feelings” and 10 statements representing deliberative preference, e.g. “I think before 
I act”. As half of the PID items were modified and used as manipulation checks, only 10 items 
(the other half) were administered in their original form. It is possible that due to chronic 
preference for either intuitive or deliberative mode, participants were unable to consciously adapt 
their decision modes. Thus, this questionnaire was administered as an alternative moderator 
variable. Average score was computed across five intuitive statements as preference for intuition 
score, α = .72, M = 3.40, SD = .74 and across five deliberative statements as preference for 
deliberation score, α = .52, M = 3.46, SD = .79.  
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2.2.2 Results 
 
A one-way ANOVA on manipulation check questionnaire across decision modes indicated that 
participants decided more intuitively in the intuitive condition and more deliberatively in the 
deliberative condition. In the cognitive reflection test, participants answered on average half of 
the questions intuitively and the other half deliberatively regardless of the experimental 
conditions.  
 
Table 1.4 Mean Scores, Standard Deviation and One-way ANOVA results on the Manipulation 
Checks across Intuitive and Deliberative Experimental Conditions 
Post-Decision Questionnaire 
Manipulation Condition How Intuitive were you? How deliberative were you? 
Intuitive 4.03 (.54) 2.68 (.82) 
Deliberative 3.65 (.76) 3.28 (.83) 
One-way ANOVA F(1,64) = 5.47, p = .023 F(1,64) = 11.97, p = .001 
Cognitive Reflection Task 
Manipulation Condition % of Intuitive Answer % of Deliberative Ans. % of non-categorized  
Intuitive 40.91 (20.45) 50.00 (21.65) 9.09 (11.09) 
Deliberative 34.34 (24.63) 53.03 (28.09) 12.63 (18.18) 
One-way ANOVA F(1,64) = 1.38, p = .24 F(1,64) = .24, p = .63 F(1,64) = .91, p = .34 
 
As in the previous study, in order to test differential relations between motives and choice 
behavior, the aggregated motive-choice score for the decision scenarios was predicted by the 
implicit and explicit motives, the intuitive vs. deliberative choice condition and the interaction of 
motive and choice mode. The analyses were done only on the matching motives between 
predictor and dependent variables: Implicit and explicit achievement motives were entered into 
regression predicting choices and ratings of achievement options, implicit and explicit affiliation 
motives were entered into regression predicting choices and ratings of affiliation option and 
implicit and explicit power motives were entered into regression predicting choices and ratings 
of power option. The mismatch motives regressions are available in Appendix C. The moderated 
regression analyses were conducted separately for the motive-choice score and for the motive-
ratings score. All predictor variables were centered before entering them into the regression and 
before computing the interaction terms. The results of these analyses were summarized in table 
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1.5 for choices and ratings of the achievement options, in table 1.6 for choices and ratings of the 
affiliation options and in table 1.7 for choices and ratings of the power options.  
 
Table 1.5 Standardized regression coefficients for regressions of motive-related choices and ratings of 
choice options on the corresponding implicit and explicit motives, condition (deliberative vs. intuitive), 
and their interaction. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
a 1 = intuitive mode, 2 = deliberative mode 
 
Table 1.6 Standardized regression coefficients for regressions of motive-related choices and ratings of 
choice options on the corresponding implicit and explicit motives, condition (deliberative vs. intuitive), 
and their interaction. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
a 1 = intuitive mode, 2 = deliberative mode 
 Implicit Motive Explicit Motive 
 Choices Ratings Choices Ratings 
Achievement – 
Hope for Success 
    
motive  .16 .03   .06    .27* 
condition
a
 -.07 .05 -.13 -.01 
motive x condition  .15 .13  .11 .11 
R
2
  .06 .02  .03 .07 
Achievement – 
Fear of Failure 
    
motive -.16 -.11   .23   .06 
condition
a
 -.13  .04 -.14   .04 
motive x condition  .08  .00 -.19 -.06 
R
2
  .04  .01   .06   .01 
 Implicit Motive Explicit Motive 
 Choices Ratings Choices Ratings 
Affiliation– 
Hope for Affiliation 
    
motive -.05 -.04    .40**      .49** 
condition
a
  .02 -.05 .01 -.07 
motive x condition -.02 -.10 .03 -.00 
R
2
  .00   .02  .16*      .25** 
Affiliation– 
Fear of Rejection 
    
motive -.07  .09 -.19   .02 
         condition
a
  .01 -.05  .05 -.06 
motive x condition -.05 -.03  .01 -.01 
R
2
  .01  .01  .03  .00 
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Table 1.7 Standardized regression coefficients for regressions of motive-related choices and ratings of 
choice options on the corresponding implicit and explicit motives, condition (deliberative vs. intuitive), 
and their interaction. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
a 1 = intuitive mode, 2 = deliberative mode 
 
There was a positive effect of explicit achievement, affiliation and power assessed with UMS, 
indicating that across intuitive and deliberative conditions, achievement ratings were predicted 
by high hope for success, affiliation choices and ratings were predicted by high hope for 
affiliation and power ratings were predicted by high hope for control. In contrast, implicit 
assessment of all three motives did not predict choices or ratings of motives option. With regards 
to the avoidance dimension, fear of failure and fear of rejection assessed with both MMG and 
UMS did not predict choices or ratings of motive options. Similarly, fear of losing control, 
assessed with the MMG, did not predict choices or ratings of power options. We did find a 
positive effect of fear of losing control when assessed with the UMS, indicating that across 
intuitive and deliberative conditions, power choices and ratings were predicted by explicit fear of 
losing control.  
 
Decision mode (deliberative vs. intuitive) did not have a strong or consistent moderating 
influence on choices or ratings. We did find a few scattered indications of interactions between 
decision mode and motive variables, with a marginal interaction effect for implicit hope for 
control. The positive regression weight for the interaction term indicates that power choices and 
 Implicit Motive Explicit Motive 
 Choices Ratings Choices Ratings 
Power– 
Hope for Power 
    
motive .18    .29*      .34**       .54** 
condition
a
 .05 -.05 -.01 -.14 
motive x condition  .22
+
   .23
+
  .10  .07 
R
2
 .09   .16*   .13*     .31** 
Power– 
Fear of loss of control 
    
motive -.02   .03    .24
+
    .30* 
   condition
a
 -.00 -.13 -.03 -.17 
motive x condition -.11 -.13 -.05  .12 
R
2
  .01   .03   .06   .13* 
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ratings were predicted by implicit hope for control more so in the deliberative as compared to the 
intuitive condition, which is contrary to our predictions. The interaction effects were significant 
only in 2 out of 12 cases for the implicit motives, the direction of the interactions corresponded 
to expectation in none of these cases. For the explicit motives, none out of the 12 interactions 
were significant. 
 
As an alternative moderator variable (replacing the decision mode), the difference between 
preference for intuition and preference for deliberation of each participant was calculated and 
entered into regression. This calculation meant that positive values indicated stronger preference 
for deliberation and negative values indicated stronger preference for intuition. The results were 
summarized in Appendix D. With regards to the hypotheses, interaction terms between PID and 
explicit achievement motive were significant in predicting choices and ratings of achievement 
options. The regression coefficient of these interactions were positive indicating that the relation 
between explicit achievement motive and choices and ratings of achievement options was 
stronger for participants scoring high in ∆deliberation-intuition compared to those scoring low. We did 
not find any other significant interaction.  
 
Importantly, the three-way interactions of motives x decision instruction (intuitive vs. 
deliberative) x decision mode preference (PID) did not reach significance in any of the analyses, 
indicating that the influence of instructed decision (intuitive vs. deliberative) was not moderated 
by individual differences in decision mode preference. In both conditions, mean difference of the 
mode preference did not differ, F(1,64) = .01, p > .10, M∆ in the intuitive condition = .04 (1.18) 
and M∆ in the deliberative condition = .07 (1.08). 
 
Combined with our additional analyses of the PID as moderator variable, readers are reminded 
that interaction effects were significant only in 4 out of 24 cases, 2 out of the four cases referred 
to the explicit motive and the other 2 referred to the implicit motive. While interactions referring 
to explicit motives corresponded to the expectation, interactions within the implicit motives were 
opposite of the expectation.  
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2.2.3 Discussions 
 
In this experiment we did not find any evidence of the expected interactions between explicit 
motives and responses toward options (neither in approach nor avoidance dimension). The only 
near-significant interaction terms that we found were between implicit hope for control in 
predicting responses of power option (choices and ratings). In both choices and ratings of power 
option, the interaction term was positive. It indicated that implicit hope for control predicted 
choices and ratings of power option better in the deliberative as compared to the intuitive 
condition. This goes contrary to our hypothesis.  
One way of going forward is to accept that our hypotheses were mistaken and that in fact 
implicit motives predict choices and ratings better in the deliberative as compared to the intuitive 
condition. This might well be the case if we redefined our intuitive condition as being 
superficial, lacking depth of understanding and externally dependent. At the same time, the 
deliberative condition could be redefined as being reflective; a self-reflection state in which 
participants honestly consult their past experiences in determining their future choices. The next 
experiment should transmit the meaning of intuitive and deliberative decision modes more 
clearly to participants. The intuitive condition as originally hypothesized should create a state of 
self-introspection while the deliberative condition should induce a tendency to make objective 
comparisons between options.  
Secondly, we did find main effects of explicit motives in predicting choices and ratings of 
achievement, affiliation and power motives across both decision modes. We did not find any 
main effect with regards to the implicit motives. The fact that we found explicit but not implicit 
motive (except for power) predicting responses in the decision task raises the question whether 
the scenario-based decision task captured only those components of motives that are part of the 
explicit motive system and not those that are part of the implicit motive system. Given that 
intuitive condition should have been a better match with implicit motives due to their shared 
automatic nature, we would expect that implicit measurement of motive would converge with 
motive-related response in intuitive condition, but this was not the case. 
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When we conceptualized decision mode as chronic preferences, we did find an interaction effect 
supporting our hypothesis. A high preference for the deliberative mode accentuated the 
predictive power of explicit achievement motive on choices and ratings of achievement options. 
This finding adds further support to the suspicion that both formats of the decision task tend to 
capture deliberative processes and are thus sensitive to explicit motives only. 
 
Further complication arises from the fact that the Multi-Motive Grid as measurement of implicit 
motive was challenged. Schultheiss and colleagues argued that the Multi-Motive Grid (MMG) 
due to their forced-choice property is more likely to measure explicit as opposed to implicit 
motives. If the MMG indeed measured explicit motives, we would not be surprised to find that 
the MMG power motive predicted responses better in the deliberative as compared to the 
intuitive condition. In this study, indeed we found that implicit and explicit power motives were 
significantly correlated (r = .31).  
 
In order to tap into the implicit motive, given that MMG sometimes measures explicit motive, an 
alternative measurement is required. Lastly, we found interaction effect only with regards to the 
power motive. Further experiments should clarify whether the influence of decision mode only 
works within the power domain or if it also extends to the achievement and affiliation motives. 
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2.3 Experiment 2 
 
Experiment 2 tried to remedy some of the potential problems found in Experiment 1. Intuitive 
and deliberative instructions were clarified with the hope that participants entered a self-
reflective state as opposed to a merely superficial state of heuristically based decision making. 
Secondly, this study aimed to replicate earlier finding that implicit hope for control interacted 
with decision mode in predicting choices and ratings of power options. As such, only power 
motives were assessed. 
 
2.3.1 Method 
Participants 
Eighty participants were recruited for the experiment during the event “Long Night of Science”, 
29
th
 November 2013, at the Friedrich-Schiller-University, Jena. Participation was voluntary 
without any monetary reward.  
Procedure and materials
3
 
Implicit power motive was measured using the Multi-Motive Grid (Sokolowski et al., 2000). 
Only pictures consisting of sentences relevant for the power motive were administered. 
Reliability of the implicit hope for control in this experiment was very low at M = 2.31 (.82), α = 
.36. 
After completing the MMG, participants were assigned either to the intuitive or the deliberative 
condition. A set of instructions were given depending on participants’ assignment. In the 
deliberative condition, participants were informed that making decisions deliberatively lead to 
good decisions. Participants were instructed to complete the upcoming decision tasks (1) by 
thinking about them as carefully as possible, (2) by thinking about what others will think of their 
decisions and (3) by considering the consequences of the decisions they will make. In the 
                                                          
3
 See Appendix E for the complete material set of Experiment 2. 
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intuitive condition, participants were informed that making decisions intuitively lead to good 
decisions. Participants were instructed to complete the upcoming decisions tasks (1) by focusing 
on their own feelings and ignoring other factors, (2) by imagining that they were themselves in 
the situation and how pleasant or unpleasant it would be and (3) by trusting their first impression 
and trying not to deliberate or think deeply about the situation.  
In the decision task, three out of the eight scenarios used in the previous studies were selected. 
These three scenarios had the highest count of power option selections indicating that in these 
scenarios on average power options were more desirable. As power options have the lowest 
desirability across the three motives, these scenarios were selected in order to produce a higher 
variance within the choices and the ratings of power options. Participants were again asked to 
select one out of three options and to rate each of these options. The order of choosing and 
evaluating were identical to the previous experiments. Slight changes were administered with 
regard to the dimension in which participants made their evaluation. In the previous experiments, 
“evaluation” (bewerte) was used for both conditions’ rating scales. In this experiment, within the 
deliberative condition, participants were asked to rate each option using the scale “bewerte” 
(evaluated positive to negative) and within the intuitive condition the scale was “löst 
unangenehme Gefühle in mir aus/löst angenehme Gefühle in mir aus” (produces pleasant or 
unpleasant feelings). The changes of the scale were done in order to provide better matches with 
the respective conditions; the deliberative condition focused on evaluating (bewerte) while the 
intuitive condition focused on feelings (Gefühle).  
Reliability of choice frequency and mean score rating of motive options across the three 
scenarios were low with M = 1.43 (1.00), α = .47 for achievement choice, M = 1.34 (.99), α = .37 
for affiliation choice and M = .24 (.56), α = .55 for power choice. Similarly, M = 3.83 (.88), α = 
.41 for achievement rating, M = 3.92 (.75), α = .41 for affiliation rating and M = 2.29 (.91), α = 
.43 for power rating.  
Following the decision tasks, all participants completed the Unified Motive Scales (Schönbrodt 
& Gerstenberg, 2012). Unlike the previous studies, fear components of the motives were not 
assessed. There had been no evidence that the fear components provide consistent or informative 
pattern of results. Similarly, it is unclear what could be derived from the fear components as the 
expected directions of the effects are unclear. As such, we decided not to assess the fear 
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components. Similar to the previous experiments, reliabilities of the UMS scale were highly 
satisfactory at M = 4.44 (.91), α = .90 for explicit hope for success, M = 4.22 (.86), α = .88 for 
explicit hope for affiliation and M = 3.25 (1.03), α = .91 for explicit hope for control.   
In the previous studies, sometimes UMS was assessed before the decision tasks for the purpose 
of counterbalancing. In this study, UMS was assessed only after the decision task because in this 
experiment we wanted to focus on the interaction between the implicit power motive and the 
intuitive condition. In the previous experiments, explicit motives were strong predictor of 
choices and ratings while implicit motives were not. We wanted to eliminate the possibility that 
in half of the participants, explicit motives became too salient or that participants were aiming to 
be consistent with their explicit motives thus reducing the influence of implicit motives on 
decisions. In other words, we want to increase the power of the current study.  
Lastly, participants had to answer ten questions as manipulation checks. The manipulation check 
questions were identical to the previous experiment. The Cognitive Reflection Test was removed 
because in the previous study the CRT result was uncorrelated with the manipulation check 
questionnaire results. An average score of the five intuitive statements across conditions was 
3.82 with SD = .73 and reliability α = .64. Similarly, an average score of the five deliberative 
statements across conditions was = 2.92 with SD = .91 and reliability α = .81. 
 
2.3.2 Results  
Manipulation check. One-way ANOVA indicated that participants in the deliberative condition 
reported to have made their decisions more deliberatively than participants in the intuitive 
condition. Participants in the intuitive condition, however, did not report to have made their 
decisions more intuitively than participants in the deliberative condition.   
Table 2.1 Mean Scores, Standard Deviation, and One-way ANOVA results on the Manipulation Checks 
across Intuitive and Deliberative Experimental Conditions 
Post-Decision Questionnaire 
Manipulation Condition How Intuitive were you? How deliberative were you? 
Intuitive 3.76 (.73) 2.67 (.83) 
Deliberative 3.89 (.74) 3.21 (.92) 
One-way ANOVA F(1,78) = .58, p > .10 F(1,78) = 7.59, p = .007 
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Correlations. Correlations between implicit motives measured by MMG and explicit motives 
measured by UMS were presented in table 2.2. Contrary to experiment 1, we observed that in 
this study MMG-Hope for Control was uncorrelated with UMS-Hope for Control (r = .09).  
Table 2.2 Correlations between Implicit Motives (MMG) and Explicit Motives (UMS) 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
MMG = Multi-Motive Grid, UMS = Unified Motive Scales;      HS = Hope for Success, HA = Hope for Affiliation, HC = Hope for Control 
 
Main analyses. The analyses for experiment 2 proceed similar to the previous experiment. The 
aggregated motive-choice score for the decision scenarios was predicted by the implicit and 
explicit motives, the intuitive vs. deliberative choice condition and the interaction of motives and 
decision mode. As in experiment 1, only match conditions were analyzed. In this case, only the 
power motive predicting choices and ratings of power options were available for analysis. The 
mismatch conditions, in which e.g. power motive was used to predict choices and ratings of 
achievement or affiliation options, are available in Appendix C.  
 
The moderated regression analysis was done separately for the motive-choice score and for the 
motive-rating score. All predictor variables were centered before entering them into the 
regression and before computing the interaction terms. The results of these analyses were 
presented in tables summarizing the results of choices and ratings for power options (table 2.3). 
 
Table 2.3 Standardized regression coefficients for regressions of motive-related choices and ratings of 
choice options on the corresponding implicit and explicit motives, condition (deliberative vs. intuitive), 
and their interaction. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
a 1 = intuitive mode, 2 = deliberative mode 
 MMG-HC UMS-HS UMS- HA UMS-HC 
MMG-HC -    
UMS-HS .14 -   
UMS-HA     .38** .36** -  
UMS-HC .09 .59** .29** - 
 Implicit Motive Explicit Motive 
 Choices Ratings Choices Ratings 
Power– 
Hope for Power 
    
motive   -.27* .09     .29*       .51** 
condition
a
  .02 .13   .08 -.12 
motive x condition -.02 .15 -.02  .04 
R
2
  .08 .06   .09
+
      .27** 
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In sum, the following pattern of findings emerged: Replicating the previous experiment we found 
strong positive main effect of explicit power motive predicting choices and ratings of power 
options. We also found a strong negative effect of implicit power motive in predicting choices 
and ratings of power option. We did not replicate the interaction effect found in Study 1: There 
was no significant interaction between the implicit hope for control and the manipulation 
condition.   
 
2.3.3 Discussions 
In contrast to experiment 1, we did not replicate the interaction effect found between implicit 
power motive and decision mode. In experiment 1, MMG measurement of hope for control was 
highly correlated with UMS measurement of hope for control. In this experiment, the two 
measures were not correlated. The combined findings suggest that it is the explicit motive 
component measured by the MMG in experiment 1 that caused the interaction effect with 
deliberative mode, as the hypothesis would predict. The UMS-hope for control itself, however, 
did not interact with decision mode in predicting choices and ratings of power options. This lack 
of interaction, which was found in both Experiment 1 and 2, casts doubt on whether explicit 
motives and decisions were really moderated by decision mode. In order to clarify the twin 
problems of measurement error and hypotheses testing, an alternative measurement of implicit 
motive will be introduce in the upcoming experiment.   
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2.4 Experiment 3 
 
Experiment 3 aimed at testing the main hypotheses and introducing personalized Implicit 
Association Test (IAT) as an alternative measure of implicit motives. The rationale of the study 
followed that of the previous experiments. 
 
2.4.1 Method 
Participants 
Eighty students of the Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena were recruited for the study (9
th
 and 
14
th
 April, 2014). Five participants (#1, #3, #25, #41 and #62) were excluded from further 
analyses due to their age (≥ 2 SD) resulting in 75 observations in total (57% female, mean age = 
23). Participation was rewarded with €4 euro per participant.   
Procedure and materials
4
 
Similar to the previous experiments, implicit and explicit motives were first assessed followed by 
the experimental manipulation via instructions. Decision tasks were completed afterwards 
followed by the manipulation check.  
Implicit motives were assessed via Multi-Motive Grid (Sokolowski et al., 2000) and explicit 
motives were assessed via Unified Motive (Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012). Fear components 
of motives were not assessed.  Again, this was due to the difficulty of determining the direction 
of results of the fear motive components: It is unclear whether fear motivation lead to a 
heightened or a lessened effort in pursuit of the motive fulfillment. 
In addition to the two measurements mentioned above, a personalized IAT was administered as 
an alternative implicit motive measure. The IAT, as with other motives measure, was 
administered before the experimental manipulation.  
                                                          
4
 See Appendix F for the complete material set of Experiment 3. 
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Table 3.1 Reliability (Cronbach’s alpha), Mean Scores, and Standard Deviation of Implicit and Explicit 
Measures for Achievement (Hope for Success), Affiliation (Hope for Affiliation) and Power (Hope for 
Control).  
 Multi-Motive Grid (frequency) Unified Motive Scores (mean) 
    Hope Component   
Achievement – HS M =  7.08 (2.41), α = .70 M = 4.36 (.71), α = .85 
Affiliation      - HA   M =  6.59 (2.28), α = .65 M = 4.23 (.96), α = .92 
Power             - HC  M =  8.64 (2.58), α = .74   M = 3.46 (1.01), α = .91 
HS = Hope for Success, HA = Hope for Affiliation, HC = Hope for Control 
 
Personalized Implicit Association Test (Olson & Fazio, 2004).  
The personalized implicit association test (pIAT; Olson & Fazio, 2004) is a variant of an implicit 
association test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998). The IAT is a reaction time based 
measure which was designed to detect the strength of a person’s automatic evaluative 
associations for various categories. The IAT is the most widely used test to measure individuals’ 
implicit attitudes (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann & Banaji, 2009). Although the IAT is not 
originally meant to assess implicit motives, a growing number of researchers have documented 
its potentials (Brunstein & Schmitt, 2004; Slabbinck, De Houwer, & Van Kenhove, 2013).  
Task. In an IAT, two category labels are presented in two opposite sides of the computer screen 
(e.g. upper left and upper right corner). Target categories represent the categories that 
participants have an attitude towards (e.g. implicit motives).  Attribute categories represent the 
dimension in which the attitudes are to be evaluated (I like vs. I don’t like). Participants’ task is 
to categorize the appropriate stimuli to the appropriate categories.  
Target Stimuli. Due to the structure of the IAT, only two target categories are available for 
evaluation. As such, we need to condense our three motive systems into two categories. Such 
categorization was commonly done by grouping achievement and power as an agentic motive 
and affiliation as a communal motive (Brunstein, Schultheiss, & Grässman, 1998; Woike & 
Polo, 2001). The word ‘agentic’ and ‘communal’ are psychological jargons that non-
psychologists may not be familiar with. Hence a different label, ‘Superiority’ was used to 
represent the agentic motive while ‘Good Relationship’ was used to represent the communal 
motive. As target stimuli, pictures depicting attainment of achievement, affiliation and power 
motives were used. Power and Affiliation pictures were taken from Slabbinck et al., 2011, while 
achievement pictures were taken based on ratings from a few expert colleagues.  
Intuitive and Deliberative Decisions | 40 
Attribute Stimuli. The idea of personalized IAT is to present participants with attribute stimuli 
that could be positive or negative depending on participants’ personal preference. Motives as 
well as attitudes could represent the preference of individuals themselves or the internalized 
preference of society in which the individuals are part of. In measuring the implicit motive, we 
are interested in the earlier definition of preference. In order to increase the influence of 
personalized preference over societal preference, the personalized IAT was utilized. In addition 
to positive attribute stimuli such as ‘nice’ and ‘friendly’ and negative attribute stimuli such as 
‘hostile’ and ‘mean’, attribute stimuli that are ambiguous in valence such as ‘frugal’ and 
‘ambitious’ were added. Participants may decide whether the ambivalent stimuli belong to the 
category ‘I like’ or ‘I don’t like’. This stands in contrast to the standard IAT where participants 
are penalized for incorrect categorization of the attribute stimuli.  
IAT Effect. Categorization of the IAT was done by pressing buttons that correspond to the 
category (left button, e.g. keyboard key ‘d’, for the category presented in the upper left corner of 
the computer screen and right button, e.g. keyboard key ‘l’, for category presented in the upper 
right corner of the computer screen. The actual categories that were presented switched between 
the different test blocks. In one test block, the categories agentic motive and “I like” were paired. 
Pairing meant that the two categories shared the same response key. This was done via 
instruction and by placing the two categories in the same side of the computer screen. In another 
test block, the pairing was switched, e.g. agentic motive was paired with “I don’t like”. Notice 
that due to the symmetric structure of the categories, when agentic motive was paired with “I 
like”, affiliative motive was paired with the opposite “I don’t like”. Similarly when agentic 
motive was paired with “I don’t like”, affiliative motive was paired with the opposite “I like”. 
The IAT effect was computed by taking the difference in average reaction time (in ms) between 
the pairing (e.g. agentic and I like) and the reverse pairing (e.g. agentic and I don’t like). If 
participants have more positive evaluation towards the agentic category, we would find that 
participants were faster in the block with agentic/I like as compared to the block with agentic/I 
don’t like. If participants have more positive evaluation towards the affiliative category, we 
would find the opposite result. In this experiment, the average reaction time of the agentic block 
(superiority/I like) was 806.22 ms (245.46 ms) and the average reaction time of the affiliative 
block (good relationship/I like) was 662.95 ms (147.78 ms). On average, the IAT effect (agentic 
– affiliative) was -143.27 ms (161.13 ms).  
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Error Rate. In addition to the IAT effect, the difference in error rate between the two pairing 
blocks was computed. Error rate refers to the average percentage of mistakes that the participants 
made when categorizing stimuli to the categories. In this experiment, participants made on 
average 9% categorization mistake within the agentic blocks (superiority/I like) and  5% 
categorization mistake within the affiliative blocks (good relationship/I like). On average, the 
error rate (agentic - affiliative) was -4%.  
Outliers. Note that prior to the IAT effect calculation, reaction time below 300 ms and above 
individual far out values were excluded from the analysis. Far out values were calculated 
individually with value at 75% + 3 x Interquartile Range (value at 75% - 25%). Only correct 
categorizations were included in the calculation. On average, 1.03 trials (less than 1%) were 
excluded per participant. 
 Experimental Manipulation 
Decision mode was induced via instructions. The instructions were identical to Experiment 2 
with the following phrases emphasized through all-capital letters: “SELBST ERLEBEN” (Self-
Experienced) and “GEFÜHL” (Feelings) for the intuitive condition and “WAS ANDERE VON 
DIR DENKEN WÜRDEN” (What others think of you) and “WELCHE KONSEQUENZEN 
SICH DARAUS ERGEBEN” (Consequences that will occur) for the deliberative condition.  
 Decision Task  
The content of the decision tasks (8 scenarios with 3 options each) was identical to Experiment 
1. The procedure of the decision tasks was modified in the following way: The intuitive 
condition was altered to emphasize the influence of feelings, participants were asked to indicate 
their first impression/feeling for each option in the scenarios before making their decisions. After 
writing down the feeling word, the next option was presented to the participant. In the 
deliberative condition, participants did not write down their first impression and all three options 
were presented simultaneously on the same screen. As in the previous experiments, choices and 
ratings were calculated. The choice variable represents the average frequency of participants 
selecting the motive options. Reliability analysis on participants’ choice indicated low 
consistency across the eight scenarios with α =.24 for achievement options, α = .35 for affiliation 
options and α = .23 for power options. Means and standard deviation of choices of motive 
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options were as follow: M = 3.03 (1.49) for achievement, M = 3.98 (1.61) for affiliation and M = 
1.00 (1.03) for power. The scale of rating of motive options followed that of Experiment 2. The 
rating variable of the deliberative condition represents the extent to which participants evaluate 
the option as positive or negative while rating of the intuitive condition represents the extent to 
which participants evaluate the option as inducing pleasant or unpleasant feelings. Reliability 
analyses on participants’ ratings were satisfactory with α = .68 for ratings of achievement 
options, α = .78 for ratings of affiliation options and α = .60 for ratings of power options. Means 
and standard deviation of ratings of motive options were as follow: M = 4.98 (.84) for 
achievement, M = 5.32 (.94) for affiliation and M = 3.68 (.89) for power.  
 Manipulation Check 
Following the decision tasks, ten items of the manipulation checks were administered. These 
items were identical to experiments 1 and 2. The items were mean-aggregated. Reliability 
analyses indicated satisfactory values of α = .66, M = 3.91 (.65) for a variable representing the 
extent to which participants decide intuitively, and α = .79, M = 3.14 (.86) for a variable 
representing the extent to which participants decide deliberatively.  
 
2.4.2 Results  
Manipulation check. One-way ANOVA on the manipulation check indicated that participants 
decided more deliberatively in the deliberative condition, but not more intuitively in the intuitive 
condition. This pattern was similar to that of experiment 2.  
 
 
Table 3.2 Mean Scores, Standard Deviation, and One-way ANOVA results on the Manipulation Checks 
across Intuitive and Deliberative Experimental Conditions 
Post-Decision Questionnaire 
Manipulation Condition How Intuitive were you? How deliberative were you? 
Intuitive 3.88 (.68) 2.83 (.85) 
Deliberative 3.93 (.62) 3.46 (.76) 
One-way ANOVA F(1,73) = .133, p > .10  F(1,73) = 9.21, p = .001 
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Correlations. In this experiment, we did not find any correlations between personalized IAT and 
implicit motives (MMG) nor between personalized IAT and explicit motives (UMS). 
Meanwhile, implicit motive hope for success was highly correlated with all explicit motives: 
Hope for success, hope for affiliation and hope for control. Similarly, implicit hope for control 
was highly correlated with explicit hope for affiliation and explicit hope for control. Implicit 
hope for affiliation was not correlated with any of the explicit motives.  
 
Table 3.3 Correlations between Implicit Motives (MMG), Explicit Motives (UMS) and pIAT 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
HS = Hope for Success, HA = Hope for Affiliation, HC = Hope for Control, RT = Reaction Time (in ms) 
 
 Regression Analysis with MMG and UMS 
 
As in the previous study, in order to test differential relations between motives and choice 
behavior, the aggregated motive-choice scores for the decision scenarios were predicted by the 
implicit (MMG) and explicit motives, the intuitive vs. deliberative choice condition, and the 
interactions of motives and choice mode. Only the match conditions were presented in the main 
text. Analyses of the mismatch conditions are available in Appendix C. The moderated 
regression analyses were done separately for the motive-choice score and for the motive-ratings 
score. All predictor variables were centered before entering them into the regression and before 
computing the interaction terms. The results of these analyses are summarized in table 3.4 
  
 
MMG-
HS 
MMG-
HA 
MMG- 
HC 
UMS-
HS 
UMS-
HA 
UMS-
HC 
IAT- 
RT 
IAT- 
Error Rate 
MMG -HS -        
MMG -HA .55** -       
MMG -HC .56** .45** -      
UMS  -HS .24* .18 .13 -     
UMS  -HA .25* .19 .26* .29* -    
UMS  -HC .25* .16 .24* .40** .46** -   
IAT    -RT .00 .05 -.03 -.06 -.06 .11 -  
IAT-Error Rate .08 .16 .12 .10 .08 .06 .04 - 
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Table 3.4 Standardized regression coefficients for regressions of motive-related choices and ratings of 
choice options on the corresponding implicit (MMG) and explicit motives, condition. 
(deliberative vs. intuitive), and their interaction. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
a 1 = intuitive mode, 2 = deliberative mode 
 
Similar to the previous experiments, regardless of decision mode we found positive relations 
between the explicit achievement motive and ratings of achievement options, the explicit 
affiliation motive and choices and ratings of affiliation options and the explicit power motive and 
choices and ratings of power options. These findings indicated that the higher the explicit 
motives of the participants, the more likely it is for the participants to choose according to the 
strength of their explicit motives and to rate corresponding motive options more positively, 
regardless of whether decisions were made in the deliberative or the intuitive mode. Regardless 
of the decision mode, we also found a positive relation between implicit achievement motive and 
ratings of achievement option as well as between the implicit power motive and ratings of the 
power options. We did not find any relations between implicit affiliation motive and decisions on 
affiliation option. These relations mirror the correlations between implicit and explicit motives: 
Implicit achievement and power motives were highly correlated with their explicit motive 
 Implicit Motive Explicit Motive 
 Choices Ratings Choices Ratings 
Achievement – 
Hope for Success 
    
motive   .15  .37**   .16     .32* 
condition
a
           -.02           -.04  -.00          -.00 
motive x condition  .04  .30**          -.24
+
          -.08 
R
2
  .03          .20**   .05    .09
+
 
Affiliation– 
Hope for Affiliation 
    
motive -.02  .04      .30**       .52** 
condition
a
  .05 -.04  .03 -.07 
motive x condition -.02  .04 -.09 -.05 
R
2
 .00  .01  .09   .27 
Power– 
Hope for Power 
    
motive   .02   .22
+
    .23
+
      .35** 
condition
a
  -.10 -.04 -.11 -.06 
motive x condition   .10 .12 -.01   .01 
R
2
   .02 .07  .06    .13* 
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counterparts, while implicit affiliation motive did not correlate with explicit affiliation motive. 
These indicated that the predictive effects of motives to choices and to evaluations were due to 
the strength of explicit and not of implicit motives.  
Apart from the main effects, we found a positive interaction between implicit achievement 
motive and manipulation condition indicating that implicit achievement motive predicted ratings 
of achievement option better in the deliberative as compared to the intuitive condition. This 
finding is the opposite of what we expected (Hypothesis 1) and is a replication of the pattern 
obtained in study 1. We also found a tendency of a negative interaction relation between explicit 
achievement motives and decision mode indicating that explicit achievement motives predicted 
choices of achievement options better in the intuitive as compared to the deliberative condition. 
This finding is the opposite of what we expected (Hypothesis 2).  
  
Regression Analysis with Implicit Association Test 
 
The IAT effect was entered into a regression as a predictor variable together with the 
manipulation condition and the interaction between the two. The same set of predictors was 
entered to predict choices and ratings of achievement, affiliation and power options. The results 
are summarized in table 3.5. 
 
Neither main effects nor interaction effects were found with the IAT predicting choices and 
ratings of achievement and affiliation options. In power options, weakly significant main effect 
and interaction effect were found. A negative main effect (b = -.22) was found indicating that 
negative values of the IAT (positive evaluation of agency relative to communal motive) 
predicted higher choices of power options. A positive interaction effect (b = .30) was found 
indicating that the prediction of choices of power options by the IAT was stronger in the 
deliberative as compared to the intuitive condition. This result would be consistent with 
Hypothesis 2 if the IAT measured explicit, as opposed to implicit motives.  
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Table 3.5 Standardized regression coefficients for regressions of motive-related choices and ratings of 
choice options on the corresponding implicit motives (IAT effect), condition (deliberative vs. intuitive), 
and their interaction. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
a IAT Effect = average reaction time (RT) of compatible block – average RT of incompatible block 
  Compatible block = Überlegenheit / Mag Ich, Incompatible block = Gute Beziehung / Mag Ich (German Version) 
  Compatible block = Superiority / I like, Incompatible block = Good Relationship / I don’t like (English Version) 
b 1 = intuitive mode, 2 = deliberative mode 
  
 Implicit Motive 
 Choices Ratings 
Achievement   
IAT Effect
a
  .18  .20 
Condition
b
  .01 -.02 
motive x condition -.06 -.12 
R
2
  .03  .03 
Affiliation   
IAT Effect
a
 -.03  .02 
Condition
b
 -.05 -.16 
motive x condition -.14 -.19 
R
2
  .02  .02 
Power   
IAT Effect
a
  -.22
+
 -.06 
Condition
b
  .07 -.00 
motive x condition   .30
+
  .08 
R
2
 .07  .01 
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2.4.3 Discussion 
In experiment 3, we found a positive interaction indicating that implicit hope for success 
predicted ratings of achievement options better in the deliberative as compared to the intuitive 
condition. We also found a negative weak significant interaction indicating that explicit hope for 
success predicted choices of achievement option better in the intuitive as compared to the 
deliberative condition. In short, we found evidence against both of our hypotheses (Hypothesis 1 
and 2). 
In this experiment, an interaction favoring the deliberative mode was found on ratings of options 
while an interaction favoring the intuitive mode was found on choices of options. Thus, it is 
possible that the form of responses (ratings or choices) interacted with the decision mode and 
with the implicit/explicit motives. Since this was the first study in which this pattern emerged 
and since it was obtained only for the achievement motive, this interpretation should be taken 
with caution.  
With regards to the IAT, the absence of correlations with the multi-motive grid and the unified 
motives score left us with little clues as to whether the IAT had successfully measured implicit or 
explicit motives.  In addition, the average IAT score was overwhelmingly negative (-149.75 ms) 
indicating that on average the pairing of affiliative motive and liking was much stronger than the 
pairing of agency motive and liking. This result might be due to the use of the word ‘Superiority’ 
which may have a negative connotation. Even when some people feel superior, it is unadvisable 
to express their feelings openly. Internalization of what is socially desirable might have played a 
role in the IAT result.  
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2.5 Experiment 4 
 
Experiment 4 aimed to test the main hypotheses while handling various issues found in the 
previous experiments by:  
(1) Further strengthening the validity of the intuitive manipulation through (a) asking participants 
to imagine themselves performing the activity described by the motive options and (b) asking 
participants to confirm whether they felt certain motive related feelings (e.g. powerful, excited, 
joyful) with regards to the imagined activity; by asking participants about their feelings we 
hoped to prime participants to consider primarily feelings while reading the scenarios.  
(2) Distinguishing between choices and ratings through procedural modifications such as 
presenting choices and ratings in separate blocks.  
(3) Solving measurement issues of the assessment of implicit motives by utilizing the Picture 
Story Exercise (PSE) and a modified Implicit Association Test (IAT) as measures of implicit 
motives.  
And (4) Increasing statistical power by focusing only on the intuitive decision mode. 
On the basis of findings reported in Exp. 3, we would tentatively expect PSE and IAT scores to 
be predictive of choices and less so of ratings, while the explicit motive questionnaire, Unified 
Motive Scale (UMS), should be predictive of ratings and less so of choices. As the experiment 
was restricted to the intuitive condition, we expected the relation between implicit motives and 
decisions to be stronger than the relation between explicit motives and decisions.  
 
2.5.1 Method 
Participants 
Sixty-seven students (54% female, mean age = 22.79) of the Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena 
were recruited for the study (10
th
 and 11
th
 of June 2014). Participation was rewarded with €4.   
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Procedure and materials
5
 
First, implicit motives were assessed with the Picture Story Exercise (PSE; McClelland et al., 
1989). Immediately after the PSE, participants were given intuitive instructions and performed 
the decision tasks. As PSE consists of an imagination exercise, we hoped that completing the 
decision tasks after the PSE would make it easier for participants to imagine the activities 
described in the motive options. Following the decision task, participants completed the explicit 
motive measure (UMS) and the Implicit Association Test (IAT).  
 
Picture Story Exercise (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark & Lowell, 1953; Winter, 1994; 
Schultheiss & Pang, 2007). The Picture Story Exercise (PSE) is a projective measure in which 
participants write imaginative stories in response to a set of pictures. The PSE is the most 
prominent measure of implicit motives and is deemed the gold standard for the assessment of 
implicit motives. The PSE materials consist of eight pictures depicting: Women in a Laboratory, 
Ship Captain, Couple by the River, Trapeze Artist, Nightclub Scene, Bicycle Race, A Boxer and 
Friends in a Café. The procedure of the PSE is as followed (Schultheiss & Pang, 2007): Each 
picture was presented on a computer screen with black background for 10 seconds. It was then 
replaced by a screen of writing instructions. Participants were instructed to write imaginative 
stories with regard to the picture they have just seen by typing directly into a window on the 
screen, with the guiding questions appearing above the writing window. Guiding questions were 
questions such as: What happened? What are the people thinking and feeling? What do the 
people want to do?. After 4 minutes had passed, the writing task exited automatically and the 
next picture was presented. Participants must remain in the writing task for a minimum of 3 min. 
Four trained coders coded the resulting stories following the Winter (1994) manual. Across the 
four coders the average interclass correlation coefficients (ICC) indicating interrater agreement 
were .94 for the achievement motive, .97 for the affiliation motive and .89 for the power motive. 
Mean scores were 7.55 (3.48) for achievement motive, 10.49 (3.97) for affiliation motive and 
7.00 (4.00) for power motive. 
Unified Motive Scale (Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012). Explicit motive was measured 
using the Unified Motive Scale questionnaire (UMS) identical to the previous experiments. Only 
                                                          
5
 See Appendix G for the complete material set of Experiment 4. 
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hope component of the motives were measured. Reliability analyses indicated satisfactory value 
with α = .84, M = 4.93 (.90) for Hope for Success, α = .89, M = 4.77 (1.14) for Hope for 
Affiliation and α = .90, M = 3.74 (1.19) for Hope for Control.   
Recoding-Association-Labelling Implicit Association Test (ReAL-IAT) (Meissner & 
Rothermund, 2013). The ReAL model was used as an alternative measurement of the implicit 
motives. The ReAL model is an analysis tool that allows a separate estimation of the 
strength/probability of different processes within the IAT. Using a multinomial processing tree 
model (Erdfelder et al., 2009), separate parameters (recoding, labelling, and associations for the 
two target categories) were estimated for each participants.  
Procedure. Since such a multinomial analysis of an IAT is based entirely on the pattern of 
correct and erroneous responses and ignores reaction time (RT), it requires a large percentage of 
errors and the procedure of the IAT has to be slightly modified in order to allow for a reliable 
estimation of parameters. The modified procedure used multiple pairs of blocks with adjustable 
response deadline. Participants were first given a response deadline of 750 ms. If participants 
made few errors (< 5% or 5-15% or 15-30%), the response deadline was shorten (-150 ms or -
100 ms or -50 ms). If participants made many errors (30-45% or > 45%), the response deadline 
was prolonged (+50 ms or +100 ms).  
Materials. Materials of the IAT were as follows: As target categories, agency and communal 
motives were labelled ‘Achievement and Power’ (Leistung und Kraft) and ‘Relationship and 
Sympathy’ (Beziehung und Sympathie). Target stimuli were pictures depicting attainment of 
achievement, affiliation and power motives similar to Experiment 3. As attribute categories, 
wanting was labelled ‘I want’ (Ich will) and ‘I don’t want’ (Ich will nicht). Wanting is deemed to 
be closer to the nature of implicit motives as compared to liking. While liking might entail a 
conscious valuation of objects, wanting came from needs and desires. Hence wanting as 
compared to liking is a more suitable assessment tool for the implicit motives. Stimuli for the 
wanting category were words depicting positive feelings such as ‘happiness’ and ‘love’ and 
words depicting negative feelings such as ‘desperation’ and ‘frustration’. 
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Correlations.  
Table 4.1 Correlations between Picture Story Exercise (PSE), Explicit Motives (UMS) and 
Parameters of the ReAL-IAT (Recoding and Associations). 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
HS = Hope for Success, HA = Hope for Affiliation, HC = Hope for Control 
A1 = Beziehung und Sympathie (Relationship and Sympathy) 
A2 = Leistung und Kraft (Achievement and Power)  
Re = negative value indicates recoding in the direction of achievement and power while positive value indicates 
recoding in the direction of relationship and sympathy 
 
As can be seen from Table 4.1, implicit motives measured by PSE and explicit motives measured 
by UMS are uncorrelated except for hope for control dimension in which the correlation is in the 
negative direction (r = -.26). IAT parameters are similarly uncorrelated with implicit motives 
measured by PSE and explicit motives measured by UMS except for hope for control dimension 
in which IAT parameter for Relationship and Sympathy is positively correlated with UMS hope 
for control (r = .26).  
 
 Experimental Manipulation 
In this experiment, only the intuitive condition was administered to increase the number of 
observations within the intuitive condition. Intuitive instructions were identical to experiment 3.   
  
 
 
 PSE-HS PSE-HA PSE- HC UMS-HS UMS-HA UMS-HC IAT-A1 IAT-A2 
PSE   -HS -        
PSE   -HA  .20 -       
PSE   -HC -.20      -.33** -      
UMS -HS  .11   .07 -.18 -     
UMS -HA  .05   .21 -.18     .32** -    
UMS -HC  .19   .17   -.26*     .44** .23 -   
IAT   -A1 -.03   .06 -.06 .11 .05  .26* -  
IAT   -A2  .03   .06 -.06 .04 .05 -.14 -.38** - 
IAT   -Re -.09 -.10 -.00 .02 .00  .14   .20 -.19 
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Decision Tasks 
The content of the decision task was identical to the previous experiments. The procedure of the 
decision task was modified in the following way: (1) For each option, participants were asked 
whether they feel the corresponding motive-feeling, e.g. powerful, excited or joyful and (2) 
whether they would like to perform the activity specified (variable ‘Choice’). As compared to the 
previous experiments, procedure of choosing an option was modified in two manners: (a) Motive 
options were presented sequentially as opposed to simultaneously to reduce the likelihood that 
participants were making direct comparisons between choices (evaluating and comparing the 
merits of these choices probably enhances deliberation, which would be the opposite of the 
intended manipulation), (b) it is now possible to choose multiple options as opposed to choosing 
only one out of the three options. In this way, participants high in two motives could respond 
‘yes’ to both options instead of being forced to choose either one. (3) To further reduce the 
likelihood of deliberation, rating of options was placed in a separate block after the participants 
made their choice on all the possible activities. 
Reliability analyses indicated low consistency of choices across the eight scenarios with α = .33, 
M = 5.58 (1.51) for choosing achievement options, α = .60, M = 5.66 (1.84) for choosing 
affiliation options and α = .27, M = 3.78 (1.57) for choosing power options. We found higher 
consistency of ratings compared to choices across the eight scenarios with α = .50, M = 4.77 
(.81) for ratings of achievement options, α = .78, M = 5.10 (1.09) for ratings of affiliation 
options, and α = .60, M = 3.56 (.83) for ratings of power options.  
 
2.5.2 Results 
Main Effects of Implicit and Explicit motives 
In order to estimate the effect of implicit and explicit motives on choices and ratings, simple 
regressions were conducted with either implicit or explicit motives predicting choices and ratings 
on the matched motives. The results were summarized in table 4.2. Regressions on mismatch 
motives were summarized in Appendix C.  
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Table 4.2 Standardized regression coefficients for regressions of motive-related choices and ratings of 
choice options on the corresponding implicit (PSE) and explicit motives (UMS). 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
 
As can be seen from Table 4.2, explicit motives strongly predicted ratings of all motives. Explicit 
motives also significantly predicted choices of affiliation and power options though with less 
amount of variance explained. Implicit motives did not predict choices or ratings of any of the 
motive options.  
Table 4.3 Standardized regression coefficients for regressions of motive-related choices and ratings of 
choice options on the corresponding implicit motive (PSE) after outliers were excluded.  
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
 
Table 4.3 summarizes the results of the simple regressions for the implicit motives after outliers 
were excluded. Outliers were cases with PSE score variance (across the four coders) larger than 
the mean of the PSE score variance plus two times their standard deviation. Excluding outliers 
from the analyses resulted in a significant positive relation between implicit achievement motive 
 Implicit Motive (N = 67) Explicit Motive (N=67) 
 Choices Ratings Choices Ratings 
Achievement      
Motive .16 .07 .20 .39** 
R
2
 .03 .01 .04 .15** 
Affiliation      
Motive .18 .13     .53** .68** 
R
2
 .03 .02     .28** .46** 
Power      
Motive -.10 -.20  .25* .47** 
R
2
 .01  .04  .05* .23** 
 Implicit Motive 
 Choices Ratings 
Achievement (N = 45)   
motive .19 .31* 
R
2
 .04 .10* 
Affiliation     (N = 48)   
Motive .23 .18 
R
2
 .05 .03 
Power           (N = 42)   
Motive -.21 -.25
+
 
R
2
  .04  .06
+
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and ratings of achievement options as well as weak significant negative relation between implicit 
power motive and ratings of power options. In all three motives however, more than 30% of the 
data had to be removed as outliers. Furthermore when implicit and explicit motives were entered 
simultaneously on data without outliers, the significant effects of implicit motives disappeared 
and only the explicit motives were significant (see table 4.4).  
 
 Table 4.4 Standardized regression coefficients for regressions of motive-related choices and ratings of 
choice options on the corresponding implicit and explicit motives after outliers were removed.  
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
 
 
 ReAL-IAT  
 
We now looked into the results of the ReAL-IAT. Table 4.8 summarized the regression results 
with association parameter for agency motive, association parameter for affiliative motive and 
recoding parameter entered simultaneously to predict choices and ratings of achievement, 
affiliation and power options.   
 
 
 
 
 
 Choices Ratings 
Achievement Option (N = 45)   
Implicit Motive .14   .25
+
 
Explicit Motive .18 .22 
R
2
 .07  .14* 
Affiliation Option    (N = 48)   
Implicit Motive .09 .00 
Explicit Motive    .58**    .75** 
R
2
    .37**    .56** 
Power Option          (N = 42)   
Implicit Motive -.13 -.14 
Explicit Motive    .34*      .52** 
R
2
   .15*     .33** 
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Table 4.5 Standardized regression coefficients for regressions of motive-related choices and ratings of 
choice options on the corresponding ReAL-IAT associations and recoding parameters. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
A1 = Beziehung und Sympathie (Relationship and Sympathy) 
A2 = Leistung und Kraft (Achievement and Power)  
Re = negative value indicates recoding in the direction of achievement and power while positive value indicates recoding in the 
direction of relationship and sympathy 
 
 
Association Parameter of the ReAL-IAT did not predict choices or ratings of motives options 
across all motives. Recoding parameter, on the other hand, significantly predicted ratings of 
power options. This finding mirrored that of experiment 3 in which the IAT score predicted 
choices of power options. Results of Experiment 4 indicated that this contribution came from the 
recoding process of the IAT, as opposed to the association process. As recoding is a strategic 
process, it is more akin to the explicit as opposed to the implicit motives. We again find that the 
explicit motives predicted choices and ratings of power options, but not the implicit motives.  
 
2.5.3 Discussions 
Despite our best attempt to find relations between implicit motives and decisions, the results of 
Experiment 4 indicated that it is the explicit motives that exerted influence on the decisions of 
motive options. Strengthening the intuitive manipulation by imagination exercise did not change 
 Choices Ratings 
Achievement    
Association Parameter 1 (A1) -.14 .11 
Association Parameter 2 (A2)  .07 .02 
Probability of Recoding  (Re)  .10 .03 
R
2
  .03 .01 
Affiliation    
Association Parameter 1 (A1) .06 .13 
Association Parameter 2 (A2) .10 .16 
Probability of Recoding  (Re) .19 .08 
R
2
 .05 .03 
Power    
Association Parameter 1 (A1) -.09 .20 
Association Parameter 2 (A2) -.01 .18 
Probability of Recoding  (Re)  .20     .33** 
R
2
  .05  .15* 
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the resulting pattern. Distinguishing between choices and ratings did not result in differential 
predictions; of implicit motives predicting choices and explicit motives predicting ratings. 
Instead, we found that explicit motives predicted both choices and ratings, but predictions of 
ratings were stronger than predictions of choices. PSE measure seems to behave similarly to 
MMG measure. Regressions on the complete data set showed that PSE measure did not predict 
decisions at all. Regressions on data without outliers showed that PSE measure positively 
predicting ratings of achievement options and negatively predicting ratings of power options. 
When explicit motives were entered simultaneously as predictor variable, the effect of PSE 
disappeared. This indicates that the PSE did not add a unique contribution to the explained 
variance of the decisions over and above the explicit motives. The ReAL-IAT similarly indicated 
that the significant effect found between recoding parameter and power option is more 
supportive of explicit motives predicting decisions as opposed to implicit motives predicting 
decisions. Lastly, the exclusive intuitive condition did not change, and even enhanced, the 
finding that explicit but not implicit motives predicted decisions.  
 
 
2.6 Joint Analysis: Meta-Analysis across Studies 
 
The results across the four experiments were unclear and inconclusive. No robust or consistent 
pattern was found across the four studies despite the highly similar structure of the experiments. 
We could nevertheless capitalize on these highly similar structures and the data across the 
experiments will now be subjected to a joint analysis.  
As indicator for implicit motives, only the MMG and only the hope scales of the MMG will be 
included in the analysis. This is because MMG was the only implicit measure that was 
consistently assessed across studies. As such, studies that did not include MMG, namely the pilot 
study and experiment 4, will be excluded from the joint analysis.  
As indicator for the explicit motive, the Unified Motives Scales will be used and as a moderator 
the manipulation of intuitive and deliberative decision mode will be used.  
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The effect size of the joint analysis is the Pearson’s correlation between implicit/explicit motives 
and choices/ratings of the matched motives in the respective intuitive and deliberative condition
6
. 
In order to compute the average score, correlations were transformed into Fisher z-scale before 
averaging and then back-transformed into the Pearson’s correlation. The transformation from 
sample correlation r to Fisher’s z is given by 
𝑧 = 0.5 × ln ( 
1+𝑟
1−𝑟
 ). 
The variance of z (to an excellent approximation)
7
 is    (for i = exp1, exp2, exp3) 
𝑉𝑖 =
1
𝑛𝑖−3
 . 
Weight is then calculated by  
𝑊𝑖 =  
1
𝑉𝑖
 . 
Thus average score is calculated by  
𝑀 =
∑ 𝑊𝑖 𝑍𝑖
∑ 𝑊𝑖
 . 
Finally, a Z-value to test the null hypothesis that the mean effect µ is zero could be computed by  
𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =
𝑀
𝑆𝐸𝑧
 , 
in which standard error is denoted by 
𝑆𝐸𝑍 =  √𝑉𝑍 . 
Two-tailed test for p-value is given by 
𝑝 = 2 [1 − (Φ(|𝑍|))] , 
where Φ(Z) is the standard normal cumulative distribution.  
Back transformation of the mean value from Fischer’s z to correlation r is given by 
𝑟 =  
𝑒(2 × 𝑀)−1
𝑒(2 ×𝑀)+1
 . 
                                                          
6
 See Appendix H for all correlations. 
7
 See Borenstein et al. (2009). Introduction to Meta-Analysis. Chapter 6.   
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The procedure
8
 for averaging correlations across the three studies as well as the respective two-
tailed test was repeated for implicit and explicit motives in the intuitive and the deliberative 
condition for choices and ratings of the respected matched motives. The results were summarized 
in table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Mean effect size (Pearson’s correlation) across three experiments on the corresponding implicit 
and explicit motives and choices and ratings of motives options. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
 
In sum, the results across experiment 1, 2 and 3 are: (1) Explicit motives predict decisions for all 
motives regardless of decision mode. Effects are somewhat stronger for ratings than for choices. 
For affiliation motive, the relation between explicit motives and ratings was somewhat stronger 
in the deliberative mode. (2) Implicit motives did not predict any decisions with two unexpected 
exceptions: They predicted ratings in the deliberative mode for the power motive and they 
predicted choices in the deliberative mode for the achievement motives.  
Table 5.2 Average correlation of explicit and implicit motives on matched and mismatched motives 
across three experiments collapsing across decision modes, motive types and choices/ratings. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
 
                                                          
8 Using fixed effect or random (mixed) effect model did not change the results because in all cases 𝜏2 denoting 
between-study variance is close or equal to zero.  
 
 Intuitive Condition Deliberative Condition 
 Choices Ratings Choices Ratings 
Achievement      
Implicit Motive .07 -.00 .23
+
 -.05 
Explicit Motive .16      .33**   .41**     .27** 
Affiliation      
Implicit Motive -.02 .01 -.06 -.01 
Explicit Motive      .29**    .30**   .25*     .45** 
Power      
Implicit Motive -.09 .16 .04    .36** 
Explicit Motive    .25*     .47**    .26**    .46** 
 Matched Mismatched 
Explicit Motive  .32
+
 .05 
Implicit Motive .06 .05 
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As can be seen from table 4.2, only the average correlation of explicit motives and decisions in 
the matched condition was significantly different from zero (r = .32).  
 
The results of the joint-analysis across experiment 1, 2, and 3 mirrored that of experiment 4 in 
which explicit motives predict decisions and implicit motives do not, regardless of decision 
mode across achievement, affiliation and power motives.  
 
One explanation for the unexpected correlations between implicit motives and decisions in the 
deliberative mode is that the implicit motives as measured by the Multi-Motive Grid share some 
variance with the explicit motives and that this shared variance predicted the decisions in the 
deliberative mode. This was also evident in the fact that in our studies, implicit and explicit 
motives sometimes significantly correlate.  
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3 General Discussions 
 
Throughout four experiments, the dissertation empirically tested the hypotheses that 1) implicit 
motives provide sources for intuitive decisions and 2) explicit motives provide sources for 
deliberative decisions. Due to scattered results, a joint-analysis was conducted. The results of the 
joint-analysis showed that explicit motives predicted decisions regardless of intuitive or 
deliberative mode. On the other hand, regardless of the decision mode, implicit motives did not 
predict decisions.  
 
The fact that no support was found for our first hypothesis could be due to: 1) we did not 
measure implicit motives properly, 2) we did not appropriately assess intuition or 3) implicit 
motives do not provide content for intuitive decisions. The general discussion will examine these 
issues in three corresponding sections. Recommendations for future research will be presented 
accordingly. 
 
3.1 Measurement Issue of Implicit Motive 
 
The methods for measuring implicit motives were the Multi-Motive Grid, the Implicit 
Association Test and the Picture Story Exercise. These methods will be discussed in the 
following three subsections. 
 
3.1.1 Multi-Motive Grid 
 
As has been previously touched upon, the semi-projective measure, the Multi-Motive Grid, may 
not capture the implicit motives as theorized. Much of the research completed within the implicit 
motive literature has relied on the full-projective measure namely the Thematic Apperception 
Test (TAT) and its modern variant, the Picture Story Exercise (PSE). Prominent scholars in the 
field, for example, Pang and Schultheiss (2005) and Schultheiss and Brunstein (2001) continued 
to use the PSE as their main measurement of implicit motives. Köllner and Schultheiss (2014) in 
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their recent meta-analysis explicitly categorized the Multi Motive Grid as a “self-report measure” 
and further excluded all studies using the MMG in their implicit motives meta-analysis. A study 
by Schüler, Brandstätter, Weger, and Baumann (2015) reported a significant but low correlation 
between the MMG and the PSE (r = .14). The popularity of the Multi-Motive Grid however is 
apparent and understandable due to its economical nature of being less labor-intensive. Recent 
publications from various researchers routinely used the Multi-Motive Grid as their measurement 
of implicit motives and found that the implicit motives measured with MMG behaved as 
predicted (e.g. Schüler, Brandstätter & Sheldon, 2013; Bilsky & Schwartz, 2008; Langens, 2007; 
Kehr, 2004; Lawrence & Jordan, 2009).  As such, the true merit of the Multi-Motive Grid 
measurement continues to be debated. 
 
Across our experiments, we found that the Multi-Motive Grid sometimes correlates with our 
explicit motives measure
9
. However, these correlations were relatively low and were only found 
within the power or the achievement motive. Overall it is clear that the Multi-Motive Grid 
behaves differently from explicit motives. While explicit motives strongly predicted decisions, 
the MMG did not predict decisions except for cases in which they were correlated with explicit 
motives in achievement and power motives. Our experiments could not determine whether or not 
the MMG truly measures implicit motives. If forced to conclude the Multi-Motive Grid is what it 
claimed to be: a semi-projective measure.  
 
In conclusion, due to some uncertainties on the use of the Multi-Motive Grid as an implicit 
motive measure, it is possible that we did not find correlations between implicit motives and 
intuitive decisions because we used the Multi-Motive Grid as our main measure of implicit 
motives. Note that the MMG was the implicit motive measure of the joint-analysis. Alternative 
measures of the implicit motive were not included in the joint-analysis because they were not 
consistently used throughout the experiments.   
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 In experiment 1, MMG hope for control was correlated with UMS hope for control (r = .31), in experiment 2, MMG and UMS 
were not correlated and in experiment 3, MMG hope for success was correlated with UMS hope for success (r = .24), UMS hope 
for affiliation (r = .25) & UMS hope for control (r = .25).   
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3.1.2 Implicit Association Test 
 
Even though it was not consistently available, the Implicit Association Test was administered as 
an alternative measure of implicit motives in Experiments 3 and 4.  
The merit of the IAT as a measurement of implicit attitudes was discussed elsewhere (Greenwald 
et al, 2009). The IAT was originally meant to measure implicit attitudes; however, several 
attempts have been made to apply the IAT to implicit motives (see Slabbinck et al., 2013). One 
disadvantage of previous attempts is that each implicit motive (achievement, power, and 
affiliation) was measured with separate IATs. Each IAT takes considerable time to complete 
(±15 minutes) and is quite taxing for the participants. Thus, it would have been ideal to have a 
single-IAT test that measures all three motives at once. We implemented this by grouping the 
motives into two categories: Achievement and power as agency motive and affiliation as 
communal motive. In addition, we took notice of previous attempts and used pictorial as opposed 
to verbal materials as stimuli for these target categories. Further modifications were implemented 
to make the test more suitable for an assessment of implicit motives. These modifications took 
the form of a personalized-IAT for Experiment 3 and a ReAL-IAT for Experiment 4. They will 
now be discussed in turn. 
 
 Personalized-IAT 
 
Among several variants of the IAT, the personalized IAT is said to reduce the contamination of 
extrapersonal associations within the IAT (Olson & Fazio, 2004). Extrapersonal associations are 
associations that come from external sources such as norms and stereotypes as opposed to 
attitudes that were formed through personal experiences. Implicit motives are personal and refer 
to the desire of the participants to achieve the particular motive independent of norms or external 
incentives. As such, the personalized IAT is more suitable than the standard IAT to measure 
implicit motives. In a nutshell, the difference between standard IAT and personalized IAT is the 
attribute stimuli could be categorized according to the preference of the participants in the 
personalized IAT 
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In Experiment 3, the personalized IAT (IAT effect) weakly correlated with choices for the power 
motive regardless of the decision mode. The faster participants categorized agency motive 
stimuli when paired with the category ‘I like’, the more likely it was that they selected the power 
option. In Experiment 3, the reaction time and the accuracy measure of the IAT (error rate) did 
not correlate with either the MMG or the UMS. 
 
ReAL-IAT 
 
The absence of predictive relations between the IAT and the choices and ratings of achievement 
and affiliation motives led us to further improve the IAT measure by utilizing a recently 
developed analysis tool, namely the ReAL-IAT (Meissner & Rothermund, 2013). The ReAL 
model allows for separate estimations of the recoding and association processes within the IAT. 
While the IAT is meant to measure implicit associations, a more strategic process is also possible 
within the IAT. The strategic process is labelled recoding because a possible process within the 
IAT is participants recode the categories of the IAT. For example, as opposed to categorizing 
disliked stimuli and exemplars representing the agency motive to their respective categories, 
participants might categorize both stimuli to a single superordinate category (e.g., ‘negative’ or 
‘effortful’). Eliminating the instructed categories during the task will undermine the assessment 
of the associations’ strength towards the intended target’s category. Employing the ReAL model 
allows a separation of association and recoding processes and thus helps to calculate a pure 
measure of associative strength for each of the target categories. 
 
In addition to the use of the ReAL-IAT, the attribute categories were changed from liking (exp. 
3) to wanting (exp. 4). Wanting is deemed more appropriate for the implicit motives as wanting 
pertains to needs and desires while liking pertains to evaluations (for a critical evaluation of 
wanting IATs, see Tibboel et al., 2011, in press). 
 
In experiment 4, the association parameters of the ReAL-IAT did not correlate with the PSE and 
did not predict choices and ratings of the motive options. Interestingly, the association parameter 
of the communal motive correlated positively with the explicit motive scale for hope for control 
(UMS).  The recoding parameter of the ReAL-IAT did not correlate with the PSE and the UMS 
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but significantly predicted ratings of the power options. The more participant recoded the 
categories paired with ’I want’, the higher the power options were evaluated. 
 
Summary and Future Outlook 
 
Results from experiment 3 and 4 combined indicated that more work needs to be done to develop 
a variant of the IAT that is capable of assessing implicit motives. The personalized IAT indicated 
some success with regards to the power motive options independent of the decision mode. It is 
unclear whether the predictive relation between the IAT and the power options was due to the 
IAT measuring the implicit or the explicit motives. The ReAL-IAT seems to support the 
conclusion that the IATs predictive effect is due to explicit motive components as it was entirely 
due to the recoding parameter as opposed to the association parameter. If the current IAT is more 
likely to measure explicit motives as opposed to implicit, perhaps making the task less evaluative 
and more need- or desire- oriented is more desirable. In other words, instead of evaluation or 
liking, the IAT should measure desire or wanting. Apparently, just exchanging the attribute 
labels from “liking” to “wanting” does not change the basic nature of the task – it is highly likely 
that participants will recode the attributes in terms of valence (see Tibboel et al., 2011, in press).  
 
In a recently developed new variant of a Wanting-IAT, Koranyi et al. (2016) induced a strong 
motive to drink before the IAT by having participants consume a large amount of salty crackers, 
and then attached motive-related consequences to one of the attribute categories of the IAT: 
Categorizing beverages stimuli to the wanting response was accompanied with a gurgling sound 
and led to amount of water at the end of the experiment. In their experiment, Koranyi et al. 
(2016) showed that the wanting-IAT exhibit differences between desired and undesired stimuli 
that were not visible in a standard liking IAT. 
 
Conceptually implicit motives are closer to wanting and desiring than liking. Thus a wanting-
IAT would be more suitable to assess implicit motives than the standard liking IAT. In a 
preliminary unpublished study (Kattlun, 2015), it was shown that a Wanting-IAT, using agency 
and communal motives as target categories, correlates with explicit measures of motives. This 
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indicates that even though the IAT is a promising venue there might be a conceptual problem of 
using the IAT as measurement of implicit motives
10
.   
 
3.1.3 Picture Story Exercise 
 
The golden standard of the implicit motive measurement is the picture story exercise (PSE). As 
mentioned, the Thematic Apperception Test and the current variant of it, the PSE, was the 
measurement of implicit motives that was used to validate key important features of implicit and 
explicit motives as captured in McClelland (1989) and Schultheiss and Brunstein (2010).  
 
In Experiment 4, we utilized the PSE as our measurement of implicit motive. Procedure of the 
PSE followed that of Schultheiss and Pang (2007) and coding was done by four trained coders 
following the Winter (1994) manual. Across the four coders, inter rater agreements were highly 
satisfactory as indicated by high intraclass correlation coefficient scores of .94 for achievement, 
.97 for affiliation and .89 for power motives.   In this experiment, we did not find a predictive 
relation between the PSE and intuitive decisions of motive options. This indicates that perhaps 
the crucial problem lies beyond the measurement of implicit motive. Even when the current best 
practice of implicit motive measurement was used, we did not find evidence for our hypothesis. 
Alternatively, the assessed decisions were not intuitive.    
 
3.2 Distinction between Intuitive and Deliberative Decisions 
 
Previously, we have discussed the measurement issue with regards to assessment of implicit 
motives. The absence of evidence for our hypothesis, however, could be due to the fact that we 
did not properly assess intuition. While basic distinction of intuitive and deliberative may be 
clear (intuitive decisions are spontaneous and impulsive while deliberative decisions are explicit 
and conscious), the processes involved are less clear. In the following subsections we will 
discuss three points in turn: (a) when exactly the intuitive mode of decision making becomes 
activated, (b) what conditions and variables determine which process will be dominant and (c) 
                                                          
10
 E.g., pertaining to the distinction between hot and cold affective states (see Blaison et al., 2011) 
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the motivational sources that influence and drive the process. Alongside each component, 
implications for future studies will be presented. 
  
3.2.1 When is intuitive mode activated? 
 
Intuitive mode can be activated when deliberation is overwhelmed. Betsch and Glöckner (2010) 
presented participants with a large amount of running information alongside distracting stimuli 
and demonstrated that intuition is capable of integrating a large amount of information. In our 
study decisions were made in each scenario. This allowed participants to treat each scenario as 
separate decision task. Each scenario dealt with only three options which were well within the 
range of working memory and thus deliberation could handle the task without any problem. This 
could be the reason why we did not find the intended effect within our study. For future studies, 
it would be interesting to present large amount of motive-related information to see if intuition 
could better detect these motives’ features. Motives information on different activities should be 
presented in a random order by interspersing achievement, affiliation and power information. 
This mirrors the real life in which information is often obtained via different sources at various 
time intervals. Similar to Betsch and Glöckner idea, the influence of intuitive process on motive-
congruent decisions could manifest in the form of affinity due to intuition retaining higher 
average count of specific motive information.   
 
Intuitive mode can be activated when highly relevant information is present. To illustrate, 
receiving unfair treatment may lead to immediate feelings of anger which lead to a spontaneous 
decision of enacting revenge. Highly relevant information could be those that are emotionally-
laden (e.g. anger, being in love), vivid (e.g. shark attacks or plane crash), or recent (e.g. 
availability heuristic). In our study decisions were not emotionally-laden nor were they striking 
or vivid. This could be the reason why we did not find the intended effect. Future studies should 
examine the influence of motives in a context that is relevant for the intuitive mode. Moral 
judgment is one such context. It is an appropriate context because (a) moral judgment is often 
emotionally-laden, (b) intuitive and deliberative moral judgments often conflict and (c) there are 
striking similarities between moral foundations of fairness, care and authority and achievement, 
affiliation and power (Haidt, 2001).  
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3.2.2 When activated which conditions determine which process 
affect behavior? 
 
In general, there is a lack of developed theory on the necessary and sufficient conditions that 
determine whether intuitive or deliberative process determines behaviours. Three determining 
variables have been proposed: (a) experience, (b) availability of resources and (c) the decision 
makers’ own preference.  
 
With regards to experience, the more familiar the decision context, the more likely it is for 
intuitive process to take over. To illustrate, many automatic activities (e.g. driving) began as a 
deliberate process of step-by-step learning. After sufficient amount of repetitions, behaviours 
become spontaneous. In other words, intuitive processes determine those behaviours that have 
undergone implicit learning (learning by doing) (Hogarth, 2001).   
 
The second proposal pertains to the availability of resources.  Under stress, individuals might 
react intuitively whereas with enough cognitive resources they would realize they should have 
behaved deliberatively. In lab experiments, availability of resources is manipulated via time 
pressure by providing a strict time limit on a task or via cognitive load by occupying 
participants’ working memory while working on a task. In these two conditions resource 
capacity is reduced and intuitive processes are assumed to be dominant. In some cases, however, 
when the stakes are high, stress condition inhibits spontaneous process, namely when one 
‘chokes under pressure’ (Baumeister, 1984).  
 
Lastly, intuitive and deliberative decisions might become dominant because of decision makers’ 
own preference (Betsch, 2004). Individuals valuing intuition are more likely to follow their 
intuitive decisions while individuals valuing deliberation are more likely to follow their 
deliberative decisions. The antecedents of these preferences might have been individuals’ value 
system (Schwartz, 1992), their Big 5 personality (Costa and McCrae, 1992) or their risk attitude 
(risk averse or risk loving; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).   
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3.2.3 Which motivational sources influence and drive which 
process? 
 
According to Strack and Deutsch’s Reflective and Impulsive Model (RIM), intuitive processes 
belong to the impulsive system and deliberative processes belong to the reflective system. While 
impulsive system has a passive role of providing content during decisions, the reflective system 
is in charge of decision making. In the case of a dominant impulsive system, the reflective 
system simply translates the response of the intuitive system into decisions. When this is not the 
case, the reflective system takes control of decisions. As such the explicit motive has advantage 
because it is already located in the decision making system. In other words, the threshold 
necessary for implicit motives to influence decisions is higher than the threshold for explicit 
motives. Hence, only experiments that give relatively large advantage to the implicit motives 
will witness its influence on decisions. This dissertation did not give the appropriate advantage 
and as such no support was found for the hypothesis. One implementation to give implicit 
motives an advantage is to take only those participants that are high in implicit motives but are 
low in the corresponding explicit motives.   
 
Finally according to our hypotheses, intuitive decisions draw their content from implicit motives 
and deliberative decisions draw their content from explicit motives.  
 
3.3 Do Implicit Motives Predict Decisions?  
 
The previous sections focused on measurement issues regarding the assessment of implicit 
motives and on the distinction between intuitive and deliberative decisions.  But perhaps the 
reason implicit motives do not drive intuitive decisions is because implicit motives do not 
influence decisions at all. According to the dual-motive theory of McClelland, implicit motives 
affect only spontaneous behavior --not controlled behavior. Perhaps decision, because it is made 
consciously, is by its very nature a form of controlled or strategic behavior. As such, if we accept 
that intuitive decisions are controlled even when the reasons behind the decisions remain (at least 
partly) unknown, our results would be consistent with the dual-motive theory. That is, implicit 
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motives do not have an influence in the domain of controlled behavior, in our case the decision-
making domain.  
 
The implicit motives literature with its impressive empirical work, including decades-long 
longitudinal studies, has never clearly specified the mechanisms in which implicit motives 
function. At best, an array of correlations was found at both the biological (hormones) and the 
cognitive (attention, memory) level
11
. The causal direction between the correlates and the 
motives as well as the mechanisms linking motives and behaviors are still a mystery. One 
possible mechanism in which implicit motives impart their influence on behavior is via implicit 
self-regulation. Goals that are congruent with motives allow individuals to draw more 
motivational resources because enjoyment of an activity reduces self-control cost (Müller, 2015). 
The ease provided by implicit self-regulation increases the chance that the individuals will reach 
their goals and goal attainment in turn provides positive feedback that satisfies implicit motives 
which adds more enjoyment and motivation for individuals to further pursue the congruent goals. 
Due to this we discovered the robust longitudinal effect between achievement and academic 
success,  affiliation and marriage satisfaction and between power and managerial success. A 
comprehensive study of these dynamic relations as such, however, is rare within the implicit 
motive literature.  
This study is one of the few that attempted to categorize mechanisms that could possibly bridge 
the gap between motives and behaviors, namely that an intuitive mode via feelings transfers the 
influence of implicit motives to decisions, whereas a deliberative mode  transfers the influence of 
explicit motives to decisions (decisions in turn determine behavior). While no evidence 
supporting this moderation has been found, it might be too early to do away with the hypotheses 
altogether. There are several ways to proceed: 1) the influence of intuitive process may manifest 
itself when behavior is less controlled or 2) Implementations of the intuitive mode could have 
been modified as section 2.3 indicated.   
The problem with decisions was that they might have been clearly controlled. Another 
behavioral indicator that is influenced by spontaneous and controlled process alike is time spent 
on a task or persistence. Participants may persist on a task because they explicitly value the 
                                                          
11 See Stanton & Schultheiss (2009) for hormonal correlates of (power) motives and Schultheiss & Hale (2007) for implicit 
motives modulation of attentional orienting.  
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outcome of the task or because they feel attracted to perform the task. In other words, persistence 
may be decided deliberately due to the evaluation of the value of the task or intuitively due to the 
desirability of the task. The task itself could be achievement, affiliation or power oriented. In this 
manner, it would be possible to test whether persistence on a specific motive related task 
depends on whether the intuitive or the deliberative process was stronger.  
Alternatively, motives content could be attached to products such as movies or objects 
symbolizing achievement, affiliation or power motives. Perhaps the scenarios design did not 
work due to its verbal nature. Selecting a product will allow participants to decide more 
spontaneously. A few challenges to this approach are finding whether the products contain 
predominantly each of the motives and verifying that the participants selected the products due to 
the motives feature. 
 
3.4 Conclusion  
 
Literature on implicit motives is mute on the mechanisms that link implicit motives with 
behavior. When exists, it is speculative and has not been directly investigated. This study was a 
promising first take to address the issue. Similarly content of intuitive decisions has been a topic 
that is neglected within both the psychology and the economics field. This study was the first to 
connect motivational sources such as implicit and explicit motives to intuitive and deliberative 
decisions.  
 
Evidence for the proposed relations between motives and decision mode has not been found. The 
problem with implicit motive measure and the complexity of intuitive and deliberative processes 
have hampered attempts to properly test the hypotheses. Alternatively, implicit motives might 
not influence decisions at all or that the hypotheses might have been misspecified or should be 
further qualified. The relation between intuitive process and implicit motives might manifest in 
less controlled behaviors such as time spent on activities or enjoyment of the activities. 
Secondly, the intuitive mode could have been implemented differently by providing large 
amount of information or by manipulating available resources. Lastly, the hypotheses could be 
tested in a more suitable domain such as that of moral judgments or on emotionally-laden issues.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Material Set of Pilot Study 1 
1. Multi-Motive Grid (Sokolowski et al., 2000) 
2. Achievement Motives Scale – Revised (Lang & Fries, 2006) 
3. Intuitive and Deliberative Instructions 
4. Decision Tasks 
 
Appendix A.1 Multi-Motive Grid (Sokolowski et al., 2000) 
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Appendix A.2 Achievement Motives Scale (Lang & Fries, 2006) 
The following statements were accompanied by a 4-point scale ranging from (1) fits me perfectly 
to (4) does not fit me at all. The exact wordings in German were as follow: (1) trifft genau auf 
mich zu, (2) trifft überwiegend (größtenteils) auf mich zu, (3) trifft überwiegend (größtenteils) 
auf mich zu and (4) trifft auf mich überhaupt nicht zu. The first five statements measured Hope 
for Success and the later five statements measured Fear of Failure.  
 
1. Ich mag Situationen, in denen ich feststellen kann, wie gut ich bin. 
 
2. Wenn mir ein Problem gestellt wird, das ich vielleicht lösen kann, dann reizt es mich, damit  
sofort anzufangen. 
 
3. Situationen, in denen ich von meinen Fähigkeiten Gebrauch machen kann, machen mir Spaß. 
 
4. Mich reizen Situationen, in denen ich meine Fähigkeiten testen kann. 
 
5. Ich fühle mich zu Arbeiten hingezogen, in denen ich die Möglichkeit habe, meine Fähigkeiten 
zu prüfen. 
 
6. In etwas schwierigen Situationen, in denen viel von mir selbst abhängt, habe ich Angst zu 
versagen. 
 
7. Es beunruhigt mich, etwas zu tun, wenn ich nicht sicher bin, daß ich es kann. 
 
8. Arbeiten, die ich nicht schaffen kann, machen mir Angst, auch dann, wenn niemand meinen 
Mißerfolg bemerkt. 
 
9. Auch wenn niemand zuguckt, fühle ich mich in neuen Situationen ziemlich ängstlich. 
 
10. Wenn ich ein Problem nicht sofort verstehe, werde ich ängstlich. 
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Appendix A.3 Intuitive and Deliberative Instructions 
 
Intuitive Condition 
 
Willkommen beim Experiment der Abteilung Allgemeine Psychologie 2 der  Friedrich-Schiller-
Universität Jena. Sie werden mit 2 Euro für Ihre Teilnahme am Experiment belohnt. Das Experiment wird 
etwa 30-45 Minuten Ihrer Zeit in Anspruch nehmen. 
 
Diese Studie untersucht die Beziehung zwischen verschiedenen Aspekten der Motivation, um daraus Ihre 
allgemeinen Präferenzen festzustellen. Insbesondere würde diese Studie gerne die Rolle der Intuition bei 
der Entscheidungsfindung feststellen. Die Entscheidung  durch Intuition / spontane Entscheidung hat  sich 
laut Wilson (1993) als positives Element für die subjektive Zufriedenheit nach der Entscheidungsfindung 
herausgestellt und hat laut Halberstadt und Levine (2006) ebenfalls eine bessere Leistung bei  objektiven 
Kriterien zur Folge. 
 
Im Folgenden werden Sie mit einer Reihe von Entscheidungsfragen  konfrontiert. Bitte folgen Sie bei der 
Beantwortung allein Ihrer Intuition und Ihren Präferenzen. Bei der Beantwortung gibt es keine richtigen 
oder falschen Antworten . Intuition ist auch als Bauchgefühl, spontane Entscheidung oder Auswahl einer 
Option zu verstehen, welche keine unmittelbaren Beweggründe benötigt.   Bitte beantworten Sie deshalb 
die Fragen allein nach Ihrem Gefühl und nach dem, was Sie als geeignet erachten.  
 
Deliberative Condition 
 
Willkommen beim Experiment der Abteilung Allgemeine Psychologie 2 der  Friedrich-Schiller-
Universität Jena. Sie werden mit 2 Euro für Ihre Teilnahme am Experiment belohnt. Das Experiment wird 
etwa 30-45 Minuten Ihrer Zeit in Anspruch nehmen. 
 
Diese Studie untersucht die Rolle der Überlegung bei der Entscheidungsfindung. Mangelnde Überlegung 
führt zu schlechteren Ergebnissen bei der Findung einer guten Entscheidung. Finanzkrise und Episoden 
des Bedauerns werden den negativen Folgen von Mangel an Überlegung zugeschrieben. Verschiedene 
Verzerrungen und fehlerhafte Heuristiken wurden ebenfalls ausführlich dokumentiert (Kahneman, 2010). 
Wir möchten testen, ob Überlegung in verschiedenen Aspekten der Entscheidungen zu mehr Kongruenz 
mit verschiedenen Aspekten des Selbst führt . 
 
Im folgenden finden Sie eine Reihe von Entscheidungsfragen. Bitte denken Sie sorgfältig über ihre 
Antworten nach. Die Studie ist über Ihre Vorlieben und daher, bitten wir Sie, gründlich darüber 
nachzudenken, was eine gute Entscheidung für Sie ist. Bitte geben Sie 3 der wichtigsten Gründe / 
Begründungen an, warum Sie sich für die von Ihnen gewählte Option entschieden haben. Es gibt nur 6 
Entscheidungsfragen zu erledigen und somit bitten wir Sie, sich Zeit zu nehmen und sich so gut wie Sie 
können, alle Pro und Contra der Wahl zu überlegen. Seien Sie ganz eindeutig in Ihrer Antwort und 
erläutern Sie diese so ausführlich wie Sie es für notwendig halten. 
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Appendix A.4 Decision Tasks 
The decision tasks consisted of six scenarios. The content of the decision tasks is exactly the 
same in the intuitive and deliberative condition, except that participants were asked to state their 
reasons in the deliberative condition only. 
 
1. Geschäftsleitung eines Unternehmens 
 
+ Geschäftsleitung des Unternehmens AB 
  
Informationen zum Unternehmen 
 
- AB ist ein Einzelhandelsunternehmen, welches kleinere Produkte, wie Shampoo, Seife und kleine 
Süßwaren verkauft.  
  - In einer Filiale wird ab sofort ein Sachbearbeiter gesucht.  
  
Stellenbeschreibung  
 - Stellt ohne weiteres die Anlieferung der Waren durch die Zulieferer sicher. 
 - Folgt spezifischen Anweisungen.  
 - Gibt der Geschäftsführung regelmäßig Berichte ab. 
 
 
+ Geschäftsführung des Unternehmens XY 
  
Informationen zum Unternehmen 
 
- XY ist ein Unternehmen des Einzelhandelsunternehmen, welches Werkzeuge, Gartengeräte und 
Baumaterialen verkauft.   
- In einer Filiale wird ab sofort ein Sachbearbeiter gesucht. 
  
Stellenbeschreibung  
 - Stellt die Verfügbarkeit der Produkte und den Lagerbestand sicher. 
 - Er leitet engagiert die Warenauslage und das Aussehen der Filiale.  
 - Bringt neue Zulieferer in Erfahrung und gewinnt diese.  
 
 
Antwort/ Auswahl: 
 
□ Sachbearbeiter des Unternehmens AB       □ Sachbearbeiter des Unternehmens XY       
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2. Politiker 
 
Informationen zur Partei Z und X 
- Die Partei X und Z vertritt die Interessen der Kleinstadt Belding im Staat Michigan.  
- Sie führt Erhebungen durch, reicht Berichte ein und stellt Anträge an die Regierung Michigans, die über 
die jährliche Finanzierung und die Zulassung ausgewählter Projekte bestimmt. 
 
+ Assistent der Parteileitung der Partei Z 
 
Stellenbeschreibung: 
- Partei X und Partei Z arbeitet im gleichen Gebiet.  
- Sie haben eine andere Organisationsstruktur, allerdings greifen sie auf bereits existierende 
Erhebungen zurück und entwickeln Anträge für die Regierung des Staates Michigan.  Alle 
Mitarbeiter sollten in der ersten Zeit ihrer Tätigkeit einen Antrag einreichen. Die Anträge 
werden anonym eingereicht.  
 
 
+ Assistent der Parteileitung der Partei X 
 
Stellenbeschreibung: 
- Erhebungen in Auftrag geben und Berichte schreiben. 
- Eine detaillierte Arbeitsweise und Achtsamkeit gegenüber Details sind entscheidend für 
diesen Job. Die Politik und die Projekte hängen schwer von den Ergebnissen dieser 
Erhebungen ab.  
 
 
Antwort/ Auswahl: 
 
□ Assistent der Parteileitung der Partei Z      □ Assistent der Parteileitung der Partei X 
 
 
3. Fußballspieler gesucht 
 
 
Beschreibung des Teams 
 
- Das Team von Carl-Zeiss Jena sucht nach ein neues Mitglied im Team. 
- Carl-Zeiss Jena war die beste Fußballmannschaft der DDR und vertrat bereits Deutschland bei dem 
Europacup. 
- In letzter Zeit stieg die Mannschaft in die vierte deutsche Liga ab.  
- Aktuell sucht sie nach frischen neuen Talenten, die positive Veränderungen in das Team bringen.  
 
 
Zwei Posten sind verfügbar: 
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+ Verteidiger. In Carl-Zeiss wird das die Position der Verteidigung auf links sein. Sie beinhaltet 
Verantwortung in dieser Position und gemeinsam mit anderen Verteidigern. Die Spieler bewegen sich 
selten aus den Seiten ihres Spielfeldes. Unabdingbar ist, dass er den an ihn übertragenen Teil des 
Spielfeldes verteidigt. 
 
+ Mittelfeldstürmer. Dies ist eine wichtige Position, die eine exakte Einschätzung der Situation und 
exzellenten Einsatz im Spiel erfordert. Die Bedeutung dieser Position hängt vom Spieler selbst ab; wie 
gut ist der Spieler in der Lage eine vorteilhafte Position auf dem Spielfeld zu finden. Der Ball sollte 
meistens zu den Stürmern gespielt werden, sodass die Wahrscheinlichkeit ein Tor zu schießen, maximiert 
wird.  
 
Antwort/ Auswahl: 
 
□ Verteidiger                                           □ Mittelfeldstürmer 
 
 
 
4. Easy Going Magazin sucht Angestellte, um neue Positionen zu besetzen. 
 
Informationen zum Magazin  
 
- Das Easy Going Magazin richtet sich an Studierende, die sich in der späten Phase ihres Studiums 
befinden. Das Magazin bietet Informationen über Freizeitangebote in der Stadt und ihrer Umgebung an, 
genauso wie begehrte Tipps über weitere studentische Aktivitäten und Jobangebote. Derzeit sieht sich das 
Magazin in Konkurrenz zum Online-Zugang zu sozialen Medien. So beabsichtigt das Easy Going 
Magazin jetzt lokale Informationen bereitzustellen, welche sich online nur schwer finden lassen. 
Die neuen verfügbaren Stellen sind: 
+ Reporter 
- Der Reporter hat die Freiheit, Informationen auszuwählen, von denen er glaubt, dass diese 
noch nicht ohne weiteres verfügbar sind. Diese sollten von Interesse für Studenten sein, deren 
Studienzeit sich dem Ende neigt. Kreativität und hohe Eigenmotivation sind erforderlich. Auf 
ein hohes Leistungsniveau und exzellente Qualität ist mit einigen Einschränkungen selbst zu 
achten.  
+ Junior Herausgeber 
- Die Aufgabe ist, Zusammenfassungen und früh eingereichte Artikel auszuwählen und diese 
auf der Basis bestimmter Kriterien einzuschätzen. Häufig wird diese Prioritätsliste von 
anderen Juniorherausgebern gegengeprüft, Objektivität und Sinnhaftigkeit werden für einen 
Aufstieg förderlich sein. Junior herausgeber assistieren Herausgebern während des gesamten 
Arbeitsprozesses  
Antwort/ Auswahl: 
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□  Reporter                                          □ Junior Herausgeber 
5. Gutschein 
 
 
Sie sind der Glückliche, der sich über ein Geschenk freuen kann; das Geschenk ist ein Gutschein für 
Freizeitaktivitäten. Sie können zwischen unterschiedlichen Gutscheinen wählen, bitten wählen Sie, 
welchen Sie haben möchten. 
 
+ Kletterwand 
-  Kletterwände bieten sportliche Aktivitäten, bei denen man alle Muskeln des Körpers und die Ausdauer, 
entsprechend seiner momentanen Fitness trainiert. Der Pfad bietet verschiedene Routen mit 
unterschiedlichen Schwierigkeitsstufen. Der Punkt, an dem man aufhören möchte, kann selbst gewählt 
werden, für Anfänger und Profis gleichermaßen. Eine Sicherheitsausrüstung, die Eintrittsgebühr und eine 
Stunde Einführungszeit sind im Gutschein inbegriffen. 
 
+ Kanufahren in der Natur 
-  Kanufahren in der Natur ist Teil eines Universitätssportkurses. Es ist leicht, günstig und ein gutes 
Training für den gesamten Körper. Dieser Kurs wird Sie entlang der schönen Ufer der Saale führen. 
Informationsbroschüre über Flora und Fauna an der Saale, Kanu samt Paddeln und ein Kursleiter für die 
Fahrt sind im Gutschein inbegriffen.   
 
Antwort/ Auswahl: 
 
□  Kletterwand                                         □ Kanufahren in der Natur 
 
 
 
6. Running Man TV Show 
 
Sie sind eingeladen, Gast der erfolgreichen Show „Running Man“ zu sein. In der Show findet eine Reihe 
von Spielen statt. Am Ende erhält der Gewinner einen Schlüssel aus echtem Gold. Es gibt zwei Folgen, 
aus denen Sie auswählen können. Bitte wählen Sie eine der beiden aus: 
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+ Individuell 
- Die individuell Möglichkeit beinhaltet eine Reihe von 10 Spielen, in denen die 10 Teilnehmer als 
Einzelkämpfer gegeneinander antreten (z.B. Verstecken; der Schnellste, der eine Aufgabe löst usw.). Der 
Sieg bei einem Spiel gibt Vorteile für das finale Spiel (bei welchem es den Preis gibt). Nur eine Person, 
der finale Gewinner, gewinnt den Preis. 
 
+ Gruppe  
- Bei die gruppe Möglichkeit werden die 10 Teilnehmer in zwei Gruppen unterteilt und diese Gruppen 
treten in 6 Spielen gegeneinander an. Jeder Gewinn in einem Spiel bietet Vorteile für das finale Spiel. Die 
Gruppe, die das Endspiel für sich entscheidet, teilt sich den Preis untereinander (gleicher Preis wie in 
Option 1).  
Antwort/ Auswahl: 
 
□  Individuell                                    □ Gruppe 
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Appendix B.1 Unified Motive Scales (Schönbrodt & Gerstenberg, 2012) 
Two different item formats are present in the UMS: classical items formulated as statements, which 
require an agreement rating, and goals, which require an importance rating. Statements are rated on a 
6-point Likert scale where each response option is labeled (0 = trifft überhaupt nicht zu, 1 = trifft 
nicht zu, 2 = trifft eher nicht zu, 3 = trifft eher zu, 4 = trifft ziemlich zu, 5 = trifft vollkommen zu [0 = 
strongly disagree, 1 = disagree, 2 = rather disagree, 3 = rather agree, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree]). 
Goals as well are rated on a 6-point Likert scale where each response option is labeled (0 = nicht 
wichtig, 1 = ein wenig wichtig, 2 = etwas wichtig, 3 = wichtig, 4 = sehr wichtig, 5 = außerordentlich 
wichtig [0 = not important to me, 1 = of little importance to me, 2 = of some importance to me, 3 = 
important to me, 4 = very important to me, 5 = extremely important to me.]). Items from the PRF, 
AMS, MAFF, and new items need the statement rating, items taken from the PVQ and GOALS need 
the importance rating. We recommend first presenting all statement items as a block and then 
presenting all goals as a second block. Similar items should not be presented consecutively. 
UMS Hope Scales 
Source Original German Item English Version 
Achievement   
PVQ Meine Leistung stets auf einem hohen Niveau zu 
halten. 
Maintaining high standards for the quality 
of my work. 
PVQ Arbeit von hoher Qualitat zu leisten. Personally producing work of high 
quality. 
PVQ Projekte, die mich bis an die Grenze meiner 
Leistungsfahigkeit bringen. 
Projects that challenge me to the limits of 
my ability. 
GOALS Mich standig verbessern. Continuously improve myself. 
PVQ Standig neue, interessante und herausfordernde Ziele 
und Projekte. 
Continuously engage in new, exciting, 
and challenging goals and projects. 
PVQ Verantwortung fur schwierige und herausfordernde 
Aufgaben und Ziele zu ubernehmen. 
Opportunities to take on more difficult 
and challenging goals and 
responsibilities. 
PVQ Eigenverantwortlich etwas besser machen zu konnen 
als es bisher gemacht wurde. 
Personally doing things better than they 
have been done before. 
AMS Ich fuhle mich zu Arbeiten hingezogen, in denen ich 
die Moglichkeit habe, meine Fahigkeiten zu prufen. 
I am attracted to situations that allow me 
to test my abilities. 
PRF Ich habe mir vorgenommen, wenigstens etwas mehr zu My goal is to do at least a little bit more 
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leisten als irgend jemand vor mir. than anyone else has done before. 
PVQ Etwas Neues schafen zu konnen. Opportunities to create new things. 
Affiliation   
PRF Ich versuche, so of wie moglich in der Gesellschaf von 
Freunden zu sein. 
I try to be in the company of friends as 
much as possible,  
GOALS 
 
Viel mit anderen Menschen zusammen unternehmen. Engage in a lot of activities with other 
people. 
PRF 
 
Ich verbringe viel Zeit damit, Freunde zu besuchen. I spend a lot of time visiting friends. 
UMS 
 
Zusammentrefen mit anderen Menschen machen mich 
glucklich. 
Encounters with other people make me 
happy. 
PRF 
 
Of ware ich lieber allein als mit einer Gruppe von 
Freunden zusammen.# 
 
Often I would rather be alone than with a 
group of friends.# 
PRF 
 
Ich bemuhe mich, andere Leute kennen zu lernen. I go out of my way to meet people. 
PRF 
 
Ich entscheide mich meist fur Freizeitbeschafigungen, 
die ich zusammen mit anderen Leuten ausuben kann. 
 
I choose hobbies that I can share with 
other people. 
MAFF 
 
Ich schliese gern soviel Freundschafen wie ich kann. I like to make as many friends as I can. 
GOALS Einen grosen Bekanntenkreis haben. Have a wide circle of friends. 
UMS 
Wenn ich neue Leute kennenlernen kann, fuhle ich 
mich voller Energie. 
I feel a rush of energy when I get to know 
new people. 
  Power   
PVQ 
 
Uber eine Gruppe oder eine Organisation Kontrolle 
ausuben zu konnen. 
 
The opportunity to exercise control over 
an organization or group. 
GOALS Einfluss ausuben konnen Be able to exert influence. 
UMS Ich habe gern das Sagen. I like to have the final say. 
PRF 
 
Ich strebe nach Positionen, in denen ich Autoritat habe. 
 
I would like to be an executive with 
power over others. 
PVQ 
 
In einer Fuhrungsposition zu sein, wo andere fur 
mich arbeiten und von mir Anweisungen erhalten. 
 
To be in a leadership position in which 
others work for me or look to me for 
direction. 
PRF 
 
Ich habe nur wenig Interesse daran, andere zu fuhren.# I have little interest in leading others.# 
PRF 
 
Ich fuhle mich in meinem Element, wenn es darum 
geht, die Tatigkeiten anderer zu leiten. 
 
I feel confident when directing the 
activities of others. 
PVQ Andere Menschen beeinflussen zu konnen. Opportunities to influence others. 
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PVQ = Personal Values Questionnaire, PRF = Personality Research Form, AMS = Achievement Motive Scale, 
MAFF = Mehrabian Affiliation Scale. UMS = Unified Motive Scales. Reverse coded items are marked with a #. 
 
UMS Fear Scales 
Note. AMS = Achievement Motive Scale, New = items newly constructed for the present study. Reverse coded 
items are marked with a # 
 
PRF 
 
Ich versuche, andere unter meinen Einfluss zu 
bekommen, anstatt zuzulassen, dass sie mich 
kontrollieren. 
I try to control others rather than permit 
them to control me. 
PVQ Eine Stellung mit Prestige und Ansehen. A position with prestige. 
Source Original German Item English Version 
Failure   
AMS 
 
In etwas schwierigen Situationen, in denen viel 
von mir selbst abhangt, habe ich Angst zu versagen. 
 
I am afraid of failing in somewhat difficult 
situations when a lot depends on me. 
AMS 
 
Es beunruhigt mich, etwas zu tun, wenn ich nicht sicher 
bin, dass ich es kann. 
 
I feel uneasy doing something if I am not 
sure of succeeding. 
AMS 
 
Wenn ich ein Problem nicht sofort verstehe, werde ich 
angstlich. 
 
If I do not understand a problem 
immediately, I start feeling anxious. 
Rejection   
UMS 
 
Wenn ich jemanden neu kennenlerne, habe ich of 
Angst, abgelehnt zu werden. 
 
When I get to know new people, I often 
fear being rejected by them. 
UMS 
 
Wenn ich Kontakt zu Fremden aufnehme und die 
zeigen mir die kalte Schulter, dann fuhle ich mich 
unsicher. 
 
Being given the cold shoulder when 
approaching strangers makes me feel 
insecure. 
UMS 
 
Ich habe kein Problem damit von anderen Personen 
zuruckgewiesen zu werden.# 
Being rejected is no big deal for me.# 
Losing 
Control 
  
UMS 
 
Ich bekomme Angst, wenn sich Dinge meiner 
Kontrolle entziehen. 
 
I become scared when I lose control over 
things. 
UMS 
 
Wenn ich merke, dass ich auf manche Dinge 
keinen Einfluss habe, dann bin ich schnell beunruhigt. 
 
I start worrying instantly when I notice 
that I don’t have an impact on some 
things. 
UMS 
 
Die Vorstellung in einer Situation machtlos zu sein 
macht mir Angst. 
 
The idea of not having any control in a 
situation frightens me. 
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Appendix B.2 Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005) 
Ein Schläger und ein Ball kosten insgesamt $ 1,10. Der Schläger kostet 1 Dollar mehr als der 
Ball. Wie viel kostet der Ball? 
 
Wenn 5 Maschinen 5 Minuten brauchen, um 5 Produkte herzustellen, wie lange würden 100 
Maschinen brauchen, um 100 Produkte herzustellen? 
 
In einem See gibt es ein Beet mit Seerosen. Jeden Tag verdoppelt sich dieses Beet in der Größe. 
Wenn es 48 Tage dauert, bis das Beet den kompletten See bedeckt, wie lange würde es dauern, 
bis die Hälfte des Sees bedeckt ist? 
 
Appendix B.3 Post-Decision Questionnaire 
Instruction: Im Folgenden werden dir Fragen darüber gestellt, wie du während des Experiments 
Entscheidungen getroffen hast. (In the following you will be asked how you have made your 
decision during the experiment.) 
 
Post-Decision Questionnaire (Intuitive Condition) 
 
Original German Item English Version 
 
Wenn ich Entscheidungen traf, beobachtete ich sorgfältig 
meine innersten Gefühle. 
 
When making decision on the scenarios, I listen 
carefully to my deepest feelings. 
 
Wenn ich Entscheidungen traf, dachte ich über mich selbst 
nach und über meine Vorlieben. 
 
When making decision on the scenarios, I think about 
myself and my preference 
 
Bei meinen Entscheidungen spielten Gefühle eine große 
Rolle. 
 
My feelings play an important role in the scenarios 
decisions 
 
Wenn ich mich entschied, richtete ich mich nach meinem 
ersten Eindruck. 
 
When deciding on the scenarios, I take my first 
impression 
 
Wenn alle möglichen Alternativen gleich gut sind, 
entschied ich mich meistens für die, die mir gefühlsmäßig 
am meisten zusagte. 
 
In the scenarios, when all possible alternatives are 
equally good, I choose most of that appeals to me the 
most emotionally. 
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Post-Decision Questionnaire (Deliberative Condition) 
 
Appendix B.4 Preference for Intuition and Deliberation (Betsch, 2004) 
Instruction: Bitte beantworte alle folgenden Fragen über dein Leben im Allgemeinen. Deine 
Antworten sollten damit übereinstimmen, wie du generell Entscheidungen trifft. (Please answer 
the following questions with regards to how you normally are. Your answers should be 
determined by how you usually make your decisions.)  
 
Preference for Intuition  
Original German Item English Version 
 
Bevor ich Entscheidungen traf, dachte ich meistens 
erst mal gründlich nach. 
 
Before making decisions on the scenarios, I think them 
through 
 
Bevor ich Entscheidungen traf, dachte ich meistens 
erst mal über meine Ziele nach, die ich erreichen 
wollte. 
 
Before making decision on the scenarios, I think about the 
goals I want to achieve 
 
Wenn ich Entscheidungen traf, schmiedete ich lieber 
ausgefeilte Pläne, als etwas dem Zufall zu überlassen. 
 
When making decision on the scenarios, I keep in mind, 
that I prefer making detailed plans rather than leaving 
things to chance. 
 
Beim lösen der Optionen nahm ich zuerst die Fakten 
und Details auseinander, bevor ich mich entschied. 
 
When I solve the option in the scenarios, I first analyze the 
facts and details before I decide 
 
Beim Entscheiden dachte ich mehr über meine Pläne 
und Ziele nach als andere Menschen. 
 
In deciding on the scenarios, I think more about my plans 
and goals than other people do 
Original German Item English Version 
 
Bei den meisten Entscheidungen ist es sinnvoll, sich ganz auf 
sein Gefühl zu verlassen. 
 
With most decisions, it makes sense to completely 
rely on your feelings. 
 
Ich bevorzuge emotionale Menschen. 
 
I prefer emotional people. 
 
Ich bin ein sehr intuitiver Mensch. 
 
I am a very intuitive person. 
 
Ich mag emotionale Situationen, Diskussionen und Filme. 
 
I like emotional situations, discussions, and 
movies. 
 
Wenn es darum geht, ob ich anderen vertrauen soll, verlasse 
ich mich auf meine Gefühle. 
 
When it comes to trusting people, I can usually 
rely on my gut feelings. 
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Preference for Deliberation  
 
Appendix B.5 Decision Tasks 
Scenario 1: Du würdest gern ein Treffen mit/für deine Kollegen, Freunde oder Bekannte 
organisieren und Gastgeber sein. Es gibt mehrere Möglichkeiten, wie das Essen während der 
Party organisiert wird: 
 
Achievement Option Affiliation Option Power Option 
Dies wäre eine gute Chance für 
mich, meine Kochkünste zu 
verbessern. Ich möchte gern das 
Essen für die Party vorbereiten. 
Ich möchte, dass sich alle 
willkommen ,verbunden und 
involviert fühlen. Ich werde 
das Essen gemeinsam mit den 
anderen Leuten vorbereiten. 
Dies ist eine gute 
Gelegenheit, allen meine 
speziellen Kochrezepte zu 
zeigen. Jeder soll kommen 
und ich werde ihnen zeigen, 
was sie machen sollen, um 
das Essen zuzubereiten. 
 
Scenario 2: Du nimmst an einem psychologischen Experiment teil. Dabei gibt es drei Arten von 
Spielen, die du spielen kannst. Welches würdest du auswählen? 
 
Achievement Option Affiliation Option Power Option 
In dem Spiel "Exzellenter 
Blob" wird es dir ermöglicht, 
deine Motorik- und 
Aufmerksamtkeitsfähigkeiten 
zu testen. Du bekommst ein 
Feedback über deinen 
Fortschritt, damit du deine 
Im Spiel "Bindung" geht es 
darum sozial, freundlich und 
kooperativ zu sein. In dem Spiel 
kannst du kommunizieren, 
interagieren und neue 
Bekanntschaften machen. 
Das Spiel "Krieg von 
Athen" zeigt die Ergebnisse 
in einem Ranking-System. 
Deine höchste Punktzahl 
sowie dein Name wird in 
der Chronik aufgenommen, 
welche alle anderen Spieler 
Original German Item English Version 
 
Ich bin perfektionistisch. 
 
I am a perfectionist. 
 
Ich mag Situationen nicht, in denen ich mich auf meine Intuition 
verlassen muss. 
 
I do not like situations that require me to rely on 
my intuition. 
 
Ich denke erst nach, bevor ich handle. 
 
I think before I act. 
 
Bevor ich eine Entscheidung treffe, berechne ich sorgfältig die 
Vor- und Nachteile meiner Entscheidung. 
 
Before I make a decision, I calculate carefully 
the pro and cons of my decision. 
 
Ich bevorzuge komplexe anstatt einfache Probleme. 
 
I prefer complex to simple problems. 
Intuitive and Deliberative Decisions | 99 
Fähigkeiten verbessern 
kannst. 
sehen können. 
 
 
Scenario 3: Stell dir vor, dass du zwischen unterschiedlichen Karrierewegen entscheiden 
müsstest, welche dich am Ende jeweils zu einen der folgenden Berufe führen. Welchen Weg 
würdest du wählen? 
 
Achievement Option Affiliation Option Power Option 
Deine Arbeit ist die Kreation 
eines exzellenten Produktes. 
Du leitest die besten 
Forschungs- und 
Entwicklungsentwürfe 
während  der kontinuierlicher 
Verbesserung des Produktes. 
Deine Aufgabe ist es, die Einheit 
und die Motivation der 
Mitarbeiter im Team zu erhalten. 
Du sollst gemeinsame 
Aktivitäten organisieren und die 
Teammitglieder zu freundlichen 
Interaktionen miteinander 
ermutigen. 
Du wirst als Leiter eines 
kleinen Teams eingesetzt, 
das am Ende einen 
Empfehlungsbericht für die 
Firma vorlegen muss. Du 
sammelst Informationen 
und prüfst die Arbeit deiner 
Mitglieder. 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario 4: Stell dir vor, du bereitest dich auf eine Prüfung vor. Welche der folgenden Arten 
bevorzugst du? 
 
Achievement Option Affiliation Option Power Option 
Ich studiere allein und erstelle 
einen Plan, was ich jeden Tag 
in der Vorbereitungszeit 
erreichen möchte. So kann ich 
die Fortschritte, die ich 
mache, genau überprüfen. 
Ich gründe eine Arbeitsgruppe, 
damit wir uns  in der harten Zeit 
der Vorbereitung gegenseitig 
emotional unterstützen können. 
Ich unterrichte die anderen 
und diskutiere mit ihnen das 
Material für die Prüfung. 
Ich möchte wissen, was 
andere tun und ich versuche 
sie von der besten Art der 
Vorbereitung zu 
überzeugen. 
 
 
Scenario 5: Du erhältst ein Stipendium für ein Austauschprogramm. Das ist eine großartige 
Gelegenheit. An welche Universität würdest du gehen? 
 
Achievement Option Affiliation Option Power Option 
Universität Ä bietet tolle 
Kurse aus deinem Fachgebiet 
an und wäre eine gute Chance 
für dich, deine Themen besser 
zu verstehen. 
Universität Ö ist eine 
ausgelassene Universität mit 
vielen studentischen Aktivitäten 
und Möglichkeiten, um neue 
Leute zu treffen. 
Universität Ü ist hoch 
renommiert und den 
meisten Leuten bekannt. 
Dies kann in Zukunft 
beeinflussen, wie die 
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Menschen deinen 
Lebenslauf sehen. 
 
 
 
Scenario 6: Was sind deine Vorlieben bei der Wahl von sportlichen Aktivitäten? 
 
Achievement Option Affiliation Option Power Option 
Ich liebe Sportarten, die 
meine Fähigkeiten 
herausfordern und mir 
erlauben zu sehen, wie gut ich 
beim Sport bin. Nicht zu 
schwer und nicht zu leicht. 
Ich möchte dabei gut sein. 
Ich liebe Sportarten, die viel 
Teamarbeit einbeziehen. Es 
macht Spaß, gemeinsam Sport zu 
treiben und ich kann die 
Beziehung zu meinen Freunden 
und Bekannten auf diese Weise 
vertiefen. 
Ich liebe Sportarten, bei 
denen ein Publikum erlaubt 
ist. Andere sollen mir 
zujubeln und mich 
ermutigen, dadurch wird der 
Sport zu einer lustigen 
Erfahrung. Zu gewinnen 
gibt mir einen Kick. 
 
 
Scenario 7: An einem sonnigen Tag im Park hast du dich plötzlich gefragt, ob du jemals ein 
Haustier haben würdest, vielleicht irgendwann in der Zukunft. Aber es gibt viele Arten von 
Haustieren, auch viele Arten von Hunden und Katzen. Welches wäre ein gutes Haustier für dich? 
 
Achievement Option Affiliation Option Power Option 
Ein intelligentes Tier, das 
Tricks lernen kann und über 
Hügel und Löcher springt. Es 
macht mich glücklich, 
verschiedene Level von 
Tricks zu erreichen. 
Ein Haustier ist ein Gefährte, also 
werde ich nach einem 
mitfühlenden Tier suchen, das 
mich begleitet, wenn ich mich 
traurig oder glücklich fühle. 
Ein großes, starkes und 
dominantes Haustier wäre 
gut für mich. Es wird mir 
Respekt verschaffen, wenn 
ich es mitnehme. 
 
 
 
 
Scenario 8: Du hattest dir selbst versprochen, irgendeiner Art ehrenamtlicher Arbeit 
nachzugehen. Nachdem du etwas herum gefragt haben, bist du zu dieser Entscheidung 
gekommen: 
 
Achievement Option Affiliation Option Power Option 
Reparatur- und 
Fortschrittsarbeit. Ich würde 
arbeiten, um meine Stadt zu 
verbessern und kreative 
Dinge erfinden, die in der 
Stadt umgesetzt werden (neue 
Systeme, neue Anlagen). 
Fürsorge für die Bedürftigen 
(Arme / Flüchtlinge / Kinder). Es 
ist gut, eine herzliche Beziehung 
zu anderen zu haben und 
denjenigen zu helfen, die in Not 
sind. 
Eine Kampagne, um das 
Bewusstsein zu erhöhen. Ich 
möchte gern mit Menschen 
sprechen und meine 
Umwelt beeinflussen, um 
sie in eine bestimmte 
Richtung zu lenken. 
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Appendix B.6 Correlations between Motive Measures (MMG & UMS) 
 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
HS = Hope for Success, HA = Hope for Affiliation, HC = Hope for Control, FF = Fear of Failure, FA = Fear of 
Affiliation, FC = Fear of Losing Control.  
Red rectangles highlight the correlations between implicit and explicit motives in the corresponding hope and fear 
component.  
 
 MMG-
HS 
MMG-
HA 
MMG- 
HC 
UMS-
HS 
UMS-
HA 
UMS-
HC 
MMG-
FF 
MMG-
FA 
MMG-
FC 
UMS- 
FF 
UMS-
FA 
UMS-
FC 
MMG-
HS 
-            
MMG-
HA 
.24* -           
MMG-
HC 
  .60** .24* -          
UMS-
HS 
-.06 .00 -.13 -         
UMS-
HA 
.04 .03 .12 .31* -        
UMS-
HC 
.22 -.13 .31* .42** .43** -       
MMG-
FF 
.23 .24* .27* -.29 .15 .07 -      
MMG-
FA 
.08 .01 .08 -.06 -.00 .01 .32** -     
MMG-
FC 
.01 -.27* -.03 -.01 .03 .12 .32** .48** -    
UMS-
FF 
.04 .05 -.03 .09 -.09 -.06 .03 .14 .05 -   
UMS-
FA 
-.31* .08 -.12 .07 -.09 -.17 -.04 .16 .06 .44** -  
UMS-
FC 
.07 .11 .09 .33** .06 .34** .03 .14 .14 .52** .19 - 
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Appendix C: Summary of Mismatch Regressions 
1. Experiment 1 
2. Experiment 2 
3. Experiment 3 
4. Experiment 4 
Appendix C.1 Summary of Mismatch Regressions for Experiment 1 
Standardized regression coefficients for regressions of choices and ratings of achievement, affiliation, and power 
options on implicit and explicit Achievement motives, condition (deliberative vs. intuitive), and their interaction. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
a 1 = intuitive mode, 2 = deliberative mode 
 
Regressions of choices and ratings of all three motive options with achievement motives, 
decision modes and their interaction as predictors indicated that the predictor effect of 
achievement motive was not motive-specific. Explicit achievement motive did not only 
positively predict ratings of achievement option, but also predicted choices and ratings of power 
options. We also found that decision mode strongly predicted choices and ratings of affiliation 
options: Participants in the intuitive as compared to the deliberative mode were more likely to 
select affiliation option as well as rate affiliation option more positively. With regards to our 
hypothesis, we found no evidence of interaction between achievement motive and decision mode 
when predicting choices and ratings of achievement options nor when predicting choices and 
ratings of power options. We did find a positive weak interaction between implicit achievement 
motive and decision mode in predicting ratings of affiliation option. This means that the 
 Implicit Achievement Motive Explicit Achievement Motive 
 
Choices of 
Achievement 
Options 
Ratings of 
Achievement 
Options 
Choices of 
Achievement 
Options 
Ratings of 
Achievement 
Options 
motive  .16 .03   .06    .27* 
condition
a
 -.07 .05 -.13 -.01 
interaction  .15 .13  .11 .11 
R
2
  .06 .02  .03 .07 
 
Choices of 
Affiliation Options 
Ratings of 
Affiliation Options 
Choices of 
Affiliation Options 
Ratings of 
Affiliation Options 
motive -.08 -.09 -.12  .13 
condition
a
  -.27*  -.26*  -.21
+
  -.24
+
 
interaction  .12   .21
+
  -.22
+
 -.14 
R
2
  .08   .11
+
   .12*   .09 
 
Choices of Power 
Options 
Ratings of Power 
Options 
Choices of Power 
Options 
Ratings of Power 
Options 
motive -.09   .12     .32*       .34** 
condition
a
 -.01   .01 -.10 -.09 
interaction   -.25* -.15 -.02   .08 
R
2
 .06   .04   .10
+
    .12
+
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predictive effect of implicit achievement motive on ratings of affiliation option was stronger in 
the deliberative as compared to the intuitive condition. This was the opposite of our hypothesis. 
With regards to the explicit motive, we found a negative weak interaction between motives and 
choices of affiliation option. This means that the predictive effect of explicit achievement motive 
on choices of affiliation option was stronger in the intuitive as compared to the deliberative 
condition. This was also the opposite of our hypothesis. Lastly, we found a significant negative 
interaction between implicit achievement motive and choices of power options. This indicated 
that the predictive effect of implicit achievement option on choices of power options was 
stronger in the intuitive as compared to the deliberative condition. The last finding is consistent 
with our hypothesis.  
Standardized regression coefficients for regressions of choices and ratings of achievement, 
affiliation, and power options on implicit and explicit Affiliation motives, condition (deliberative 
vs. intuitive), and their interaction. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
a 
1 = intuitive mode, 2 = deliberative mode 
 
Regressions of choices and ratings of all three motive options with affiliation motives, decision 
modes and their interaction as predictors indicated that the predictor effect of affiliation motive 
was not motive-specific. Explicit affiliation motive did not only predict choices of affiliation 
options, but also predicted choices and ratings of achievement options, as well as ratings of 
power options. It was also found that decision mode strongly predicted choices and ratings of 
 Implicit Affiliation Motive Explicit Affiliation Motive 
 
Choices of 
Achievement 
Options 
Ratings of 
Achievement 
Options 
Choices of 
Achievement 
Options 
Ratings of 
Achievement 
Options 
motive    .09 -.03   -.34** .06 
condition
a
     .33*    .29*  .24*  .22
+
 
interaction -.02 .07 .20
+
  .22
+
 
R
2
    .13* .07   .29**  .11
+
 
 
Choices of 
Affiliation 
Options 
Ratings of 
Affiliation 
Options 
Choices of 
Affiliation 
Options 
Ratings of 
Affiliation 
Options 
motive -.05 -.04    .40**      .49** 
condition
a
  .02 -.05 .01 -.07 
interaction -.02 -.10 .03 -.00 
R
2
  .00   .02  .16*      .25** 
 
Choices of 
Power Options 
Ratings of 
Power Options 
Choices of 
Power Options 
Ratings of 
Power Options 
motive  .07   .16   .04       .34** 
condition
a
 -.04 -.09 -.03   .04 
interaction  .01 -.15 -.03 -.01 
R
2
  .01   .04   .01   .12
+
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achievement options. Participants in the deliberative mode were more likely to select 
achievement options as well as rate these options more positively. With regards to our 
hypotheses, we found positive weak interaction effects between explicit affiliation motive and 
choices and ratings of achievement options. This indicated that the predictive effect of explicit 
affiliation motive on choices and ratings of achievement options were stronger in the deliberative 
as compared to the intuitive condition. There were no other interaction effect.  
Standardized regression coefficients for regressions of choices and ratings of achievement, 
affiliation, and power options on implicit and explicit Power motives, condition (deliberative vs. 
intuitive), and their interaction. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
a 
1 = intuitive mode, 2 = deliberative mode 
 
Regressions of choices and ratings of all three motive options with power motives, decision 
modes and their interaction as predictors indicated that the predictor effect of explicit power 
motive was specific only to choices and ratings of power options. Implicit power motive, on the 
other hand, negatively predict choices of affiliation option and positively predict ratings of power 
options. In the absence of achievement and affiliation motives as predictors, we found both the 
positive relation of deliberation on the selection and evaluation of achievement options as well as 
the positive relation of intuition on the selection and evaluation of affiliation options. With 
regards to our hypothesis, we found that implicit power motives predict choices and ratings of 
 Implicit Power Motive Explicit Power Motive 
 
Choices of 
Achievement 
Options 
Ratings of 
Achievement 
Options 
Choices of 
Achievement 
Options 
Ratings of 
Achievement 
Options 
motive  .18 -.09 -.09 -.03 
condition
a
     .40**   .24
+
   .33*  .21 
interaction -.19
+
 .06 .09 .19 
R
2
     .19** .08  .14*  .10
+
 
 
Choices of 
Affiliation 
Options 
Ratings of 
Affiliation 
Options 
Choices of 
Affiliation 
Options 
Ratings of 
Affiliation 
Options 
motive  -.22
+
 -.16  -.06 .03 
condition
a
  -.30*  -.27*   -.24
+
 -.24
+
 
interaction .12 .16 -.01 .04 
R
2
   .12*  .10
+
  .07 .05 
 
Choices of 
Power Options 
Ratings of 
Power Options 
Choices of 
Power Options 
Ratings of 
Power Options 
motive .18    .29*      .34**       .54** 
condition
a
 .05 -.05 -.01 -.14 
interaction  .22
+
   .23
+
  .10  .07 
R
2
 .09   .16*   .13*     .31** 
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power options better in the deliberative as compared to the intuitive condition. This is the 
opposite of our hypothesis.   
Appendix C.2 Summary of Mismatch Regressions for Experiment 2 
Standardized regression coefficients for regressions of choices and ratings of achievement, affiliation, and power 
options on explicit Affiliation and Achievement motives, condition (deliberative vs. intuitive), and their interaction. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
a 1 = intuitive mode, 2 = deliberative mode 
 
Standardized regression coefficients for regressions of choices and ratings of achievement, affiliation, and power 
options on implicit and explicit Affiliation and Achievement motives, condition (deliberative vs. intuitive), and their 
interaction. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
 Explicit Achievement Motive Explicit Affiliation Motive 
 
Choices of 
Achievement 
Options 
Ratings of 
Achievement 
Options 
Choices of 
Achievement 
Options 
Ratings of 
Achievement 
Options 
motive  .06    .20
+
  -.19
+
  .06 
condition
a
 -.03 -.08 -.06 -.10 
interaction -.15 -.17  .08  .05 
R
2
  .03    .09
+
  .04  .02 
 
Choices of 
Affiliation Options 
Ratings of 
Affiliation Options 
Choices of 
Affiliation Options 
Ratings of 
Affiliation Options 
motive   -.19
+
 .18  .14 .16 
condition
a
 -.03 .09  .01 .08 
interaction   .20
+
 .15 -.12   .20
+
 
R
2
  .08 .05  .03 .07 
 
Choices of Power 
Options 
Ratings of Power 
Options 
Choices of Power 
Options 
Ratings of Power 
Options 
motive     .22*       .31** .10       .36** 
condition
a
  .10 -.09 .08 -.10 
interaction -.09  .08 .08 -.01 
R
2
  .06   .12* .02      .15** 
 Implicit Power Motive Explicit Power Motive 
 
Choices of 
Achievement 
Options 
Ratings of 
Achievement 
Options 
Choices of 
Achievement 
Options 
Ratings of 
Achievement 
Options 
motive   .06    .03 -.12   .01 
condition
a
 -.03 -.10 -.04 -.11 
interaction -.06     .25*   -20
+
   -.27* 
R
2
  .01  .08  .05   .08+ 
 
Choices of 
Affiliation Options 
Ratings of 
Affiliation Options 
Choices of 
Affiliation Options 
Ratings of 
Affiliation Options 
motive .10 .10 -.05 .10 
condition
a
 .01 .08 -.01 .07 
interaction .08   .24*    .21
+
  .23
+
 
R
2
 .02  .08
+
  .05 .06 
 
Choices of Power 
Options 
Ratings of Power 
Options 
Choices of Power 
Options 
Ratings of Power 
Options 
motive   -.27* .09     .29*       .51** 
         condition
a
  .02 .13   .08 -.12 
interaction -.02 .15 -.02  .04 
R
2
  .08 .06   .09
+
      .27** 
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a 1 = intuitive mode, 2 = deliberative mode 
 
 
Appendix C.3 Summary of Mismatch Regressions for Experiment 3 
Standardized regression coefficients for regressions of choices and ratings of achievement, 
affiliation, and power options on implicit and explicit Achievement motives, condition 
(deliberative vs. intuitive), and their interaction. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
a 
1 = intuitive mode, 2 = deliberative mode 
 
Regressions of choices and ratings of all three motive options with achievement motives, decision modes 
and their interaction as predictors indicated that the predictor effect of implicit achievement motive was 
specific only to ratings of achievement options. Explicit achievement motive, on the other hand, did not 
only predicted ratings of achievement option, but also predicted choices of affiliation options and ratings 
of power options. In experiment 1, implicit achievement motive did not predict any of the dependent 
variable. In this experiment, we did not find significant effect of decision mode on any of the dependent 
variables. With regards to our hypothesis, we found very significant interaction between explicit 
achievement motives and choices of affiliation options. The stronger the achievement motive, the less 
likely it is that affiliation option was selected and this effect is accentuated in the deliberative mode. This 
is in-line with our hypothesis. We also found a weak negative interaction between motives and decision 
mode. The positive effect of explicit achievement motive on selecting achievement option is stronger in 
the intuitive as compared to the deliberative mode. This is in opposition to our hypothesis. What would be 
consistent with this finding is the idea that having stronger motives in general increases the likelihood of 
selecting and liking an option. What determines which option was selected is then the decision mode with 
deliberation accentuating the positive attribute of achievement motive and intuition accentuating the 
positive attribute of affiliation option.   
 Implicit Achievement Motive Explicit Achievement Motive 
 
Choices of 
Achievement 
Options 
Ratings of 
Achievement 
Options 
Choices of 
Achievement 
Options 
Ratings of 
Achievement 
Options 
motive  .15  .37**   .16     .32* 
condition
a
           -.02           -.04  -.00           -.00 
interaction  .04  .30**            -.24
+
           -.08 
R
2
  .03          .20**   .05    .09
+
 
 
Choices of 
Affiliation 
Options 
Ratings of 
Affiliation 
Options 
Choices of 
Affiliation 
Options 
Ratings of 
Affiliation 
Options 
motive -.13   .02 -.30* -.02 
condition
a
  .08 -.04 .09 -.04 
interaction  .03   .13    .36**  .14 
R
2
  .02   .12 .13*  .02 
 
Choices of 
Power Options 
Ratings of 
Power Options 
Choices of 
Power Options 
Ratings of 
Power Options 
motive -.03  .14    .23
+
       .35** 
condition
a
 -.10 -.07 -.13 -.09 
interaction -.10  .09  .21 -.08 
R
2
   .02  .03  .07    .11* 
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Standardized regression coefficients for regressions of choices and ratings of achievement, affiliation, and power 
options on implicit and explicit Affiliation motives, condition (deliberative vs. intuitive), and their interaction. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
a 1 = intuitive mode, 2 = deliberative mode 
 
Standardized regression coefficients for regressions of choices and ratings of achievement, affiliation, and power 
options on implicit and explicit Power motives, condition (deliberative vs. intuitive), and their interaction. 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
a 1 = intuitive mode, 2 = deliberative mode 
 Implicit Affiliation Motive Explicit Affiliation Motive 
 
Choices of 
Achievement 
Options 
Ratings of 
Achievement 
Options 
Choices of 
Achievement 
Options 
Ratings of 
Achievement 
Options 
motive .10     .39** -.28*  .17 
condition
a
 .02 .03 .04  .02 
interaction .02  .21
+
 .04 -.03 
R
2
 .01    .19** .09  .03 
 
Choices of 
Affiliation 
Options 
Ratings of 
Affiliation 
Options 
Choices of 
Affiliation 
Options 
Ratings of 
Affiliation 
Options 
motive -.02  .04      .30**       .52** 
condition
a
  .05 -.04  .03  -.07 
interaction -.02  .04 -.09  -.05 
R
2
  .00  .01  .09   .27 
 
Choices of Power 
Options 
Ratings of Power 
Options 
Choices of Power 
Options 
Ratings of Power 
Options 
motive -.11  .16 -.06   .28 
condition
a
 -.10 -.05 -.10 -.06 
interaction  .00  .11  .07 -.07 
R
2
  .02  .04  .02  .08 
 Implicit Power Motive Explicit Power Motive 
 
Choices of 
Achievement 
Options 
Ratings of 
Achievement 
Options 
Choices of 
Achievement 
Options 
Ratings of 
Achievement 
Options 
motive -.09   .28* -.11   .19 
condition
a
  .01 .05  .02   .03 
interaction -.09 .14 -.03 -.06 
R
2
  .02   .11*  .01  .04 
 
Choices of 
Affiliation 
Options 
Ratings of 
Affiliation 
Options 
Choices of 
Affiliation 
Options 
Ratings of 
Affiliation 
Options 
motive .07   .21
+
 -.05  .18 
condition
a
 .05 -.03  .05 -.05 
interaction .02  .12  .04  .03 
R
2
 .01  .06  .01  .03 
 
Choices of Power 
Options 
Ratings of Power 
Options 
Choices of Power 
Options 
Ratings of Power 
Options 
motive   .02   .22
+
    .23
+
       .35** 
condition
a
 -.10 -.04 -.11  -.06 
interaction   .10  .12 -.01   .01 
R
2
   .02  .07  .06    .13* 
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Appendix C.4 Summary of Mismatch Regressions for Experiment 4 
Standardized regression coefficients for regressions with implicit (PSE) and explicit motives (UMS) entered 
simultaneously to predict choices and ratings of the corresponding choice options (N = 67). 
 Choices of 
Achievement 
Options 
Ratings of 
Achievement 
Options 
Choices of 
Affiliation 
Options 
Ratings of 
Affiliation 
Options 
Choices of 
Power 
Options 
Ratings of 
Power 
Options 
Achievement        
PSE-  Achievement .14 .03 .09 .09 .03 .11 
UMS-Achievement .18    .38** .13  .31*   .22+     .40** 
R
2
 .06   .15** .03  .11* .05     .18** 
Affiliation       
PSE-  Affiliation -.03 -.08 .07 -.01 -.14 -.06 
UMS-Affiliation .13      .33**    .52**       .68**     .31*      .47** 
R
2
 .02   .11*   .29**       .46**     .10*      .21** 
Power       
PSE-  Power -.02 -.07 -.05 -.12 -.04 -.08 
UMS-Power -.10  .01  .08  .06    .24
+
       .45** 
R
2
  .01  .01  .01  .02   .06       .23** 
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
 
Appendix D: Alternative Moderator Variable 
Standardized regression coefficients for regressions of motive-related choices and ratings of choice options on the 
corresponding implicit and explicit motives, preference for intuition and deliberation (PID), and their interaction.  
+ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
a PID = preference for deliberation – preference for intuition   
 
 Implicit Motive Explicit Motive 
 Choices Ratings Choices Ratings 
Achievement– 
Hope for Success 
Achievement 
Option 
Achievement 
Option 
Achievement 
Option 
Achievement 
Option 
motive    .20
+
 .07 -.05    .23
+
 
PID
a
      .36**  .24
+
      .33**  .20 
motive x PID -.02 .l6    .24*    .24* 
R
2
  .16 .09      .18**    .17* 
Affiliation– 
Hope for Affiliation 
Affiliation 
Option 
Affiliation 
Option 
Affiliation 
Option 
Affiliation 
Option 
motive -.05 -.06      .32**      .42** 
         PID
a
  -.26
+
 -.21 -.15 -.12 
motive x PID -.03  .03 -.19 -.15 
R
2
  .07  .06      .21**      .26** 
Power– 
Hope for Control 
Power 
Option 
Power 
Option 
Power 
Option 
Power 
Option 
motive  .19    .32*     .30*       .51** 
         PID
a
 -.01  .02 -.06 -.05 
motive x PID -.06 -.02 -.10 -.14 
R
2
  .04   .10
+
    .11
+
      .30** 
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Appendix E: Decision Task Instructions for Experiment 2 
Intuitive Condition 
In dieser Untersuchung interessiert uns besonders, welchen Einfluss spontanes Entscheiden - also eine 
intuitive, gefühlsbasierte Herangehensweise - auf Entscheidungsprozesse hat. 
Aktuelle Forschungen zeigen, dass Intuition hilfreich beim Treffen von Entscheidungen sein kann. Im 
Gegensatz dazu führt ein Ignorieren intuitiver Tendenzen eher dazu, dass Entscheidungen später bereut 
oder als unpassend empfunden werden. 
In diesem Versuch werden wir Ihnen verschiedene Entscheidungssituationen  mit drei 
Antwortmöglichkeiten vorgeben. Versuchen Sie, sich jede der möglichen Situationen bildlich und lebhaft 
vorzustellen. Malen Sie sich für jede der drei möglichen Optionen aus, wie es wäre, wenn Sie die 
Situation selbst erleben würden. Achten Sie besonders darauf, welche Gefühle in der jeweiligen Situation 
bei Ihnen entstehen würden.  
Im Anschluss bewerten Sie bitte alle Situationen und entscheiden Sie sich im letzten Schritt für eine der 
Optionen.  Bitte berücksichtigen Sie dabei keine anderen Faktoren sondern lediglich, wie Sie sich in der 
Situation fühlen würden.  
Stellen Sie sich die jeweiligen Situationen vor und entscheiden Sie, ob sie für Sie angenehm wäre oder 
nicht. Bitte vertrauen Sie immer Ihrem ersten Eindruck (Gefühl) und antworten Sie, ohne tiefgründig über 
die Frage nachzudenken. Seien Sie Sie selbst so gut es geht. 
 Deliberative Condition 
In dieser Untersuchung interessiert uns besonders, welchen Einfluss genaues Nachdenken - also eine 
kühle, rationale Herangehensweise - auf Entscheidungsprozesse hat. 
Aktuelle Forschungen zeigen, dass genaues Überlegen hilfreich beim Treffen von Entscheidungen sein 
kann. Im Gegensatz dazu führt ein Mangel an Nachdenken eher dazu, dass Entscheidungen später bereut 
werden oder als unpassend empfunden werden. 
In diesem Versuch werden wir Ihnen verschiedene Entscheidungssituationen mit drei 
Antwortmöglichkeiten vorgeben. Denken Sie genau darüber nach, ob es sich um eine gute oder eine 
schlechte Option handelt. Im Anschluss bewerten Sie bitte alle Situationen und entscheiden Sie sich im 
letzten Schritt für eine der Optionen.  
Denken Sie bitte sorgfältig darüber nach, was andere von Ihnen denken würden, wenn Sie die jeweilige 
Option wählen, zum Beispiel Ihre Freunde, Ihre Familie, Ihre Bekannten oder Menschen, die Sie noch 
nicht kennen. Überlegen sie, inwieweit die Entscheidung Sie in Zukunft beeinflussen würde und welche 
Konsequenzen sich daraus ergeben.  
Nehmen Sie sich Zeit und denken sie objektiv darüber nach, ob die Entscheidungsmöglichkeiten gut oder 
schlecht sind, ob Sie die jeweilige Option wählen sollten oder nicht. 
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Appendix F: Experiment 3  
Appendix F.1 Decision Task Instructions for Experiment 3 
Intuitive Condition 
In dieser Untersuchung interessiert uns besonders, welchen Einfluss spontanes Entscheiden - also eine 
intuitive, gefühlsbasierte Herangehensweise - auf Entscheidungsprozesse hat. 
Aktuelle Forschungen zeigen, dass Intuition hilfreich beim Treffen von Entscheidungen sein kann. Im 
Gegensatz dazu führt ein Ignorieren intuitiver Tendenzen eher dazu, dass Entscheidungen später bereut 
oder als unpassend empfunden werden. 
In diesem Versuch werden wir Dir verschiedene Entscheidungssituationen mit drei Antwortmöglichkeiten 
vorgeben. Versuche, Dir jede der möglichen Situationen bildlich und lebhaft vorzustellen. Male Dir für 
jede der drei möglichen Optionen aus, wie es wäre, wenn Du die Situation SELBST ERLEBEN würdest. 
Achte besonders darauf, welche GEFÜHLE in der jeweiligen Situation bei Dir entstehen würden.  
Im Anschluss bewerte bitte alle Situationen und entscheide Dich im letzten Schritt für eine der Optionen. 
Bitte berücksichtige dabei keine anderen Faktoren sondern lediglich, wie Du Dich in der Situation fühlen 
würdest. 
Stelle Dir die jeweiligen Situationen vor und entscheide, ob sie für Dich angenehm wäre oder nicht. Bitte 
vertraue immer deinem ersten Eindruck (Gefühl) und antworte, ohne tiefgründig über die Frage 
nachzudenken. Sei Du selbst. 
Deliberative Condition 
In dieser Untersuchung interessiert uns besonders, welchen Einfluss genaues Nachdenken - also eine 
kühle, rationale Herangehensweise - auf Entscheidungsprozesse hat. 
Aktuelle Forschungen zeigen, dass genaues Überlegen hilfreich beim Treffen von Entscheidungen sein 
kann. Im Gegensatz dazu führt ein Mangel an Nachdenken eher dazu, dass Entscheidungen später bereut 
werden oder als unpassend empfunden werden. 
In diesem Versuch werden wir Dir verschiedene Entscheidungssituationen mit drei Antwortmöglichkeiten 
vorgeben. Denke genau darüber nach, ob es sich um eine gute oder eine schlechte Option handelt. Im 
Anschluss bewerte bitte alle Situationen und entscheide Dich im letzten Schritt für eine der Optionen. 
Denke bitte sorgfältig darüber nach, WAS ANDERE VON DIR DENKEN WÜRDEN, wenn Du die 
jeweilige Option wählst, zum Beispiel deine Freunde, deine Familie, deine Bekannten oder fremde 
Menschen. Überlege dir, inwieweit die Entscheidung Dich in Zukunft beeinflussen würde und WELCHE 
KONSEQUENZEN SICH DARAUS ERGEBEN. 
Nimm Dir Zeit und denke objektiv darüber nach, ob die Entscheidungsmöglichkeiten gut oder schlecht 
sind, ob Du die jeweilige Option wählen solltest oder nicht. 
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Appendix F.2 Implicit Association Test Material for Experiment 3 
 
Labels:  
Attribute 1 = "MAG ICH" 
Attribute 2 = "MAG ICH NICHT" 
Stimuli:   
Attribute 1    = NETT, FREUNDLICH, GROSSARTIG 
Attribute 2    = FEINDSELIG, LÄSTIG, BÖSE 
Personalized Attribute  = EMOTIONAL, RUHIG, EHRGEIZIG,  
   SELBSTBEWUSST,  SCHÜCHTERN, SPARSAM 
 
Labels:  
Target1 = "Überlegenheit" 
Target2 = "gute Beziehung" 
 
Stimuli: 
Target 1 =  
       
   
 
Target 2 =  
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Appendix G: Experiment 4 
Appendix G.1 Implicit Association Test Material for Experiment 4 
Labels:  
Attribute 1 = "Ich will" 
Attribute 2 = "Ich will nicht" 
Stimuli:   
Attribute 1  = Glück, Liebe, Freude, Zufriedenheit,  
         Stolz,  Spass, Hoffnung, Respekt 
Attribute 2    = Trauer, Enttäuschung, Ärger, Langeweile 
    Verzweiflung, Frust, Stress, Bedauern 
Labels:  
Target1 = "Leistung und Kraft" 
Target2 = "Beziehung und Sympathie" 
 
Stimuli: 
Target 1 =  
      
                
Target 2 =  
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Appendix G.2 Picture Story Exercise (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark & Lowell, 
1953; Winter, 1994; Schultheiss & Pang, 2007) 
Instructions  
In der Bildgeschichten-Übung wird es deine Aufgabe sein, zu insgesamt sechs Bildern je eine 
vollständige Geschichte zu schreiben. Eine fantasievolle Geschichte mit einem Anfang, einem 
Hauptteil und einem Schluss. Versuche zu schildern, wer die Menschen auf dem jeweiligen Bild 
sind, was diese fühlen, denken und welche Wünsche sie haben. Versuche zu erzählen, wie es zu 
der Situation kam, die auf dem Bild dargestellt ist, und wie die Geschichte zu Ende geht. Bitte 
schreibe deine Geschichte in das leere Fenster, das du auf dem Bildschirm siehst. Unter dem 
Fenster stehen zudem einige hilfreiche Fragen. Diese solltest du nur als Hilfestellung für das 
Verfassen deiner Geschichte betrachten. Du musst diese Fragen NICHT speziell beantworten. 
Falls du schon einmal Geschichten zu diesen Bildern geschrieben haben solltest, kannst du 
entweder die gleichen Geschichten noch einmal schreiben oder dir neue Geschichten dazu 
ausdenken. 
 
Jedes Bild wird dir 10 Sekunden lang gezeigt. Nachdem es verschwunden ist, schreibe bitte 
einfach die Geschichte, die dir dazu in den Sinn kommt. Grammatik, Rechtschreibung oder 
Zeichensetzung spielen hierbei keine Rolle. Du wirst für jede Geschichte etwa vier Minuten Zeit 
haben; der Computer wird dich wissen lassen, wenn nur noch 20 Sekunden verbleiben. Falls du 
weniger als vier Minuten brauchst, kann der Computer schon nach drei Minuten mit dem 
nächsten Bild weitermachen. 
 
Accompanying Questions 
Was passiert gerade? Wer sind die Personen? Was passierte vorher? Worüber denken die 
Personen nach, was fühlen sie? Was wollen sie? Was wird als nächstes passieren? Wie geht die 
Geschichte aus? 
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PSE Picture 1. Bicycle Race 
 
 
 
 
PSE Picture 2. A Boxer 
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PSE Picture 3. Couple by the River
 
PSE Picture 4. Ship Captain 
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PSE Picture 5. Women in Laboratory 
 
 
PSE Picture 6. Nightclub Scene 
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PSE Picture 7. Friends in a café 
 
 
 PSE Picture 8. Trapeze Artist 
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Appendix H: Correlations between Implicit and Explicit 
Motives on Choices and Ratings of Motive Options across 
Intuitive and Deliberative Conditions in Four Studies 
EXP. 
Decision 
Mode 
DV 
Implicit/ 
Explicit 
Motives Options Correlations 
EXP. 1 INTUITIVE Choice Implicit 
Ach 
Ach  .01 
Aff  .06 
Pow -.14 
Aff 
Ach  .09 
Aff -.03 
Pow  .07 
Pow 
Ach -.02 
Aff  .04 
Pow -.01 
Explicit 
Ach 
Ach -.06 
Aff -.15 
Pow  .24 
Aff 
Ach     -.64** 
Aff      .46** 
Pow  .15 
Pow 
Ach -.32
+
 
Aff  .16 
Pow  .21 
Rating Implicit 
Ach 
Ach -.09 
Aff   .04 
Pow -.03 
Aff 
Ach -.05 
Aff   .02 
Pow -.08 
Pow 
Ach -.20 
Aff -.10 
Pow   .05 
Explicit 
Ach 
Ach   .24 
Aff   .25 
Pow       .45** 
Aff 
Ach -.02 
Aff      .54** 
Pow      .47** 
Pow 
Ach -.24 
Aff   .26 
Pow       .57** 
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EXP. Decision Mode DV Implicit/ Explicit Motives Options Correlations 
EXP 1 DELIBERATIVE Choice Implicit 
Ach 
Ach  .28 
Aff -.18 
Pow  .03 
Aff 
Ach  .12 
Aff -.09 
Pow  .08 
Pow 
Ach .22 
Aff  -.33
+
 
Pow   .35* 
Explicit 
Ach 
Ach  .06 
Aff -.13 
Pow     .41* 
Aff 
Ach -.22 
Aff    .32
+
 
Pow -.04 
Pow 
Ach   .15 
Aff -.29 
Pow    .41* 
Rating Implicit 
Ach 
Ach   .17 
Aff -.27 
Pow   .23 
Aff 
Ach   .01 
Aff -.13 
Pow   .29 
Pow 
Ach   .00 
Aff -.17 
Pow      .47** 
Explicit 
Ach 
Ach  .22 
Aff -.05 
Pow  .28 
Aff 
Ach -.02 
Aff    .41* 
Pow  .24 
Pow 
Ach  .15 
Aff -.26 
Pow      .51** 
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EXP. 
Decision 
Mode  
DV 
Implicit/ 
Explicit 
Motives Options Correlations 
EXP. 2 INTUITIVE Choice Implicit 
Ach 
Ach - 
Aff - 
Pow - 
Aff 
Ach - 
Aff - 
Pow - 
Pow 
Ach  .10 
Aff  .03 
Pow -.15 
Explicit 
Ach 
Ach  .19 
Aff     -.43** 
Pow    .27
+
 
Aff 
Ach -.24 
Aff  .14 
Pow  .03 
Pow 
Ach  .08 
Aff   -.33* 
Pow   .26
+
 
Rating Implicit 
Ach 
Ach - 
Aff - 
Pow - 
Aff 
Ach - 
Aff - 
Pow - 
Pow 
Ach -.22 
Aff -.14 
Pow -.06 
Explicit 
Ach 
Ach       .41** 
Aff  .02 
Pow  .23 
Aff 
Ach  .01 
Aff -.03 
Pow    .35* 
Pow 
Ach  .31 
Aff -.14 
Pow       .48** 
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EXP. Decision Mode  DV Implicit/ Explicit Motives Options Correlations 
EXP. 2 DELIBERATIVE Choice Implicit 
Ach 
Ach - 
Aff - 
Pow - 
Aff 
Ach - 
Aff - 
Pow - 
Pow 
Ach -.01 
Aff  .24 
Pow -.30
+
 
Explicit 
Ach 
Ach -.09 
Aff  .09 
Pow  .08 
Aff 
Ach -.14 
Aff  .18 
Pow  .09 
Pow 
Ach   -.33* 
Aff  .21 
Pow  .19 
Rating Implicit 
Ach 
Ach - 
Aff - 
Pow - 
Aff 
Ach - 
Aff - 
Pow - 
Pow 
Ach  .28 
Aff    .35* 
Pow  .26 
Explicit 
Ach 
Ach  .03 
Aff   .30
+
 
Pow    .39* 
Aff 
Ach  .11 
Aff    .35* 
Pow    .37* 
Pow 
Ach -.22 
Aff    .30
+
 
Pow      .53** 
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EXP. 
Decision 
Mode  
DV 
Implicit/ 
Explicit 
Motives Options Correlations 
EXP. 3 INTUITIVE Choice Implicit 
Ach 
Ach   .12 
Aff  -.15 
Pow   .08 
Aff 
Ach   .08 
Aff   .00 
Pow  -.13 
Pow 
Ach   .00 
Aff   .05 
Pow -.08 
Explicit 
Ach 
Ach   .30
+
 
Aff     -.45** 
Pow    .37* 
Aff 
Ach  -.30
+
 
Aff    .32* 
Pow -.14 
Pow 
Ach -.08 
Aff -.08 
Pow    .27
+
 
Rating Implicit 
Ach 
Ach  .07 
Aff -.11 
Pow  .04 
Aff 
Ach  .19 
Aff  .00 
Pow  .05 
Pow 
Ach  .13 
Aff  .07 
Pow  .09 
Explicit 
Ach 
Ach    .31
+
 
Aff -.11 
Pow    .31
+
 
Aff 
Ach  .18 
Aff      .47** 
Pow   .32
+
 
Pow 
Ach  .26 
Aff  .15 
Pow  .35 
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EXP. Decision Mode  DV Implicit/ Explicit Motives Options Correlations 
EXP. 3 DELIBERATIVE Choice Implicit 
Ach 
Ach   .19 
Aff -.10 
Pow -.12 
Aff 
Ach   .12 
Aff -.04 
Pow -.10 
Pow 
Ach -.19 
Aff   .11 
Pow   .11 
Explicit 
Ach 
Ach  -.10 
Aff   .09 
Pow   .02 
Aff 
Ach -.26 
Aff  .26 
Pow  .01 
Pow 
Ach -.13 
Aff -.01 
Pow  .20 
Rating Implicit 
Ach 
Ach      .62** 
Aff .16 
Pow .22 
Aff 
Ach     .57** 
Aff .09 
Pow .27 
Pow 
Ach     .44** 
Aff  .38* 
Pow  .36* 
Explicit 
Ach 
Ach  .28
+
 
Aff .15 
Pow .33 
Aff 
Ach .15 
Aff    .57** 
Pow .23 
Pow 
Ach .12 
Aff .21 
Pow   .35* 
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EXP. 
Decision 
Mode  
DV 
Implicit/ 
Explicit 
Motives Options Correlations 
EXP. 4 INTUITIVE Choice Implicit 
Ach 
Ach  .16 
Aff  .10 
Pow  .06 
Aff 
Ach  .00 
Aff  .18 
Pow  .07 
Pow 
Ach  .01 
Aff -.07 
Pow -.10 
Explicit 
Ach 
Ach  .20 
Aff  .14 
Pow    .23
+
 
Aff 
Ach  .13 
Aff      .53** 
Pow    .28* 
Pow 
Ach -.09 
Aff  .09 
Pow    .25* 
Rating Implicit 
Ach 
Ach  .07 
Aff  .12 
Pow  .15 
Aff 
Ach -.01 
Aff  .13 
Pow  .03 
Pow 
Ach -.08 
Aff -.14 
Pow -.20 
Explicit 
Ach 
Ach      .39** 
Aff     .32** 
Pow     .42** 
Aff 
Ach     .31** 
Aff     .68** 
Pow     .45** 
Pow 
Ach .03 
Aff .09 
Pow     .47** 
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